

HISTORY
OF THE
WAR IN HUNGARY

IN 1848 AND 1849.

BY
OTTO WENKSTERN.

Præcipuum munus annalium reor ne virtutes sileantur,
utque pravis dictis factisque ex posteritate et infamiâ
metus sit.—TACITUS.

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HISTORY OF THE WAR IN HUNGARY

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INTRODUCTION.

OF the wars which sprang from the revolutionary impulse of the year 1848, none was so fatal in its fury, so important in its results, and so interesting, even to the least political, among the nations of Europe, as the struggle of the Hungarians for independence. The contests of the belligerent Germans and Danes in Holstein and Shleswig were longer, but their decision was withheld rather by the artificial means of armistices and negotiations than by the tenacity of purpose of the combatants. The Shleswig war commenced and terminated in the manœuvres of diplomacy, which are naturally slow, temporizing, and of distant and doubtful result. The war in Hungary, which began later than the Danish war,

and which ended sooner, had no pause for rest, consideration, or mercy: it swept from event to event to the goal to which its component elements, rather than the wishes of the antagonistic parties, were tending. And while in Shleswig, the principal means of attack and defence consisted in foreign troops, whose sympathies were not with the cause they championed, and while even the native forces were commanded by foreign generals, hired for the purpose, the Hungarian war was conducted by the natives of the country, with the assistance only of a small number of sympathizers and exiles, while its fatal end was hastened by the active interference of a third power, and consummated by the despondency of some and the treachery of others of the native leaders.

The Hungarian war, though most commented on, was least understood; for so difficult has the study of the political questions which affect the east of Europe always been to those accustomed to deal with the more attractive, because more conspicuous, affairs of the west, that this war, of unappreciated motives, uncertain beginnings, and of a mysterious end, has uniformly been treated by those only whose prejudices or interests disqualified them for the task. The

series of events which commenced with the invasion of Hungary by the Ban Jellachich, and which ended with General Görgey's surrender at Vilagos, has come to be a popular myth rather than an important, interesting, and fateful section of the history of this century. Such a state of things must needs be detrimental to a just appreciation of the political condition of Europe, now and hereafter. I have, consequently, endeavoured in these pages, disinterestedly and impartially, to trace the causes and record the events of the Croatian Invasion, of the War of Independence, and of the Russian Intervention in the affairs of Austria and Hungary.

CHAPTER I.

A Retrospect.—Constitution of Austria.—Annexation of Hungary.—Hungary under the Habsburgs.—Oppression of the Crown lands.—Hungary since 1815.—The Diets of 1823 and 1833.—Crimes and follies of Magyarism.—Louis Kossuth's *debut*.—His career.—His Parliamentary Reports.—Mr. Kossuth persecuted by the Government.—His Trial and Imprisonment.—His Election into the Lower House.

FOR a full understanding of the causes which, for a time, armed one part of the Austrian empire against the other, it must be borne in mind, that the dominions of Austria are not, like France and England, peopled by men whose laws, customs, manners, and language are the same either originally or by the action of a political union, and an amalgamation or absorption of various races. The provinces which own the hereditary sovereignty of the imperial descendants of the Counts of Habsburg, were acquired partly by conquest, and partly by treaties between the Austrian princes and the sovereigns of other countries. By these and by other means, foreign to my object, the Habsburgs, who formerly owned the crown, and sometimes disposed of the power of

the Roman and German Empire, attained the sovereignty, and annexed Bohemia, Moravia, Lombardy, together with many smaller territories and principalities, over which they ruled, without the power to assimilate the Sclavonic and Italian tribes which inhabited the annexed territories to the German population of Austria Proper.

Attempts were, indeed, made for that purpose, and some dependencies, such as Bohemia, Moravia, and Carinthia, were partly Germanized by settlers from the hereditary provinces; but this measure, instead of creating an identity of interests and an uniformity of laws and language among the subjects of the crown of Austria, tended rather to divide them, and to split every kingdom, principality, or province, into two distinct factions, whose antagonism, though it retained them in subjection, effectually prevented the absorption of the conquered races. Hence soon after the dissolution of the Roman and German Empire, the Emperors of Austria ruled as kings in Hungary, Bohemia, and Galicia; as Archdukes in Austria Proper; as Dukes in Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, and Silesia; as Princes in Transylvania; as Markgraves in Moravia; and as Counts in Habsburg

and in the Tyrol ; while each of these countries had a distinct administration, and boasted of separate privileges and immunities, by which the sovereign's authority was more or less confined, according to the terms of the original compact, in virtue of which each was subject to the Habsburg family.

This diversity of dominion was productive of evils to the sovereign, as well as to his subjects ; and many princes in the last century and in this, sought, by open and covert means, to suspend the provincial charters, to abolish provincial privileges, and to concentrate the administration of all parts of the Austrian monarchy. But the tenacity of purpose of which those princes can justly boast was neutralized by an equal perseverance on the part of their subjects, who refused to exchange their laws for a state of absolute dependence on the irresponsible will of the sovereign. In this protracted struggle, baffled violence had recourse to intrigue, and baffled intrigue to violence, until disaffection to the crown, hatred of its German partisans, and a frantic desire for national independence, struck deep roots amidst the Slavonic, Magyar and Italian subjects of Austria. That this should be so is natural, but

it is an extraordinary fact, that each tribe sought to confirm its old privileges, and to obtain fresh immunities, by aiding and abetting the sovereign's plans against the provincial independence of its fellow-subjects. The Emperor's influence thrived on the discords, and his power became absolute by the secret jealousies of the various nations, each of which sought to derive some private advantage from the common ruin.

Hungary was at once the most conspicuous, the most powerful, and the most troublesome part of the Austrian empire. Joined to that empire in the year 1526, after their forces were defeated and their king slain at Mohats, where they had striven, more gallantly than discreetly, to repel the invasion of the Turks: the Hungarians acknowledged the sovereignty of Ferdinand of Austria, conditionally only, against the protests of many, and with the cordial adhesion of none, except the faction of Ferdinand's own sister, the Queen Dowager Maria. But so desperate was the condition of Hungary, as the weaker state, and wedged in between Germany and Turkey, that national independence could no longer be thought of, and no choice was left to the small remnant of that mighty barbarian nation which at one time overran and despoiled

all Europe, between subjection to the authority of Austria on the one hand, or to that of Turkey on the other, and according to the common saying, it was an open question which was the worse, the Turk or the Austrian. Either expedient was perilous : for Austria as well as Turkey had given ample proofs of its dislike of the liberties which the Hungarians had received at the hands of their native kings, or extorted from foreigners whom they from time to time elected to the throne. Ferdinand of Austria was the last of these foreigners. He took his oath to the constitution of Hungary, that is to say, he swore to respect and maintain the laws of that country such as he found them, and he was solemnly crowned on the 3rd November, 1527.

From that time to the commencement of the last war, the royal crown of Hungary has been part of the inheritance of the Austrian princes of the House of Habsburg, who reigned in Hungary, not by virtue of their sovereignty in other countries, but by the right and on the strength of the original compact of the year 1527. These princes, though they often neglected to perform that part of the compact by which it was stipulated that they should clear

Hungary from the Turks, protect its frontiers against their invasions, and restore to the Hungarians the provinces occupied by the Turks, or tributary to them, were at length compelled to wage a war of extermination against their pagan neighbours, whose ambition grew with success, and who, not satisfied with invading Hungary, sought also to conquer the German provinces of the Empire. About the end of the last century only did the united forces of the Austrians and Hungarians fully succeed in repulsing the armies which the sovereigns of Turkey every now and then despatched across their frontiers, nor could successive defeats and terrible reverses permanently awe the Turks or disgust them with their predatory expeditions, until their power was finally broken by the infant strength of the Russian Empire.

The three centuries which have passed since Hungary first acknowledged the supremacy of a German prince, were not only troubled by Turkish invasions, and wars with other foreign antagonists and rivals of the growing power of Austria, but they were filled with disputes between the princes and the people. It was the object of the sovereigns still further to connect the kingdom with the other countries over which

they ruled, to accustom the Hungarians to the manners, politics, and laws of Germany, and to suppress their sectarian leanings towards the Bohemian reformers, by the establishment of a rigorous and uncompromising Roman Catholicism.* To these ends were all the powers of government strained, and advantage was taken both of national weaknesses and national dangers, while the Hungarians in their turn foiled the artifices of a superior policy, and the slow but certain workings of administrative measures, by an occasional appeal to arms. Their insurrections would have been more successful, or less frequent, had they consented to reform their political constitution, and had they in that reform consulted the necessities of a more enlightened age. But throughout this protracted struggle, it was their misfortune and their

* Martinitz, Minister under Leopold II. of Austria, is the most lucid exponent of the traditional principles of Austrian government. He says:—"The duty of the magnates and nobles ought to be subjection; that of the people, servitude. It is a high crime and misdemeanor to inquire into the legality or illegality of the measures it pleaseth the king to take in the country which hath been reduced by the just force of arms. Curious and impertinent inquiries into the alleged limits of the royal power are hateful in the eyes of kings. There is no resisting the Emperor's will," &c.

crime to defend privileges which had become abuses, and to claim that justice at the hands of their sovereign which they denied to those subject to their own power. For in the same manner in which the Germans, led by their princes, sought to establish themselves in Hungary, with all the prerogatives of a conquering and dominant race, did the Magyar population of that country exercise an arbitrary, and in many instances a cruel, domination over the conquered races of the Serbs, Slowacks, Wallacks, and Croats, and over the vagrant populations of the gipsies and Jews. Even the privileges and immunities granted by charter to the Suabian settlers, whom promises of land and money had induced to immigrate into parts of the country which had been depopulated by the cruelty of Magyar dominion, or the passage of Turkish armies—were the cause of discontent among the Magyars, who considered it a grievance that a part of the population, however small that part might be, should be subject to the laws of the land rather than to the will of the dominant race. Hence by cruelty, oppression, enmity, and persecution, the Magyars of Hungary contrived to break the spirit of the Serbs, Slowacks, and Wallacks,

to exasperate the Croats, and to impress the minds of the Suabian settlers with the conviction that their own and their children's hopes of peace, independence, and prosperity, were bound up with the maintenance and extension of the Austrian power.

Thus isolated by their own misdoing, and frequently in the hour of need deserted or attacked by the conquered races—which, though divided in origin and language, were yet united by common hates and fears—the Magyars of Hungary were ill prepared to resist the influence of Austrian perseverance and Catholic fanaticism. If they did withstand it to some extent, it was owing to events foreign to their control. The dangers of Turkish invasion, the religious wars in Germany, and at a later period, the precarious position of the Austrian emperors in their wars with Prussia and France, compelled them to suspend their operations against the independence of the kingdom, and to court the support of the bellicose Magyars by flattery, concessions, and promises of future privileges. It is but justice to the Hungarians to say, that on such occasions they have scarcely ever taken an unfair advantage of the dangers which threatened their

kings; that their treasures and their lives were freely sacrificed on behalf of Austria; and that no offers of independence and power could tempt them to abandon the cause of their sovereign. But when peace was restored, and imperial power re-established, the Austrian Princes resumed their schemes of home-conquest against the country which had propped up their falling cause, and Hungary, depopulated and drained by the necessities of war, divided against herself, and taking her stand on the untenable ground of stubborn, uncompromising conservatism, was compelled to gather her last remaining strength for a feeble defence against the attacks of a crafty, powerful, and unscrupulous antagonist.

Such was the state of things at the close of the last European war. Throughout that war, in the disastrous campaigns against the French Republic, and in the not less fatal conflict which the Austrian cabinet provoked with Napoleon, the Hungarians had cheerfully borne their part of the burdens of the time, and their regiments had done excellent service on many a battle-field. It is true that their devotion was the result rather of national and individual vanity than of love for the reigning house of Austria, or for the Emperor, Francis II., whose coarse

vulgarity and selfish, cruel disposition betrayed itself by a thousand acts of vexatious despotism. Hence, immediately after Napoleon's reverses in Russia, the estates of Hungary proceeded to besiege their sovereign with petitions, in which they claimed the reward of their loyalty and patriotism ; and the old struggle between king and people was renewed in all its silent fury. At the Diet of 1812 and 1813, the representatives of the nation remonstrated against the financial measures of the Austrian cabinet —against measures which had involved the other provinces of the empire in a common gulf of confusion and ruin, and whose *de facto* influence had already been extended to Hungary. Their remonstrances remained ineffectual, and almost unconsidered. Francis dissolved the Diet, and resolved to govern without the interference of the nobles, knights, and burgesses of Hungary. This resolution was adhered to, until the troubles of 1819 and 1820 intimidated the cabinet of Vienna to such a degree that the expedient of another Diet appeared acceptable, and even desirable. But the exasperation of public feeling in Hungary threw formidable obstacles in the way of that expedient. A Diet had been

thought of, not as a means of information concerning the wrongs of the nation, with a view to their redress, but merely to amuse the public mind with hopes of a better future. It was also thought desirable that part of the odium which rested on the government should fall on the representatives of the people, and that the discontents with which the time was rife should be foiled by want of concentration. Measures were taken to prepare and influence the elections, whose result, it was thought, depended mainly on the energy and ability of the king's lieutenants, who presided on such occasions. It was not, therefore, until the year 1823 that the government thought it safe to convoke the Diet, which, when assembled, proved less corruptible than its originators anticipated. Among its first acts was the impeachment of the king's lieutenants and commissioners, who were, however, saved by the interference of the crown.

Another result of this Diet was the establishment of the Magyar idiom as the official language in the administrative and judicial courts of the kingdom. A motion to that effect was made by Paul Nagy, the member for Oedenburg; it was assented to by the Diet, and con-

firmed by the king, who considered this concession as unimportant, and in return, desired that the Diet 'should forget the events of the last years.' The Diet consented, for few of its members were bold enough to court the odium and the danger of an uncompromising opposition. The official recognition of the Magyar language obtained a disproportionate and lasting importance by the indiscretion of the Hungarians, who attempted to introduce their language into provinces and districts where the Magyar population was outnumbered by other races. Their fanaticism, and the opposition of the conquered races, were spurred on and fomented by the Austrian agents and functionaries, for the division of the country was a guarantee of its weakness.

The French Revolution of 1830, the exile of the Bourbons, and the revolutions in Belgium and Poland, influenced the policy of the Austrian court, and its measures respecting Hungary. The Diet, at once convoked, was informed of the Emperor's resolution to resign the crown, but not the government of the kingdom, in favour of his son and heir, Ferdinand. Nothing in this proposal could provoke opposition, and Ferdinand, the fifth king of that

name, was allowed to take the customary oath to the constitution. His coronation took place at Presburg, with great pomp and solemnity, and with all that festivity and rejoicing which the great mass of nations delight in, and which has an irresistible attraction for the enthusiastic, susceptible, and credulous. The event justified the policy of the Austrian statesmen. Not only did the session pass without a demand for the redress of grievances; Hungary not only remained tranquil during the Polish insurrection, but the demand for fresh levies of recruits was readily sanctioned by the Diet, and an additional levy of 20,000 men decreed, against the necessities of the time requiring the augmentation of the Austrian army. Discretionary powers to this effect were vested in the government.

The next Diet met in 1833, and this time an attempt was made to introduce some order into the confusion of the Hungarian affairs. Nor could the most zealous partisans of the Vienna Cabinet deprecate such an attempt as premature or uncalled-for. It appears, from the testimony of most native writers of the period, that the errors and sufferings of all classes and races in that unfortunate king-

down, had come to be beyond toleration as well as beyond endurance. Since the peace of 1815, almost all the countries of Europe had increased in wealth, science, and arts: Hungary was poor: her peasantry were starving, her aristocracy ruined, or courting ruin by absenteeism. Usury and public and private immorality prevailed; superstition grew apace, for public instruction had been allowed to decline. Justice was venal; all places of trust and importance were either sold to the highest bidder, or given to men whose want of principle recommended them to those in power. The peasantry were overburdened with taxes and feudal imposts and labour. Manufactures there were none; the want of means of communication obstructed the import and export of produce. Trade was monopolized by the Jews and Greeks, and the country swarmed with vagrants, robbers, and gipsies.

Part of the reproach of such a state of things is doubtlessly chargeable on the Austrian government, which preferred home conquest to home colonization, and which hailed the abject condition of Hungary as a means of obtaining an uncontrolled and irresponsible sway over that country. But the burden of the blame

rests with the Hungarians themselves, who at all times chose rather to rise against their oppressors, than to withstand their bribes of favour, influence, or money. If, in its contest with the despotic tendencies of the Austrian crown, the Magyars fought single-handed, they suffered the penalty for separating their cause from that of the other inhabitants of their country, whom conciliatory manners, rather than a conciliatory policy, would have converted into their firmest friends and allies. The friendship or enmity of nations, as of men, is called forth less by great and sweeping measures, than by the petty kindnesses or oppressions of every-day life. The violence and brutality which the Magyars deprecated in the Austrians, marked their own conduct to the non-Magyar population of Hungary.

A partial step in the right direction was taken by the Diet of 1833, when, in spite of a powerful organized government opposition, it regulated, and in fact abolished, the feudal burdens which oppressed the peasantry. A bill was passed, limiting the power of inflicting corporal punishment upon the denizens of the glebe (*glebae addicti*), and enabling the peasants to possess freeholds, and to purchase immunity

from feudal burdens and *robot*, or forced labour on the lands of the lord of the manor. This Diet, too, became remarkable for the first popular demonstration against the corruption which had hitherto enabled the government to oppress the Hungarians, by means of their own vices. M. Baloz, the member for Bartsh, and a leader of the liberal opposition, was impeached by the king's commissioners. According to the customs of Hungary, his constituents were called upon to decide between him and his accusers. A member of the Diet, when accused of any crime, was bound to offer himself for re-election, and the result of that election decided his fate. In Baloz's case, great exertions were made to induce the freeholders of Bartsh to return the government candidate, and the promise of their votes was bought by a liberal distribution of five-florin notes, which they accepted. But on the day of the election, they marched up to the hustings with the purchase-money in their hands, and, fling past the king's commissioner, flung the bribe at his feet. Baloz was re-elected.

Nor is this demonstration of electoral independence the only remarkable feature of the Diet of 1833. Its debates contain the first

public records of a man who, from small beginnings, has risen to great power and dignity. Louis Kossuth's public career commenced in the course of that Diet, whose sittings he attended as solicitor and proxy for an absentee. For although various ill-advised attempts have been made by Hungarian and British writers to compare the constitution of Hungary with those usages and observances which in England have limited the violence of hostile factions, and compelled them, in spite of private passions, to labour for the public good, it will be found, on closer examination, that the two constitutions are as different in their mode of working as in their results.

In Hungary, the Upper House of the Legislature, or 'Board of Magnates,' consisted of the large landed proprietors and dignitaries of Church and State; it was provided that even the widows of magnates, and those whom business, pleasure, or ill health prevented from attending the sittings of the Board, should watch its proceedings by means of a deputy, who took the seat allotted to the absentee, but who was not permitted to vote. It appears that the duties of a magnate's deputy were confined to the watching and reporting the debates for the in-

formation of his employer. The functions of that charge were usually entrusted to young or briefless barristers and solicitors, who, besides the emoluments of such a situation, wished to obtain that information respecting the details and management of public affairs, which the great newspapers in England convey to all ranks and classes, but which, in Hungary, from the want of private or official parliamentary reports, was confined to the few whose privilege it was to watch the proceedings of the two Houses. Among the most serious evils of this system were the facilities it afforded to the magnates of slighting their legislative duties, and the amount of superficiality, ill-judged zeal, chicanery, and double dealing which it encouraged. Whatever good effects it had, were confined to the training of a few needy and talented youths to the management of public affairs.

Of these was Louis Kossuth, the son of a small freeholder and land-steward in the county of Zemplin, who, born in 1806, had completed his twenty-seventh year when his ancestral poverty and natural gifts attracted the attention of his father's employer, and procured for him the stipend of a parliamentary agent and re-

porter. Although considerable interest has been excited by later events respecting the early career of a man whom many consider as the prototype of the good and bad qualities of his nation, yet so blind were the loves and hatreds which clung to him, that little or no authentic information has transpired on the subject. The few facts which can be said to be established, show him a gloomy and eccentric boy, and a youth in whom habits of study and application were curiously blended with some less creditable pursuits. His enemies have accused him of excessive intemperance and sexual immorality, and of gambling and dishonesty in money matters. His friends protest that Louis Kossuth's youth passed amidst the purest and brightest aspirations; that he remained a stranger to the vices of the age; and that the dishonesty, intemperance, and immorality of the dominant Austrian faction could never seduce the ascetic severity of his morals, or the Catoic rectitude of his principles. Fiction reigns undisturbed where facts fail, nor is it possible to reclaim the life of the Hungarian dictator from the extravagant assertions of party romance, so long as those who are most likely to know the truth are most

interested in concealing it. There is reason to fear that some portions of Louis Kossuth's life, such as the alleged embezzlement of public monies, will always remain debateable ground for biographers and the writers of political memoirs ; for, rightly or wrongly, he was charged with the crime and prosecuted, and the documents relative to that prosecution have been destroyed.

It would appear that the corps of magnates' deputies and private reporters of parliamentary proceedings at the Presburg Diet of 1833 must have been deficient in style, as well as in a just appreciation of the leading points of the debates ; for Louis Kossuth had no sooner entered on the functions of his office, than the manner and the style of his reports attracted the attention of his friends, and by degrees that of members of the Diet, and others interested in its proceedings. His reports and commentaries on the most important debates, were in great requisition, and it was ultimately resolved to print and circulate them. The manner in which this resolution was carried out is characteristic of the time and of the people. The magnates and wealthy commoners of Hungary, who recklessly spent their incomes,

if not more, in pursuits often discreditable to themselves and obnoxious to others, were without an exception unable to afford the funds for the projected literary undertaking. A small lithographic press was purchased, but the sum had to be collected by a general subscription of the liberal opposition. Mr. Kossuth's reports, thus multiplied, were published under the title of a *Parliamentary Gazette*, and distributed among the original subscribers, and those country gentlemen who chose to purchase political intelligence at the price of a few shillings per annum. This undertaking, however limited in its extent, exercised a powerful influence on the political development of Hungary.

Up to that period, a general report of the proceedings of the Diet had been published by the government, but its style, like that of most official productions, was not calculated to engage the generality of readers. Its guarded language; its equivocations and frequent omissions of facts; its *edition* for an official purpose, made it an object of suspicion and disgust. These reports were, moreover, published with all the slowness which formerly characterized the operations of the continental press. The publication of official returns was carried on by fits

and starts, and the public were alternately disgusted by an over-abundance, and by a total want of, printed papers. Mr. Kossuth's reports, published daily after the close of public business, recorded and commented upon the last debates ; they came to hand in single numbers, and while the questions of which they treated were still pending, and consequently open to influence from without ; and they were confined to the pith and marrow of the matter before the House. His undertaking was eminently successful, and its influence became soon manifest to those agents of the government whose duty it was to watch and report on the state of public opinion in Hungary.

The worst fault of nearly all continental governments is their practice of increasing the popularity of their political antagonists by petty persecutions. Though as vindictive, they are less courageous than the politicians of former times, who never struck a second blow. In Austria the system of repression by small measures had been carried to an astonishing and a dangerous perfection, for it enlisted public sympathy on behalf of the victims. Louis Kossuth, the journalist, was a cause of annoyance to the Austrian government ; an injunc-

tion was issued to prevent the publication of his reports by means of lithography. The result of this injunction was, that those reports were copied by a staff of clerks, that their language became violent, and their price higher, and that their circulation increased. At the close of the Diet in 1836, Louis Kossuth, whom experience had taught the benefits of persecution, continued to provoke the government by his reports on the transactions of the county magistrates of Pesth. Up to that period, the king's lieutenants in the various counties had succeeded in preventing the publication of the local or county Diets; and by so doing, they prevented all joint action and co-operation of the various Hungarian districts. Injunction after injunction was issued from Vienna, and disregarded by Mr. Kossuth; who, assured of the protection of the magistrates of Pesth, and glorying in the attacks of an unpopular cabinet, sought still further to goad his opponents to measures of violence. Orders were issued for his arrest; but the chancellor of the kingdom refused to sign the warrant. He was removed, and his place given to the Count F. Palffy, a willing tool in the hands of the cabinet; and the cities of Buda and Pesth wit-

nessed the extraordinary spectacle of a company of grenadiers, with fixed bayonets, marching to arrest a single and defenceless man. The reason why so strong a force was sent to do the office of constable has never been explained. Even at the time it was a question with the witnesses of the scene whether the cabinet sought to awe the public mind by an imposing display of military force, or whether those in power over-estimated the amount of popularity which their persecution had gained for Mr. Kossuth. But whether from bravado or fear, the result proved that the Austrian government committed a terrible fault, if not a crime, in arresting the franklin of Zemplin, the salaried clerk of a country gentleman, and the publisher and editor of a small local newspaper, with all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of a martial expedition.

The news of the event spread like wildfire through Hungary. Petitions, remonstrances, and deputations were sent in from all parts; and while Kossuth awaited his trial in the 'New Prison' of Pesth, his name became the watchword of the opposition, and his liberation was considered as the rallying-point of the wildest hopes. Nor could this popularity.

be lessened by the arrest of other liberals, although these later victims were more conspicuous, some by birth, and some by a longer and more active public career. The Count Raday, Madaraz, Ujhazy, B. Wesseleneyi, and Balogh shared the journalist's fate, and were arraigned with him before the same tribunal. The sentence against Wesseleneyi and Kossuth condemned them to three years' imprisonment, 'for having disobeyed the king's orders.' This sentence appears extremely mild, if compared with the long terms of imprisonment which Austrian judges are in the habit of pronouncing against those whom their government fears or hates. But so great are the horrors of an Austrian fortress, that even the confinement of a few months sufficed to affect the health of body and mind of many unfortunate prisoners. When, after two years' confinement, the menacing attitude of the Hungarian counties induced the cabinet of Vienna to conciliate the public by an amnesty, Mr. Kossuth left his cell in the fortress of Buda, broken in health, and exasperated to the last degree. 'My fate rests in God's hands,' said he, at a later period; 'it is His to consign me to suffering, to exile, or to the block; but even

His power shall never again make me subject to the Habsburg dynasty !'

It is strangely characteristic of the Austrian government, that after raising Mr. Kossuth from his obscurity to the eminence of a political antagonist, and after giving him bodily proofs of their cruelty and vindictiveness, they should at the eleventh hour have sought to gain him over to their party. Their measures to that effect were as petty and awkward as their former persecutions. If the liberated convict had been left to starve or live on the bounty of his friends, his poverty would have ruined his independence, and crippled his energy. If he had been appointed to an important and lucrative office, his patriotism would have been suspected, and his condition envied by those who could not hope for an equal amount of good fortune. The cabinet of Vienna, impelled by a strange fatality, chose a middle course between the two expedients. They sought to conciliate their enemy by granting a licence for a newspaper, the *Pesti Hirlap*, and they consented to Kossuth undertaking its management. Nothing could be more advantageous for a man of an almost feminine softness, vanity, indolence, and irascibility, than to be thus thrown on his own re-

sources, and compelled to come again before the public, with the reminiscences of a victim and the glory of a martyr. From that time forward, Louis Kossuth took his place among the leaders of the opposition. At the elections for the Diet of 1840 and 1845, the government succeeded in preventing his return as a member of the Lower House, or Board of Estates ; but his influence grew apace, and when the Diet of 1847 opened, the opposition had obtained a signal triumph in the elections, and Mr. Kossuth took his seat as member for the county of Pesth.

CHAPTER II.

Dismay of the Government.—Demands of the Opposition.—Diet of 1847.—Abolition of Servitude.—Introduction of the Magyar language.—The Revolution of 1848.—Ferdinand of Austria.—Proceedings of the Diet.—The Hungarian Deputation.—Formation of a Cabinet.—Riots at Pesth.—Count Louis Batthyanyi.—Riots at Presburg.—Mr. Kossuth's Position.—The Austrian Army.—Court Intrigues.—Joseph Jellachich.—His Intrigues.—Manifesto against Him.—The Servian Insurrection.—Kossuth's Speech on the State of the Nation.—Batthyanyi's Loyalty.—A last Appeal.—The Croatian Invasion.

THAT the power of government—that its threats of displeasure—that its promises of favour and patronage, and other bribes of a different and still grosser kind, co-operating with domestic prejudices and enmities, with the zeal of old foes and the rancour of old friends—should have failed, not to ruin, but merely to prevent the election into Parliament of one man, was an unprecedented fact in the history of the Austrian administration. This fact became still more significant and startling from that man's circumstances and past career. He derived his influence neither from birth nor

wealth. The name of Kossuth was not connected with the insurrections and victories of ancient times, and he who bore it, lacked the means to purchase the support of a faction. Raised to notoriety by a series of persecutions which were as imprudent as they were unjust, his popularity was proportionate to the unpopularity of the government. He represented, not his own interests or those of a class or an order, but the disaffection and opposition which were rife in all ranks and classes. His election by the most important of the counties, showed that disaffection had awoke to a consciousness of its intensity, and that Louis Kossuth could command the suffrages, and rely on the support, of the magnates, the franklins, and even of the serfs of Hungary, so long as he could give voice to their feelings, and demand the redress of grievances which all felt, though none could state them so well.

Facts like these were not lost on the Austrian government, which for once was alive to the signs of the time. A last attempt was made to disarm opposition by concessions. The demands of that opposition were clear and well defined. The protection of native interests; the reform of municipal institutions, and the

supremacy of Magyarism, had frequently but vainly been asked at the hands of the King of Hungary. It was now resolved to comply with the two former of these requests, and by this compliance to obtain the remission of the third. For the supremacy of Magyarism implied not only the paramount dominion of the Magyars over the conquered races, but their administrative independence from Austria. While concentration was the object of the Austrian policy, the Hungarians strove for separation, and a division of all but the outward form of their allegiance. This, then, was the real question at issue between Austria and Hungary.

On the 12th of November, 1847, the Diet met at Presburg, and the Emperor and King Ferdinand opened its proceedings by an address in the Magyar language. The first effect of this expedient exceeded the boldest hopes of those who had advised it. The members of the two Houses were frantic in their enthusiasm, grey-haired old men wept with joy. For the first time in three hundred years a King of Hungary addressed the Estates in their mother tongue. The propositions which accompanied his address were liberal in the extreme: they anticipated the demands of the reformers, for

by them the attention of the Diet was directed to the very reforms which the opposition had for many years sought to force upon the government at Vienna, and upon its partisans in Hungary. An equitable distribution of public burdens; the more efficient representation of the cities, free districts, and chapters; the abolition of the customs line between Austria and Hungary; the improvement of internal communications, such as the navigation on the Theiss and the construction of the Fiume railway, important because it connected the fertile plains of Hungary with the Adriatic—these and other alleviations, concessions, and means of improvement, were offered by the Austrian cabinet. In 1837, the least of these propositions would have sufficed to satisfy the moderate desires of the reformers, and to convert their opposition into the stanchest conservatism. But in 1847 the party of progress had become reckless by disappointment. The concessions of the government spurred them to fresh exertions. Hence the address which Mr. Kosuth was instructed to write in reply to the royal speech, acknowledged and accepted all the government had offered, but it also adduced fresh grievances and advocated further reforms. It is

true that this address was violently opposed by the Conservatives in the Lower House, and that the Board of Magnates condemned it altogether; but the result was, that the Estates of Hungary returned no answer whatever to the royal speech, and that it required an extraordinary, explanatory, and exculpatory message, to obtain the usual vote of thanks from the two Houses.

The same spirit of determined, uncompromising opposition pervaded all other debates and transactions of the Diet. The government plan of superseding the lord-lieutenants of the counties by special commissioners, whom the minister appointed, and who were removable at pleasure, was assailed by Mr. Kossuth and the rest of the liberal deputies. A more equitable distribution of the taxes and imposts was moved by Bartholomew Szemere, and supported by Count Szechenyi. The county rates, it was resolved, should not for the future be borne exclusively by the serfs and their liberated descendants, but also by the Magyar franklins, whom, by a strange perversity of language, the Hungarians designate by the name of 'noblemen,' whereas, in reality, their aristocracy is small in numbers, and a distinct and separate body from the large mass of the franklins or freeholders. These—who

had never before taken their part in the burdens of the State, while, with many exclusive rights and privileges, they owned only the duty of *insurrection*, that is to say, the duty of doing military service in defence of Hungary and Austria—were now for the first time called upon, not only to impose taxation, but also to take their share of the burden. The abolition of the ‘censur’ of printed books and papers was likewise moved by Mr. Kossuth in the Lower House, and in the House of Mag-nates by Count Louis Batthyanyi and Bishop Lonovics, who quoted the liberal reform movement which the Pope Pius IX. headed in Italy. Thus supported, Mr. Kossuth’s motion was referred to a committee of the Lower House. The completion of the abolition of feudal burdens was brought forward by Gabriel Lonyay, who entreated the Diet to make the acceptance of the fine, if offered by the serfs, compulsory to the lords of the manor. After a protracted debate, the house accepted G. Lonyay’s motion, and the abolition of urbarial burdens and personal servitude, which the last Diet had commenced, was completed on the 6th December, 1847.

In the first weeks of 1848 the two Houses discussed the propriety of taking measures for

the propagation of the Magyar language. They resolved to extend and enforce the laws which had been passed on former occasions, and enacted that documents drawn up in any but the Magyar language should be null and void. Had this resolution excluded the German language only, it might be considered as an act of prudent resistance against the encroachments of a foreign minority; but it was aggressive likewise. The conquered and dependent races which live amidst and around the Magyars, clung as tenaciously to their idioms and languages as the Magyars did to theirs; and the spirit of nationality with which the latter sought to protect their language and national customs against the aggressions of the Germans, animated the Servians, Wallacks, Croats, and other subdivisions of the great Slavonian family, to defend their languages and customs against the Germans and the Magyars. It is true that, in a country such as Hungary, the question might naturally arise, which of the many idioms ought to be the dominant official or diplomatic language? The Magyars, who claimed the prerogative of imposing theirs, were in a minority if compared to the bulk of the popu-

lation of Hungary, but as a race compared to other races, they were in a majority—that is to say, there were in Hungary about seven millions of Magyars, while neither the Serbs, nor the Wallacks, nor the Croats or Slowacks, reached so high a figure. The Magyars, although vastly inferior to the aggregate amount of non-Magyars, outnumbered each of the other tribes. Deputies from Croatia and from other Sclavonian counties sat in the Hungarian Diet; and these deputies, who knew little of the Magyar language, protested against its supremacy, and insisted on speaking in Latin, which for many centuries had been the *lingua franca* of their mixed nationalities.

The introduction of the Magyar language into the non-Magyar counties was an act of oppression. The purposes of a liberal government would have been better served had the Diet acquiesced in the use of all idioms and languages which were represented on Hungarian ground; had some linguistic proficiency been made obligatory on their officials and judges, and had they, by the cultivation of polite arts and sciences in the Magyar, sought to absorb rather than suppress the Sclavonic and Daco-Roman idioms. These are

the means by which the English language has been spread among all the nations of the earth. The races which we conquered have been the more ready to adopt our language, from the respect we showed to their national peculiarities. The Magyars were strangers to this British tolerance, and this the more, since their own linguistic enthusiasm was of recent date. The arbitrary decrees by which the Diet of 1847-48 sought to suppress the Slavonic dialects, served still further to exasperate the non-Magyar population in Hungary, and the inhabitants of Croatia and Transylvania, and to prepare their minds for a secession from and an insurrection against the encroachments of Magyar supremacy.

The Diet was still occupied with these, and with some restrictive measures against the inhabitants of Croatia, when the news of the third French revolution reached Presburg. The manner in which that news acted upon almost all countries of Europe must be fresh in the recollection of many. The intelligence of the sudden overthrow of the Orleans dynasty was discredited at first hearing, and when doubt became impossible, men looked at one another with pale blank faces, inquiring, what

next?—like those that find no room for rejoicing in the face of an awful danger. In all Continental countries, the liberal party thought the moment favourable for obtaining some concessions from those in power, but in place of the liberal concessions which they demanded, they were overwhelmed with a radical revolution. So faint-hearted and trembling were the rulers of Europe in those awful days, so vacillating were their resolves, and so self-defeating their policy, that the large mass of disorderly and restless persons which agitates at the bottom of all political societies, was provoked to acts of aggression against the authorities, which acts, when not resented, were succeeded by other deeds of greater violence, until within a few weeks after the flight of Louis Philippe of Orleans from Paris, there was no continental capital without its riots. Nor were there many continental princes whose pusillanimity did not swell the riots into revolts. In those days of frantic excitement even the better part of the population were exasperated by the concentration of large bodies of troops, which, assailing or assailed, were always compelled to retreat from the fury of the unleashed passions of the populace. The

princes stood alone ; their servants, who had used them as instruments for their selfish purposes, took flight when they ought to have sealed the sincerity of their principles and the loyalty of their attachment, with the blood they had so often offered to shed for their masters. And those masters, who were, for the most part, utter strangers to the wishes and the necessities of the people—who foolishly believed that the cry for independence and self-government emanated only from a small number of factious persons, were terrified to see all ranks, all classes, all ages—rich and poor, high and low, men, women, and even children, arrayed against them, and demanding that as their right, which, a few short months before, even the boldest would have trembled to solicit as a grace. Deserted by their favourites, abandoned by their troops—the roar of an angry multitude swelling on their ears, and with their mind's-eye fixed on that old man, whom the execration of a nation hunted across the British Channel ; or worse, on that king of the same country, whose head fell on the Place de la Révolution amidst the yells of a brutalized mob—these princes resisted no demand, resigned all power of government, and clutched

with an eager and trembling grasp the crumbs which fell from the table of the demagogues and leaders of the hour.

If such was the conduct of men, some of whom, though they lacked all public virtues, were renowned for the talents which adorn the lives of persons in a private capacity; what could be expected from a prince such as Ferdinand of Austria? That unfortunate emperor wanted not only the qualities of a regent, but also that moderate degree of common sense of which his meanest functionaries could boast. Ferdinand, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, had been subject to various ailments from his infancy. His education was neglected, his attention confined to boyish pleasures and sports, and from his first assumption of the crown to the day on which he resigned his power, he was accustomed to obey rather than to command. It is said of him (and there is no reason to disbelieve the statement) that he would frequently burst into tears when thwarted by those among his subjects who surrounded his person; and that the only occasion on which he had recourse to his prerogative of irresponsible sway, was an act of rebellion against the dictates of his cook and his physician.

This prince, whose life had passed among his birds and flowers, who obediently and placidly performed the functions of an imperial *dummy*—the only ones which were ever asked at his hands—was in March, 1848, pushed forward by his relatives and councillors to receive and pacify the riotous deputations from the inhabitants of his capital, of his provinces, and crown-lands, which thronged the halls, and blocked up the stairs of the imperial palace; while all round, in the narrow streets and squares of the city of Vienna, moved an impatient and clamorous populace; while the tramp of armed citizens re-echoed from the Freyung, and the shouts of hundreds of thousands of men and women from the suburbs and the country districts rent the air. The deputations, whose unceremonious presence and excited bearing paralysed the nerves of the monarch, belaboured his ears with splendid phrases, and sounding words of remonstrance. But amidst the throng, there appeared some men of Hungary, who uttered no complaints of past misrule, or remonstrances against present oppression, but who preferred deliberate, specified demands for the emperor to grant or refuse at his peril.

When the Presburg Diet received the first

intelligence of the revolution in France, the news was accompanied by a sudden fall of the funds. Hungary had too long and too painfully suffered from financial mismanagement, and the depreciation of Austrian notes, not to be alive to the fear of another State bankruptcy like those of 1811 and 1814. A revolution in France might lead to another European war, and with it to another Austrian bankruptcy. For the finances of that empire, which, during and after the campaigns against Napoleon, had been re-established at the expense of the nation, were not by any means improved by a peace of thirty years. What could be expected when armaments and foreign expeditions were to weigh upon them? Moved by these considerations, and urged on by the prevailing financial panic, a committee of inquiry into the affairs of the Austrian Bank was demanded by the member for the city of Raab (M. Balogh), and supported by L. Madarass and Szentkirálji. Mr. Kossuth was expected to speak in favour of the motion, but to the surprise of the House, he opposed it, in a speech which has justly been considered as a pronouncement of the new direction at which he aimed in the conduct of the affairs of Hungary.

He thanked the member for Raab for his zeal, but doubted its judiciousness. The want of confidence which had been shown would suffice to warn the government, that a candid statement of the financial condition of the country was a matter of absolute necessity. The funds had been lower in 1830 than at the present season, and the Austrian Bank was in danger only if the government of Vienna persisted in its traditional policy. If that policy were reformed, to suit the necessities of the time, the bank was safe. It was to this point that Mr. Kossuth sought to direct the attention of the house. A *radical reform* was wanted. Hungary was safe, if it were possible to animate her constitutional forms with the breath of life; and, to effect this, it was necessary to change the absolutism, which prevailed in the other Austrian provinces, into a constitutional government. Unless this be done, unless Austria discard the arbitrary spirit which pervades her councils, all the generous energies and talents of the Hungarian legislators are wasted in vain endeavours. And their endeavours must needs be vain, *unless they are supported by the loyal declarations of the various nations of Austria.*

An address to this effect proposed by Mr.

Kossuth was accepted by the Lower House, and, although the Magnates endeavoured to obstruct its progress, it was resolved to send the document, and with it a deputation of eighty members, to Vienna. This deputation, supported by from 250 to 300 of the clients and followers of the Diet, embarked on the 14th March on a steamer, which bore them to the Austrian capital, where Mr. Kossuth's speech, and the contents of the address, had some days previously been published by the newspapers. Their object was known to the Viennese, who for the last two days had from petty riots gradually and almost insensibly proceeded to a revolution. The deputies landed amid the frantic acclamations of an excited crowd, who, true to the German idiosyncrasy which prevails among the Viennese, admired the waving plumes and the laced tunics of the new comers, whom they delighted to cheer with the Magyar cry of 'Eljén!' Louis Kossuth, the patriot and liberator, was the chief object of their reverence and noisy admiration. Hemmed in on all sides by the crowd of armed citizens and students, fashionably dressed women, soldiers, labourers, and loungers, who filled the narrow streets; grasped by many arms, and

greeted by a thousand voices, he was all but borne along to the emperor's palace, where the address was duly read, while an instant reply was demanded by the impatient crowd which filled the Franzensplatz and the Freyung. The formal expressions of the address were more fully interpreted by the speaker of the deputation. A separation of the government, the administration, and the finances of Hungary from those of Austria was demanded. The unfortunate emperor knew not how to refuse. He intimated his consent, when, at the last moment, his relatives interfered, advising him rather to resist, and risk all, than to pronounce the virtual independence and secession of the Hungarian kingdom. Thus placed between two conflicting demands, the monarch, in his tribulation, found, for the first time, the energy to oppose the will of those who had hitherto swayed his own, and who, he justly considered, had placed him in a painful and dangerous position. 'Am I, or am I not, the sovereign of this country?' was his reply to the archdukes, who thereupon retired, and consulted how by secret intrigues they might prevail against the emperor's weakness and the strength of the Hungarians. These latter left the presence with

a gracious, and, as events proved, a sincere assurance that their demands should be complied with. The Palatine was forthwith instructed to command the formation of a separate and responsible Hungarian cabinet, under the presidency of the Count Louis Batthyanyi, and the deputies returned to Presburg greatly excited, and with the wildest hopes of the future. It was on the occasion of this visit to Vienna that Mr. Kossuth held 'the crown of Austria in his hand.' Extravagant as this assertion appears, it was not an empty boast. So violent was the excitement of the Viennese; so great their desire to imitate the example of the populace of Paris, and so hopelessly panic-stricken and paralysed was the government, that a much smaller popularity than that in which Kossuth revelled, would have sufficed to overthrow the throne of Austria. The Hungarian agitator had to use all the powers of his oratory to calm and pacify the people of Vienna. Had compliance with his demands been refused, he had the power, and perhaps the will, to consign the Habsburgs to the fate which befel the members of the Orleans family.

In the interval between the departure of

the deputation for Vienna, and their return to Presburg, Mr. Kossuth's speech on Balogh's motion had done its work at Pesth. The cities of Buda and Pesth, the real capitals of Hungary, and the centre of its administration, while they applauded Mr. Kossuth's speech, were dissatisfied with his address to the king, the real bearings of which they were unable to appreciate. The radical members of the aristocracy and of the learned professions, combined with the students of the Pesth university, held tumultuous meetings, and agreed on forcing the Diet into a more decided line of action, or, if that were impossible, to send a deputation of their own to Vienna, there to demand an independent cabinet, annual parliaments, liberty of the press and of worship, an amnesty for the political prisoners, and various other concessions, which Mr. Kossuth's deputation was just then in the act of obtaining. The news of the Vienna riots, and of their success, added to the enthusiasm, and stimulated the courage of these reformers. Violent speeches were made. Printing presses were seized and used for a practical demonstration of the liberty of the press. The Guildhall at Pesth was surrounded, and the magistrates compelled to sign

the petitions, and adopt the demands of the radicals. Vast crowds appeared before the gates of the fortress of Buda, demanding the instant liberation of Michael Stancsics, a state prisoner. The populace were unarmed, whilst the fortress was strongly garrisoned, and provided with a formidable complement of artillery in commanding positions. But so great were the terror and confusion of the Austrian officers, that the demands of the people were complied with. The prisoner was liberated, and borne in triumph through the streets of Pesth, and into the Magyar theatre, where the national hymn was sung by many thousand enthusiasts in and around the building. On the following day (March 16) the rioters proceeded to supersede the authority of the magistrates, and to appoint their own revolutionary administration. Two provisional committees of safety for the city and county of Pesth were chosen, and to illustrate the principle of the equality of religious societies, three Jews were elected to sit in the city committee.

It has been generally admitted that these boards, the creations of a tumultuous movement, made laudable exertions in the cause of

peace and order, to uphold which they decreed the organization of a national guard. The cockades and weapons of this corps were furnished by the municipality. Such was the enthusiasm, that not only the able-bodied among the inhabitants, but also decrepit old men and cripples on crutches, not to mention hundreds of strangers and visitors, insisted on being enrolled among the defenders of the city. They were so enrolled, for resistance to any demand was in those days likely to be attended with serious consequences.

The excitement at Pesth was increased by the news of the concessions which the deputation had obtained at Vienna, and the popular feeling rose to frenzy, when it became generally known that Count Louis Batthyanyi had been appointed to the presidency of the first Hungarian Cabinet. That nobleman, the descendant of an ancient Magyar family, and one to whose exertions the Habsburgs were indebted for their advent to the throne and for its preservation at sundry periods of foreign or domestic dangers, possessed in a high degree those qualities which his countrymen chiefly respect. His aspect was commanding, his bearing noble, and his dis-

course had that mysterious brevity which, coupled with a fulness, not to say sadness of tone, imparts a meaning even to trite arguments, while it makes commonplace remarks attractive. Left in early youth to be 'lord of himself, that heritage of woe,' Count Louis Batthyanyi was bred to a soldier's profession in Italy; he travelled through various European countries, sojourning in each too long for oblivion, and passing too quickly for instruction; and on his return to his native land, he spent some years overwhelmed with all the cares of a most profuse hospitality. His hereditary authority, the power of his wealth, and the influence he obtained by its liberal transmission into other hands, tempted him, as pleasure palled and ambition awoke, to take a leading part in the affairs of the nation, nor was it long before he was considered as the chief of the liberal opposition in the House of Magnates. His influence supported Mr. Kossuth's struggles for reform, and to his hands did the Emperor Ferdinand confide the difficult task of securing the independence of Hungary, and at the same time preserving her for Austria.

It is to be presumed that the Count Bat-

thyanyi was alive to the difficulties of his position. But if the excitement of a gratified ambition, and the gratification of an honest and generous patriotism, caused him to overlook those difficulties for a moment, he was but too soon and too painfully reminded of the fact, that most lamentable is the lot of those who are doomed to mediate between the past and the future. His first measures touched neutral ground, and in them he was borne forward by the enthusiasm of the day. The impending dissolution of the Diet, and the expected convocation of a Parliament at Pesth, strengthened the popular belief that all arrangements were but provisional and likely to be followed by some mysterious future good—the vague *alcun bene* of Dante. Some disturbances were, indeed, caused by the ‘press-law,’ which B. Szemere moved, and which was supported by Mr. Kossuth. Exorbitant sums, as caution money, were by this law imposed upon the daily and weekly press.* The Diet accepted the bill, but the populace burnt it. The elec-

* 2000*l.* was the caution money for a daily, and 1000*l.* for a weekly paper; while a deposit of 400*l.* was demanded for the mere establishment of a printing-press.

toral law, which was likewise supported by Mr. Kossuth, and opposed by Madarass, Perczel, and Kubinyi, was inveighed against on account of its restrictions of the franchise. It was considered as a special grievance that this law made no allowances for the 'qualification of intelligence' in favour of the learned professions. But it passed. The Diet appeared at one time to be alive rather to the prejudices than to the rights of the people. The Jews, a numerous and wealthy class, had been admitted to the franchise, and to the right of sitting in Parliament. The citizens of Presburg protested against this resolution, and the Diet reversed it. The mob, emboldened by its success, proceeded to attack the Jews' quarter, and to burn, murder, and destroy; while in the immediate vicinity of this scene of horrors, the members of the Diet, assembled in the Presburg Cathedral, assisted at the chanting of a solemn *Te Deum!* in honour of the liberties which God had vouchsafed to grant to the nation.

The same scenes were in April and May repeated at Kashau, Eperies, Kerd, Nadaz, and almost throughout Hungary.

Deputations and addresses poured in from

all parts of the country. The Pesth Committee of Safety sought to establish itself as an independent revolutionary authority, with a view of superseding the Diet, until its proceedings were checked by the firmness and determination of Mr. Kossuth, who publicly and peremptorily refused to listen to the suggestions of the Committee, and its representative, Paul Hajnik.

These were some of the difficulties which assailed Count Batthyanyi on the part of the Hungarians; still graver obstructions were placed in his path by the members of the Imperial family and the officials at Vienna. The composition of his cabinet excited the indignation of those who, immediately after the departure of the Hungarian deputies from Vienna, resumed their usual influence on the affairs of the empire. In that cabinet, B. Szemere was appointed minister for home, and Prince Paul Esterhazy for foreign affairs; while the departments of justice, war, public instruction, works, and trade, were entrusted to Messrs. Deak, Messaros, Eötvös, Szechenyi, and Klauzal. None of these was a favourite at Vienna, and none of them was likely to advocate the interests of Austria; but the appointment of Mr.

Kossuth to the important post of minister of finance was most offensive to the feelings of his old persecutors, for it was fraught with real danger to their interests, and to the stability of their government.

Mr. Kossuth, as minister of finance, was not prone to sacrifice the interests of his country to the necessities of the Austrian exchequer. The military forces of Hungary, placed at the disposition of one of Mr. Kossuth's colleagues, might at any time be turned against the empire. Or, discarding the probability of so extreme a case, it could not be expected that they would for the future be allowed to join the aggressions and support the despotic rule of Austria in other countries.

Mr. Kossuth was aware of the apprehensions which the Austrian cabinet connected with his person. He felt that his own position and the safety of the country were in danger, unless he succeeded in convincing his enemies at Vienna of his desire to make concessions in their favour. On the 20th of July he exerted all his influence to procure from the parliament a vote of subsidies against the Italian insurgents. His was a difficult task. He had to convince the House of his sincerity in making a demand

which was in direct contradiction to the traditions of his past career. This he endeavoured to accomplish by a subtle distinction between his private and public feelings, between his sentiments as an individual and his duties as a minister. Supported by Eötvös and the rest of the cabinet, but opposed by Perczel and Teleky, the bill in favour of the subsidies was passed by 236 against 33 votes.

But this manifestation of his intentions came too late to disarm the hostile measures which the Austrian cabinet and the members of the Imperial family had taken against Hungary. Defeated in Italy, opposed in Bohemia, and insulted in the metropolis of their country, the Habsburgs showed to the last that stubborn perseverance which, had it been exerted in a good cause, would entitle them to the highest respect. While the court was compelled to fly from Vienna to the mountains of the Tyrol, strenuous endeavours were made to obstruct the development of Hungarian independence, and to neutralize the patriotism of Batthyanyi and the ambition of Kossuth, by the horrors and dangers of a civil war. For that purpose the members of the Imperial family looked out for friends in Hungary, and two powerful

allies were found in the *esprit de corps* of the army and in the discontents and the ambition of the Croats.

It has always been the practice of the Austrian War Office to stifle in their soldiers and officers old friendships and associations of home, and to prevent their contracting new alliances in the towns and provinces on which they were quartered. The recruits from Lombardy, Poland, and Bohemia were marched to depôts in Hungary and Austria Proper; while the levies from Hungary and Austria Proper were sent to join the garrisons of the Italian, Polish, and Bohemian fortresses. In case of an insurrection in any province, the soldiers, strangers to the language and the grievances of that particular part of the empire, and who, moreover, as foreigners and servants of a despotic government, were exposed to frequent insults, were at all times ready to act against the native population. Their term of service was long; the regiments were moved to different and equally foreign parts of the empire, whenever a good understanding and an identity of sympathies seemed to spring up between them and the natives. To restrain their officers from connexions with the provin-

cials was more difficult, but the task was accomplished by the careful fostering of ignorance in the young men who aspired to a military career in Austria; by a constant watching of their leanings and connexions, and by their 'dislocation' to regiments in other provinces, whenever, by marriage or acquisition of property, they attempted to establish themselves in the country in which they sojourned. No one but a nobleman or a foreigner could expect to rise to high command. If the former, his career was promoted by wealth; if the latter, poverty and want of reputation were a recommendation rather than a drawback to the claims of the aspirant. Thus the army came to be a nation in itself—a vagrant population, which immigrated and emigrated, according to the orders of the War Office. Its members, peculiar in their language, sentiments, and morals, were devoted to the system of irresponsible despotism, which maintained them at the expense and in the domination of the country; and they were the most uncompromising antagonists of reform.

In the spring of 1848 the various corps of the Austrian army were for a short time shaken in their allegiance, by the precarious

position of their masters, and by the violent expressions of popular hate which assailed them. In Hungary, in particular, the Italian, Polish, and German regiments were content to shut themselves up in their quarters, and to remain quiet spectators of the excesses of the populace. In this season of uncertainty, the commanders of fortresses, though aggrieved by the decree of the emperor, which sanctioned the authority of the new Hungarian War Office, could not decline to deliver up their command into the hands of the agents of Count Batthyanyi. Thus were the fortresses of Leopoldstadt, Komorn, Buda, Peterwarasdin, and Esseg surrendered to Magyar officers. But scarcely had the general panic begun to subside, when secret orders came from Vienna to the commanders in Hungary, instructing them, 'by prudent management,' to defeat the measures of the Hungarian cabinet. These officers, greedy of favours and rewards, endeavoured by delays, rather than by direct disobedience, to paralyse the action of the new War Office at Pesth, and to ensure the defencelessness, rather than the defence, of the country, at a time when a combination of formidable powers arrayed itself against Hungary.

For, obedient to the secretly expressed wishes of the Archduchess Sophia, wife to the heir-apparent to the Austrian crown, the ancient hatreds of the Servians, Croats, and Wallacks, in the border counties of Hungary, were turned against the country. In Transylvania the Wallackian population exceeded the Magyars by two-thirds, and yet these Wallackians were excluded from the Diet of that province. In Upper Hungary, where the original inhabitants of the country, the Sclavonian Slowacks, had sought refuge from the violence of the invader Arpad and his hordes, the numerical difference between Magyars and non-Magyars was equally great; and much discontent prevailed among these descendants of a conquered race against Magyar dominion, arrogance, and that insulting temper which has always characterized the sons of Arpad in their dealings with the conquered and alien populations, and which received a new impulse by the easy triumph which Mr. Kossuth obtained over the Austrian oppression. The discontents that were rife among the Slowacks, were lashed into action by Hodza, a Protestant clergyman at St. Miklos, in Liptau county, who, with a horse-whip in his hand, compelled the peasant popu-

lation to take the pledge of temperance and of enmity against the Magyars and the Jews. With him was Hurban, ex-priest of Szobotist, near Miava, who, from pot-house tables and scaffoldings, reminded the Slowacks of the ancient glories of their kingdom, of Svatopluk and Libussa, and the white horse which the Magyar invaders offered in scorn as purchase-money for the rich plains of southern Hungary. Upon these he exhorted them to make a razzia. He succeeded in collecting at Miava a large crowd of smugglers, labourers, and carmen, whom he led to frightful jacqueries on the manor-houses and the Jews of Wagenstadl, Brezova, and Szobotist.

But more dangerous to Hungarian prosperity than the Wallackians of Transylvania, or the Slowacks of the north, was another branch of the great Slavonic family, the Croats, whose country, although a province under the crown of Hungary, was governed by a 'Banus,' or Stadtholder, an officer of high rank, who took precedence after the chancellor of the kingdom. The Croats, though favoured with many valuable privileges and immunities, had on several occasions suffered from Hungarian violence and pride; and after the constitu-

tion of the Batthyanyi cabinet, they were specially aggrieved by the attempts which the parliament made in favour of the Magyar language. In their endeavours to repel this encroaching policy, they were supported and urged on, not only by secret agents sent from Vienna, but also by their Ban, the Baron Joseph Jellachich. This man, the chief promoter of the war in Hungary, born in 1810, at Peterwarasdin, and son of an Austrian officer, received his education in a military college, where he was noted as pre-eminent in all military and gymnastic exercises. Promoted to a lieutenancy of dragoons, he passed some years amidst the dissipations to which Austrian officers have at all times been addicted, until, broken in health, he was compelled to retire to Agram a prey to a painful and dangerous complaint. Restored to health, he served again in Vienna, and on the Croatian frontier, where, as colonel and commander of the 1st Border regiment, he headed a razzia into Turkish Bosnia, and suffered defeat in a skirmish near Posvid.

Early in 1848 the unsuccessful chief of the Bosnian expedition was appointed to the office of Ban of the three kingdoms of Croatia, Dalma-

tia, and Illyria. His first official act was a hostile demonstration against the Batthyanyi cabinet. He travelled through the country, addressed the populace, and exerted all his influence to foment a war between Hungary and Croatia. From his head-quarters at Agram he gave the signal for a general rising of the South Sclavonians. The Croats, Serbs, and Slowacks were, by his exertions, united into a grand anti-Magyar league. The Diets of the various Sclavonian provinces were convoked, against the express prohibition of the Hungarian parliament; and while the Servian patriarch, Rajachich, dressed in the robes of his sacred office, and bearing a large cross, travelled through the country, preaching a crusade against Hungary; while the Austrian Colonel Mayerhofer collected a band of Turkish marauders on the Bosnian frontier, and urged them on to murder and incendiarism: the Ban Jellachich proceeded to expel the Magyar commissioners, and to quarter his troops on some districts of the Banat whose inhabitants were known to favour the cause of Hungary.

The Hungarian cabinet thus threatened, sought protection and support from the

emperor; and, on the 10th of June, Count Louis Batthyanyi obtained the publication of an Imperial manifesto, by which the Croats and Slavonians were informed that the Ban had been suspended from all his dignities and offices. In this document, the Croats were told that their ingratitude had been a grievous disappointment to the emperor's paternal heart. 'Persons,' says the emperor, 'there are who persecuted your fellow-citizens, and who, by intimidation, forced them to leave their country, because they attempted to enlighten you as to the facts of the case.'

The emperor proceeds to state that his deep concern was heightened by the apprehension, that the man whom his grace had overwhelmed with tokens of his royal bounty, and whom he had appointed to be the guardian of the law in Croatia—that the Baron Joseph Jellachich, had given himself up to this criminal sedition, and, led away by factious animosity, had dared to conspire against the union of Croatia with Hungary. He was consequently a traitor against the emperor's crown and dignity. The charges against him are his disobedience, his attempts to seduce the lawful authorities to the same disobedience, and the violent and

illegal measures by which he compelled the Croatians to hostile demonstrations against Hungary. The emperor further accuses the Ban of having persecuted the friends of the union between Croatia and Hungary, of having deposed them from their offices, and tried them by court-martial; of having prevented the legally appointed lord-lieutenants from entering upon their duties; of having seized the public funds, compelled the people to take arms, and driven them to acts of murder and rapine against the Hungarians. And lastly, the Ban is accused of conniving at an insult offered to the Archduke Palatine, and of mutiny against the emperor's commissioner, the Baron Hrabowsky. For these and other high crimes and misdemeanours the Baron Joseph Jellachich is deprived of all his dignities, commands, and offices, and summoned to surrender to the emperor's commissioner, the Baron Hrabowsky, to show cause why he should not be treated as a traitor and a rebel.

Two days after this manifesto obtained the emperor's signature, the Ban Jellachich left his capital of Agram, and proceeded to the court at Insbruck. He was accompanied by Colonel Denkstein, and the Counts Nugent,

Louis Erdödy, and Draskovich. The emperor's proceedings at Insbruck, on the 10th of June, could not be known at Agram on the 12th of that month. But as the manifesto against the Ban was the result of long and earnest solicitations on the part of the Count Louis Batthyanyi, there is reason to believe that Jellachich was informed of the dangers of his position, and that he went to Insbruck for the purpose of securing the support of his friends at court. This view is justified by the fact, that not only was the 'traitor and rebel' allowed to approach the emperor's court, but he was admitted to an audience by the Archduke Francis Charles, heir-apparent to the throne, and the Archduchess Sophia, his wife. Nor could all the protests of the Hungarian ministers prevail against the powerful influence of the emperor's relations; and on the 19th of June, Ferdinand of Austria was induced to accept the homage of a man whom, nine days before, he had accused of the worst crimes which can be preferred against a subject and a public functionary. If proof were wanting of the duplicity of the Imperial family, it is furnished by the fact, that no reproach, no accusation, was made against the Ban; and

that the Archduke John, whom the Germans at that time elected to the regency of their country, (chiefly because he had married the daughter of a publican, and because he liked low company,) wrote a letter to the declared enemy of Hungary in which he addressed him as 'My dear Banus.' Nor were measures taken to revoke the manifesto against the Ban. That document was published and circulated, while he whom it denounced received the strongest marks of his master's esteem and favour.

While these intrigues were spinning at the emperor's court in Insbruck, the results of other intrigues became still more apparent and dangerous to the public safety. The Servians, who form the majority of the inhabitants of the counties of Bács, Torontál, Krassó, Temes, Banya, and Syrmia, had at an earlier period manifested their desire to secede from the kingdom of Hungary: they demanded a separate administration, diet, and king's lieutenant. The above-mentioned counties were to be constituted as a separate crown-land—the Servian Wojewodina. Not only were these demands preferred, but measures were taken to dispense with the consent of the Hungarian Cabinet.

The priest Rajachich was elected to be patriarch of the Wojewodina ; and Suplicacz, a celebrated warrior, was appointed to the Wojewodeship. The Servians, reinforced by Colonel Mayerhofer's bands from Turkish Servia and Bosnia, illustrated their idea of national independence by frequent and terrible raids on the Magyar villages within their domains and on their borders. Murder and rapine were the rule of the day, and the Servians showed that they, like most continental nations, believed that *liberty* means an unbounded licence and absolute dominion over the lives, properties, and opinions of all other men.

The measures which the Hungarian cabinet adopted to pacify the Servians were judicious and liberal. It convoked an assembly of their estates at Temesvar, where it proposed to hear, and, as far as in it lay, to comply with their demands. This peaceable policy might have produced a favourable result, but for the secret agents of the Imperial family. The old hatred of the Slavonians was excited by tales of past oppression, by anecdotes of words of scorn and menace, which were said to have fallen from the lips of the Hungarian ministers, and

their fanaticism was aroused by wild and vague hopes of independence, not only from Hungary, but from Austria also. They were reminded of their ancient nationality, language, and religion, as distinct from Magyar protestantism and Austrian catholicism; they were artfully told that if the power and influence of the Magyars were reduced, the emperor would crown their boldest wishes, and weld the three kingdoms of Croatia, Dalmatia and Illyria into one great Slavonic empire. It required all the ignorance and enthusiasm of the natives of that part of Europe to believe these statements. But believed they were; and the Slavonians, a nation of instinctive cruelty and greed, believed, moreover, that to exterminate the Magyars, and appropriate their goods and chattels, was the surest means to justify the emperor's good opinion and encourage his benevolent intentions towards themselves. To confirm them in this conviction, money, arms, and ammunition were sent from Insbruck, while, at the same time, exhortations, injunctions, and threatening manifestoes against the Slavonians, were signed by the sovereign, and published in Hungary. In June, when the

violent proceedings of the armed bands of Servians compelled the Hungarian Cabinet to protect the lives and properties of the subjects of the kingdom, they instructed General Hrabowsky to pacify the insurgent districts. That officer, at the head of a strong force of soldiers and National Guards, attacked the Servians, and expelled them from Karlowitz, the newly-created capital of the Wojewodina. He allowed himself to be outwitted by granting them an armistice of fourteen days, for the purpose, as they alleged, of settling the dispute. But, while he remained at Karlowitz, the Servians fell back upon the walls and moats of an old Roman camp, which was already occupied by 8000 of their own nation. Reinforcements came from all sides, and at the expiration of the armistice, they had the advantage, not only of numbers, and of various strong positions, but, moreover, of chiefs and leaders, whose enthusiasm kept pace with the fanaticism of the common militiamen. Their line of defence leant on the Danube, with the cities of Semlin, Pancsova, and Orsova, as depôts and rallying points; they infested the left bank of the Danube and either bank of the Theiss, and commanded the road from Panc-

sova to Temesvar. But their strongest points were the line of Roman encampments from the Danube to the Theiss, and the fortifications of Titel, St. Thomas, Perlasz, and Alibunár. On this line, and in these positions, they had an army of 30,000 men, and among them 4000 auxiliaries, the scum and refuse of Turkish Servia. They had 100 pieces of artillery. Their forces were commanded by the two Servians, Stratimirovich and Knichanin, and by the Austrian Colonel Mayerhofer.

The Hungarian forces which were to oppose these formidable bands mustered from 17,000 to 18,000 men, foot, horse, and artillery. But the majority of these troops consisted of Austrian regiments and battalions, commanded by Austrian officers, who had for the time being been placed at the disposition of the Hungarian Cabinet. These officers were inclined to protract the war, which they would not terminate in favour of Hungary. Their delays caused a terrible onslaught which the Servians made (26th June) on the Magyar and German inhabitants of the city of Neusatz, where unarmed citizens, women, and children were overpowered, seized, and tortured, while the garrisons of the Roman encampments, issuing

from their strongholds, devastated the country in all directions. Thus compelled to action, the Hungarian Cabinet reinforced their army with strong levies of National Guards, until in the first days of July their forces amounted to 80,000 men, with sixty field-pieces.

And now commenced an extraordinary and almost inexplicable warfare. To all appearance the Servians were besieged in their extensive lines of fortification. But, in fact, their position was not that of a besieged garrison, for the lines of the Hungarians extended only along their front, while the country in the rear was open, and they were free to attract reinforcements and provisions to any extent. Nor were the attacks against their lines attended with success; for the Austrian officers in command of the Hungarian forces did all in their power to defeat the troops whom they should have led on to victory. In the attack on St. Thomas, the Hungarians were commanded by General Bechthold, who left the field of battle, and ordered a general retreat, at the moment when his forlorn hope had carried the Servian entrenchments at the point of the bayonet. Having thus done his utmost to daunt the courage and confuse the minds

of the soldiers, General Bechthold resigned his command. That the position of the Servians was not impregnable, and that the Hungarian troops were sufficiently strong and brave to carry them, was shown at Perlasz, where Major Vetter and Colonel Ernest Kiss, at the head of 4000 men, attacked and stormed the Servian entrenchments, captured their artillery, routed their garrison, and compelled them to fly to Titel. The most important capture on this occasion was a document, which left no doubt of the treachery of the Austrian Cabinet. In the quarters of the Servian commander a letter was found from the Austrian Field-Marshal Lieutenant Spanoghr, commander of a division at Gratz, announcing the march of two batteries and transports of ammunition to Karlowitz, and promising further supplies of artillery.

It was under the influence of such events and revelations that, in the parliament at Pesth, Mr. Kossuth gave notice of his intention to move a resolution for the 'defence of the country.' The 11th of July was the day appointed for that motion, and from its nature, and the events of the time, it was justly presumed that the agitator intended to crush

anything like opposition by an extraordinary display of those oratorical powers which afterwards gained him respect and admiration in countries foreign to his sentiments, ideas, and language, but which, when brought to bear upon his own nation, proved irresistible and overwhelming. Hence the galleries and even the stairs of the parliament-house were crowded with the idle, the curious, and the patriotic, and large masses of the populace surrounded the building itself. They were anxious to watch the result of Mr. Kossuth's speech, though they could not expect to hear the speech itself. On this and many other occasions, the admirers of that extraordinary man have compared him to one of our greatest and most impressive speakers—namely, Lord Chatham. The comparison holds good in more than one respect; for, like Lord Chatham, Mr. Kossuth moved the pity of his audience by an appearance of extreme debility, and by the report of his physical sufferings. Ambition seemed extinct in a mind which craved nought but rest. The influence of office, the power of dominion, and the triumph of a mind which swayed and bent the minds of a nation at its will, appeared so many sacrifices, which,

though painfully, were freely offered to the salvation of the country. It has been said of Lord Chatham, that there was persuasion in his flannels, conviction in his crutch. There was much of Lord Chatham's influence in the compassionate murmurs which greeted Mr. Kossuth's appearance, when his slight and emaciated form, supported by the arms of two friends, was seen creeping through the crowded hall to the tribune. There was much of Lord Chatham's persuasion in his hollow eyes, the high furrowed brow, the pale wan face, and the air of intense hopeless exhaustion with which he leant forward to acknowledge the thundering cheers which for awhile drowned the low, plaintive tones of his voice.

He said he came to implore them to save the country. *That country was in danger!* The House knew it. Croatia was in open rebellion, which was not justified either by the past or the present. The Hungarians had always shared with the Croats their rights and privileges. The last Diet had made great sacrifices in favour of the Croatian finances and nationality. Their language had been protected. The Ban's power had been secured and extended. He had

been invited to take his seat at the council board, and assured that what he asked in reason should be freely granted. But the policy of the Croats was incomprehensible. He (Mr. Kossuth) could understand that a nation should woo liberty at the point of the sword ; but an insurrection in favour of despotism was an inscrutable mystery to him. Croatia played the part of the French Vendée—it was all sham-loyalty, and real servility, on the part of the leader ; while the people were led away by the scheme of an Austro-Sclavonian monarchy.

It was much the same with the Servians. As for the Austrian government, it repented of its late concessions, and sought to recover the sword and the purse-strings of the nation—the departments of War and Finance. The rest would follow. The Croatian movement was connected with this scheme, and the last days, in particular, had revealed many secrets. A demand had come from Vienna for the Cabinet to pacify the Croats at any sacrifice, and for supplies to be sent to Jellachich. He (Mr. Kossuth) had refused to furnish a declared rebel with the sinews of war ; whereupon the Austrian ministers had sent their ‘ dear rebel ’ the sum of 150,000 florins.

Mr. Kossuth proceeded next to sift the foreign relations of Hungary. England was favourable; France and Germany were doubtful. But favour or no favour, all the hopes of Hungary were in herself. 'That nation alone can live, whose vitality is strong within it. There is no future for a nation which relies for safety on foreign help.' And, therefore, the speaker demanded that the House should vote an extraordinary credit of 42,000,000 florins for the mobilization of an army of 200,000 men. Of these, 40,000 were to be enrolled at once, the rest at the discretion of the ministers.

As Mr. Kossuth approached the climax of his motion, after a speech of more than two hours, his pallor increased; he stammered, leant forward, and fainted away. Whatever the divisions and party feelings of the House, they were overpowered by the last breaking tones of that voice. Paul Nyáry, a member of the opposition, rose, and with outstretched arms cried: We consent! And in a moment all the members followed his example, and with their hands raised to heaven, they repeated Nyáry's words: We consent! Their tumultuous movements, their voices, and the cheerful words of his friends, roused Mr. Kossuth from his trance.

He rose with an effort, and with streaming eyes and hands humbly crossed on his breast, concluded his speech in faint and trembling accents, thanking the House for their ready vote, and imploring their patience. He bowed before the nation's greatness. If its perseverance equalled its patriotism, even the gates of hell should not prevail against Hungary.

Mr. Kossuth's speech on his motion of the 11th July is considered the best and most extensive display of his oratorical powers. On that day the fate of the nation was really and truly decided. Other orators have been fortunate if they could influence the decision of a constituent assembly. Mr. Kossuth did more, he dictated that decision. And it appears from the concurrent testimony of all the witnesses of that remarkable scene, that so great was the excitement of his hearers, that all, friends and foes, conservatives and liberals, rushed forward to grasp his hand, and to thank him for the resolution he had wrung from them. It was impossible to proceed with the business before the House, which had to be adjourned until the members had vented their feelings in frantic cheers and sobs, and frequent embraces. That these physical demonstrations of universal love

and goodwill were produced by Mr. Kossuth's manner, rather than by the weight of his arguments, was shown by the tardy repentance of the opposition. Strenuous endeavours were made in subsequent debates to pledge the Cabinet to a decisive policy. Mr. Kossuth, says his biographer Horn, 'would have met the opposition half way, but in the Cabinet councils his influence was paralysed by Count L. Batthyanyi.' That high and generous nobleman could not believe in the treachery of the Austrian Cabinet; and though frequently disappointed, he returned with unshrinking and persevering loyalty to his attempts at reconciliation. Neither the proclamations published by the Ban of Croatia, in which that officer boasted of Austrian support, nor the statements of the Austrian Secretary-at-War, Count Latour, who made public exhibitions of his joy at the successes of his 'faithful Servians' and 'beloved comrades,' could persuade him that his sovereign's friends and servants conspired against the peace and the prosperity of the nation. He, accompanied by F. Deak, the minister of justice, posted to Vienna to solicit a repetition of those solemn assurances which the Imperial family had given at an earlier and

more dangerous period. But the time of promises was past. The Hungarian ministers were delayed in the capital, but could not obtain an audience. Their suit received an indirect answer in a memorial which (August 21) was sent from Vienna to Pesth; it contained the first definitive expression of the Austrian demands. It tried to prove that the concessions of March were incompatible with the Pragmatic Sanction, that they undermined the stability of the Austrian empire, and ruined its provinces, and that the emperor had not the right to make those concessions. The Hungarians were asked to resign the advantages which had fallen to their share during the convulsions of the Austrian revolution.

In reply to this memorial, Mr. Kossuth induced the parliament to send a deputation of one hundred members of the Lower House, and of twenty magnates, to inform the emperor of the sentiments of the nation, and to demand most energetic measures against the rebellion of the Serbs and Croats. The deputation left Pesth on the 5th September: its instructions were to proceed to Vienna, de-

mand an audience, and return unless that audience were immediately granted. In Vienna the deputies were received by an excited populace, which welcomed them with cheers and other expressions of sympathy. They saw the emperor, who read his reply (contrary to the Austrian custom) from a paper prepared for the occasion. It was evasive. The deputies left the palace, and ornamenting their hats with red plumes, in token of war, they returned to Pesth, where the result of this last endeavour was forthwith communicated to the parliament. The deputies brought from Vienna a copy of a public letter which the emperor (Sept. 4) had addressed to the Ban of Croatia. It thanked the Ban for his zeal and loyalty, and for his desire to conciliate the Hungarian Cabinet, and expressed a conviction of the groundlessness of the charges of high treason which had been preferred against him. The Ban was absolved from all inquiry, and exhorted to proceed on the path he had taken 'for the maintenance of the integrity of the Hungarian Crown, and the prosperous progress of its crown lands.' This letter caused the resignation of the Batthyanyi Cabinet, which was accepted by the Palatine, who in-

formed the Assembly of his intention to appoint another premier. Mr. Kossuth remonstrated. The Palatine's message was illegal, for it wanted the counter-signature of a responsible minister. He pointed out the defect, but forgot to mention the remedy, and, to defeat the Palatine's plans, he resumed his office. Another Cabinet was formed on the spot, with D. Pazmandy and Paul Nyáry of the Lower House, and Perenyi of the Magnates. A deputation was sent to the Palatine to protest against his message, and obtain his sanction of the new Cabinet. The Prince demurred, but after some negotiations, Count Batthyanyi was again found willing to resume office. His first official act was the publication of important and decisive intelligence. Count Adam Teleky, who commanded on the Drave, had some time previously announced his intention of retreating upon Pesth, since the Ban Jella-chich was preparing to cross the river. The completion of that intelligence had now arrived in a letter from the commissioner, L. Csanyi.

The Ban of Croatia, with an army of 40,000 men, had crossed the Drave, the frontier of Hungary Proper. His soldiers

devastated the country along the whole line of his march. The Hungarian forces were in full retreat, and the sword and fire of the Croats threatened the walls of Great Kanisha.

CHAPTER III.

Composition of Jellachich's Army.—Evil Repute of the Croats.—Measures of Defence.—Teleky's Retreat.—The Palatine.—His Flight.—Lamberg's Mission.—Riot at Pesth.—Assassination of Lamberg.—Skirmish at Sukuro.—Breach of the Armistice.—Jellachich the Alter Ego.—The Vienna Riots.—Appointment of Prince Windishgrätz.—Battle of Shwechat.—Arthur Görgey.—The Hungarian Noble Guard.—Kossuth's Agitation.

THE Ban Jellachich crossed the frontiers of Hungary on the 9th of September, from Kopreinetz, with the centre of his army, mustering 20,000 men. His right wing, of 10,000 men, was commanded by General Hartlieb, who threatened the fortress of Esseg; while 10,000 forming the left wing, stood at Warasdin, under the command of General Shmiedl. His reserves, under General Kempfen, were at Kreuz, and consisted of 10,000 men. The centre of Jellachich's army was composed of Austrian regiments of the line, which were equipped and paid by Count Latour, the chief of the Vienna War Office. His right and left wings and his reserves consisted

chiefly of Croat levies and Szeretshaners, savage troops, whose cruel and predatory disposition has become proverbial in the annals of Germany, and who have through many generations been trained to the sanguinary contests of the Turkish border. They are feared as the most formidable allies of the House of Habsburg, and execrated not for their deeds on the field of battle, but for the ruthlessness of their warfare against the weak and the defenceless. In the religious wars against Sweden, and in the contest with Prussia for the possession of Silesia, the princes of Austria let these bands of midnight assassins and marauders loose on the German countries; plunder, conflagrations, the murder of children, the mutilation of aged men, and violence done to women, marked the path of the 'red-cloaked' soldiers. They massacred their prisoners—or worse, they tortured them to death. Such were the traditions. That their manners and morals were still the same had been shown by the events of the Lombard insurrection in March, 1848. At Milan the Croats burned their prisoners alive, and women of every rank and age were first violated and then cut into pieces. That Baron Jellachich was permitted and encouraged to attack and overrun Hungary with troops whose

practices had acquired such an infamous notoriety, proved the determination of the Imperial House to reconquer Hungary at any price. No other invasion was so terrible as this. No other attack could have roused all ranks, classes, and political parties to so powerful a feeling of danger, and to so firm a resolution to repel the invader. Jellachich, indeed, prefaced his march by a proclamation to the Hungarian nation, informing them that he came to crush the criminal intrigues of a faction, and to free the country from the yoke of a hated, incapable, and rebellious government. He promised to respect all privileges; and protested that he came as a friend and a brother. But the friendship of the Croats, and the brotherhood of the red-cloaked Szeretshanners were so formidable, that the inhabitants of the country protested against these insidious advances. Mr. Kossuth, acting on the spur of the moment, proposed and obtained the sanction of parliament to several important resolutions. The issue of five-florin notes,* the crea-

* Notes of ten shillings. Usually, the bank-notes in Austria are of a lesser amount—viz., of two and four shillings.

tion of a parliamentary army of Honveds, or 'Defenders of the country,' and the incorporation of the Hungarian regiments into this new and essentially national force, were all decreed in less than an hour. It was further resolved to invite the Hungarian soldiers in Italy and elsewhere to return to their country and join the Honved.

These were revolutionary measures. But they were justified by the terrible dilemma in which the parliament was placed. They had either to submit to the discretion of Jellachich and the mercy of his borderers, or to take their salvation into their own hands, by an appeal to the fears, the passions, the exasperation of the moment. It is almost an insult to the Cabinet of Vienna to believe that the violent and revolutionary measures which Mr. Kossuth proposed, and the parliament sanctioned without a single dissentient voice, either surprised or dismayed the Imperial family. Although the events, and the all but fatal result of the war were not foreseen, it was expected that the Croatian invasion would hurry the Hungarians into illegal proceedings, and thus furnish the Imperial government with a pretence for the subjugation, and per-

haps the incorporation of Hungary. To shake off the humiliations of the year 1848—to turn defeat into victory, and resignation into conquest—to have but receded in order to perform a more astonishing feat of strength and agility, was, indeed, a task worthy of the ambition of a family which gloried in that part of its history which connected it with Florence and its proverbial policy. There are strong reasons to suspect that the Archduchess Sophia and her favourites intended to punish Hungary for resisting Jellachich, and Jellachich for attacking Hungary. For although they did not conceal their enmity against the Hungarian Parliament, they were at great pains to give to every one of the Croatian leader's measures the appearance of having been taken without sufficient authority, and at his own peril. The official documents of the time mention the Croatian invasion as 'a quarrel between the Ban and the Hungarian Parliament;' and although the Baron Jellachich was subsidized by the Vienna War Office, and privately encouraged by confidential letters from the Imperial family, he complained, in his correspondence with Count Latour, that he 'was placed in a false position,' and that he wished

'the government would publicly acknowledge him as their agent.'

While he forwarded these complaints to Vienna, he proceeded with his expedition against Great Kanisha; his right wing invested Esseg, and compelled that fortress to hoist the emperor's colours. This done, the Croats, not caring to enter a fortress, which offered but small temptations to their predatory propensities, left the place in the hands of its old commander and garrison, and proceeded to the more profitable task of devastating the neighbouring districts. No obstacles whatever were placed in their way by Count Adam Teleky, who commanded four battalions of the line, four battalions of *gardes mobiles*, three squadrons of hussars, and about 9000 men, landsturm or levies from the counties of Tolna, Shümegh, and Szalad. At the approach of the Croatian army, Teleky fell back upon Keszthely, on the north-western banks of Lake Balaton;* and but for the opposition of his officers, he would have continued his retreat, and left the capitals of Buda and Pesth at the mercy of the Croats. These latter advanced to Szemes, on the south-

* The German name is 'Platten See.'

western bank of the same lake, where the Ban Jellachich established his head-quarters.

Thus threatened, exposed by the cowardice of the commanding general, and apprehensive of treachery at the hands of the other military leaders, who seemed disposed to break the trammels of their divided allegiance, Mr. Kosuth considered that the parliament might still retain the services of the trained officers and troops, if the Palatine could be induced to take an active part in the war against the Croats. The presence of an Austrian prince would legalize the proceedings of the army, and compel the doubtful and wavering among the officers to unconditionally support the cause of Hungary. This view, however plausible, did not meet the facts of the case. The combination of hostile influences, which first paralysed and afterwards cancelled the Emperor's decree against Jellachich, was even more irresistible in its struggle with a junior prince of the Imperial house, and the military chiefs were accustomed to look for favour, patronage, and bounties, not to a Viceroy or the temporary commander of a detached corps, but to the Vienna War Office. Mr. Kosuth, who in the sitting of 15th September pro-

posed that a deputation should solicit the Palatine's assumption of the chief command of the army, was startled when the prince, without a moment's hesitation, intimated his readiness to proceed to the camp. His motives were suspected, and three commissioners appointed to accompany him, and watch his movements. Maurice Perczel was among them. That impetuous young man had, in the early part of the movement, taken the lead against Batthyanyi's Cabinet. But the progress of events and the defeat of Batthyanyi's peaceable policy tended to prepare the future alliance between the hostile factions. Mr. Kossuth shrank from confiding so delicate a mission to the zealous and undiplomatic Perczel; but the urgency of the case admitted of no delay, and other men, better qualified for the office, declined accepting it.

Some delay was, however, caused by the prince, who allowed three days to pass before he assumed the functions of an office which he had accepted with so much eagerness. Before he reached the head-quarters at Keszthely, he had communicated with the Archduke Francis Charles, husband to the

Archduchess Sophia, and he had received his instructions. The Archduke approved his assumption of the chief command, and care was taken to publish the Emperor's and the Archduke's assent to the steps taken by the Palatine. But that prince was secretly instructed neither to offer battle to the Ban nor to accept it. In other words, he was to follow the lead of Adam Teleky and the rest of the Austrian generals: he was to paralyse the forces of Hungary, and retreat at the advance of the Ban.

Amidst the double-dealing and the treachery of that fatal period, it is a relief to find at least one member of the Imperial family of Austria, less dishonest, but also unfortunately less firm, than the rest. It was clearly the intention of the Archduke Francis Charles that the Palatine should by his presence overawe the resolution of the popular leaders; that he should concentrate the armed forces, compel them to inaction, and surrender the country and the capital to the Croatian army. The Palatine Stephen, wavering between the dictates of his heart and his honour, between the guilty family which claimed his services and the country whose rights he had sworn to protect, found a

temporary expedient in negotiations ; and when these proved unavailing ; when his attempts to obtain a personal interview with the Ban Jellachich were met with suspicion and insult ; and when the Croats proceeded to extremities, he left the camp and returned to Buda. On the following night, the Prince, Archduke and Palatine, the Viceroy and Regent of Hungary, suddenly left his palace. He fled from Buda without a single attendant, and in a mean disguise. Seated on a peasant's cart, he crossed the Hungarian frontier into Austria. Other princes, in that eventful year, fled like convicts, alone, disguised, on foot, and under the protection of night. But they made their escape from the fury of a mob which hunted on their track. The Archduke Palatine's case was singular. Perhaps it was weak not to abdicate in plain daylight ; but the trials which of his own free will he confronted at Vienna were more terrible than Mr. Kossuth's violence—more harrowing than the Count Batthyanyi's pleadings. His desertion was a breach of the family compact. His relations would not listen to his justification, and scorned his entreaties to spare the country which had become dear to him. He tendered his resignation. The

offer was greedily accepted, and measures were taken to carry out the designs of the dynasty by the appointment of a more energetic and unscrupulous regent. Such a man was Count Lamberg, a landed proprietor in Hungary, and a field-marshal lieutenant in the army, imbued with its traditions, and an unflinching champion of those high and arbitrary principles of government which have so frequently brought Austria to the brink of ruin. Count Lamberg was appointed to the post of Extraordinary Commissioner for Hungary, entrusted with the chief command of all Hungarian troops, national guards, and bands of volunteers, instructed to proceed to the scene of war, to terminate the hostilities against the Ban Jellachich, and to restore peace and order in Hungary 'as a part of the Austrian monarchy.' He was supported by an Imperial manifesto, ordering the soldiers of the Hungarian army to 'return to the Austrian standard,' and to eschew all acts of hostility against Jellachich.

Count Lamberg's appointment was illegal, for it imposed a dictator while the parliament was assembled, which alone could sanction the grant of extraordinary powers. The

orders to the army were equally illegal, for they reversed the Emperor's former decrees, and showed a deliberate intention to regain by violence what had been lost by pusillanimity.

The news of these hostile measures reached Pesth on the 27th of September, and in an extraordinary sitting of the parliament, L. Madarass moved, and Mr. Kossuth seconded, a resolution against Lamberg's usurped authority. It was carried without a debate and without a single dissentient vote. A proclamation was next proposed by Mr. Kossuth, and sanctioned by the House, denouncing the appointment of Count Lamberg as illegal and invalid; instructing the troops to oppose his commands, and declaring that he, and those who assisted or obeyed him, should be considered as false traitors, and punished accordingly. If the Count Louis Batthyanyi had been present, his influence might have modified these violent measures. The news of the resolutions of the House reached him in the camp, whither he had gone to meet and protect Count Lamberg. Unable to reverse the decree of the House, he sought to neutralize its action, and prevailed upon the parliamentary commissioners, who were charged

with its publication, to delay that fatal act. Count Batthyanyi believed the Dictator, obedient to his master's instructions, would make his appearance at the head-quarters of the army, and from that army he wished to conceal the existence of the resolutions against Count Lamberg, which he considered as that nobleman's death-warrant. He could not prevent their publication at Pesth. That city was filled with volunteers from all parts of the country. Savage herdsmen from the plains of the Theiss, peasants from the mountain districts, boatmen from the Lower Danube, in strange and uncouth dresses, wielding their rustic weapons ; volunteers of the free corps, full of martial ardour and eager to flesh their maiden swords ; exiled Poles, the bloodhounds of revolutions, whom accident or instinct collects at all scenes of carnage ; vagrant gipsies and travelling Jews thronged the streets of the two capitals, and crowded the bridge which joins Buda to Pesth. They knew of the Emperor's decrees ; they knew the doom which the parliament had pronounced against the tool of the Cabinet, and they watched anxiously and impatiently for the courier who was to bring the news of the traitor's arrival in the camp.

This rude, suspicious, and half-maddened crowd swayed tumultuously from one part of the two cities to another, as the misgivings of individuals, taken up at random, swelled into rumours, while every insignificant item of intelligence was distorted and magnified into an appalling event. At one time, the shouts of the populace were hushed into absolute silence, as the tale crept from lip to lip that Jellachich had left his cantonments—that he was marching upon the capital—that the Croats were at Stuhlweissenburg. Again it was said an Austrian conspiracy had been discovered. The commander of Buda intended to steal the Hungarian crown, the crown of St. Stephen, and the Regalia, which were connected with so many cherished traditions and wild superstitions. The crown of St. Stephen was to be taken to Vienna! The populace turning in horror and dismay to oppose this sacrilegious scheme, was met by another distorted fact. Count Lamberg, the dictator, was at Buda—the commander of the fortress submitted to his authority—he had ordered the gates to be closed—the batteries were about to open upon Pesth and the Parliament House. As this news spread through the

crowd with the rapidity of lightning, the infuriated people, uttering wild cries, and brandishing their swords, pikes, scythes, and pickaxes, rushed to the bridge, to occupy the fortress and prevent the closing of the gates.

On the bridge they met Count Lamberg on his way to Pesth, where he intended to announce his mission to the parliament. He was recognised, and dragged into the road. He had been denounced by Kossuth, and sentenced by the parliament. In vain did the unfortunate man sue for mercy; vainly did he plead his duty and his master's orders; and vainly was the Emperor's decree, with the Sovereign's seal and sign-manual, held forth by his trembling hands. It was a scene of unutterable confusion: a storm of oaths, the crash of arms, a long, piercing death-cry—and as the dense masses severed and rolled back, they dragged the Emperor's lieutenant at their heels, a distorted and mangled corpse. The murderers ran through the streets of Pesth, holding high their blood-stained weapons, and one man, it is asserted, entered the Parliament House, his sword reeking with the blood of the victim.

There can be no doubt that the death of Count Lamberg at Pesth, as well as the assassi-

nation of the Prince Lichnowsky and Major Auerswald at Frankfort, are chargeable on the absurd interpretation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which in 1848 was rife throughout the countries of the continent. The advocates and parasites of popular power had so long and so loudly proclaimed that the will of the sovereign people was a sacred law, and that the people's will was the voice of God, which must be right, that every part and fraction of the people claimed the sanctity of inspiration for its whims, passions, and prejudices. But the burden of the guilt does not lie only on the agitators of that fatal period: no! part of it falls on those who, by precept and example, accustomed the continental nations to consider sovereign power, no matter with whom it rested, entitled to defy all laws human and divine, and to believe that the strong hand must do right, whatever it may do. Those who revile Mr. Kossuth for directing the weapon which struck down Count Lamberg, should not spare Francis II. who forged it.

There is no evidence to show that Mr. Kossuth and the members of the Pesth parliament instigated the populace to the murder of Count

Lamberg, although they placed themselves in the position of 'accessories after the fact.' They voted, indeed, an address to the Emperor, lamenting the unfortunate accident, and they instructed the magistrates of Pesth to arrest and punish the assassins. But due diligence was not used in the execution of this decree; the assassins were allowed to go at large and boast of their crime. So notorious were they, that, at a later period, they were with the greatest ease captured, tried, and convicted by the Austrian authorities.

For Mr. Kossuth it may be pleaded that the criminals were protected by the passions of the populace, and that the dangers of the time compelled the government to concentrate the whole of its strength against the Ban Jellachich and his army, which had actually advanced to Stuhlweissenburg, while General Moga, who succeeded Count Adam Teleky in the command of the Hungarian army, had withdrawn his forces to Velencze, about nine miles from Buda. To save the capital from the violence of the Croats had now become a duty. The country was, moreover, without a legal government, for Count Batthyanyi's return to office had not obtained the emperor's sanction. Another revo-

lutionary measure appeared unavoidable. Mr. Kossuth originated that measure, when he prevailed upon the parliament to entrust the executive power to an Extraordinary Commission for the Defence of the Country, of which he was appointed the president, and whose members, with the exception of Messaros and Pazmandy, were taken from the leaders of the radical party. Count Louis Batthyanyi stood aloof. That nobleman refused to direct the war against his sovereign's troops, but he volunteered as a private soldier to carry arms in defence of his country.

On the 29th of September, the day after Lamberg's assassination, the Hungarian army was drawn up on the high level land between Sukuro and Pakozd, to defend the road from Stuhlweissenburg to Buda. Their right wing rested on Csala, their centre occupied the Sukuro road, and their left wing and reserve leant on Velenceze. They mustered 16,000 men, troops of the line, national guards, and volunteer corps, with a few irregular battalions. They had thirty-six field-pieces. This small force was the nucleus of that great army, which a few month later threatened the existence of the Austrian empire, and which remained un-

conquered even when the power of Russia came to the rescue of the Habsburgs.

The Ban Jellachich brought 30,000 men and fifty-eight pieces of artillery into the field. He attacked the right wing of the Hungarians with the intention of turning their flank and driving them into the marshes of Velenceze. His centre sought to force the Hungarian centre on the Sukuro road, and advance upon Buda. But the Croats shrank from the attack; and when, after four hours' skirmishing, the Hungarians showed no disposition to leave the field, the Ban retreated to Stuhlweissenburg. General Moga, who bivouacked on the field of battle, retreated on the following day, and pitched his camp at Martonvasar. His partial success, magnified by popular rumour, and announced as a splendid victory, roused the peasantry against the invaders. The tocsin sounded from all the steeples in their rear. Intimidated and obstructed on his line of retreat, the Ban solicited and obtained an armistice of three days. According to the rules of war, which all civilized nations know and respect, the belligerent armies must, during an armistice, remain in the exact positions which they occupied

at the time of its conclusion. It is a breach of faith either to advance or to retreat. The Ban Jellachich pledged and forfeited a soldier's honour, when, on the 1st of October, he turned aside, and led his army in forced marches towards the Austrian frontier. On the second day he reached Kisber, and desired admittance into Komorn. The gates of that fortress were closed against him. Marching onwards through Raab, he crossed the frontiers of Austria Proper on the 6th of October.

According to the terms of the truce, the armistice expired on the 3rd of October. On that day the Hungarian forces were led against Stuhlweissenburg, where they found an empty camp. But the Croatian reserves, which, commanded by the generals Roth and Phillipovich, were marching to join Jellachich, arrived too late to accompany him on his flight. They received the news of his march on the road, and turned aside to follow him into Austria. At Ozora, where they attempted to cross the river Sió, they were met by the national guards of Tolna, and compelled to surrender to a corps of 6000 men, under Colonel M. Perczel and Major Arthur Görgey. On the 6th of October, these two young officers

received the swords of two generals and fifty-one officers of various grades, and returned to Pesth with 8000 prisoners, twelve field pieces, and a large number of baggage and ammunition wagons. Another Croatian force of 3000 men, which had been left in charge of the depôts of Great and Lesser Kanisha, was attacked and routed by the national guards of the counties of Zala and Eisenburg. Of the 40,000 troops which the Ban Jellachich led into Hungary, he brought but 15,000 into Austria; and so poor and neglected was the condition of this remnant, that the disaffected among the Viennese said the Ban's soldiers had lost their shoes by dint of hard running.

The court and the cabinet had, meanwhile, over-speculated on Jellachich's success. His bulletins showed him marching from victory to victory. He announced on the 28th of September, that Buda and Pesth were to be occupied within the next three days. His despatches to that effect reached Vienna simultaneously with the news of the assassination of Count Lamberg. To reward the success of their ally, and to retaliate upon the people which defied the court and murdered its agents,

it was resolved to strike another and a decisive blow against the cabinet, the parliament, and the nationality of Hungary.

On the 3rd of October, the Emperor was induced to sign a manifesto, which dissolved the parliament, reversed its resolutions, proclaimed martial law, and the suspension of ordinary jurisdiction throughout Hungary, and invested the Ban with the full power and authority of an Imperial Commissioner and Alter Ego of the Sovereign, so that whatever the Ban of Croatia should 'order, regulate, determine, and command,' was to be considered as 'ordered, regulated, determined, and commanded' by the Emperor himself. Letters were addressed to the military commanders in Hungary, ordering them to obey the Ban's instructions in all things, and to subject all their measures to his approval. Care was taken to defeat the constitutional opposition of the Pesth parliament by a strict adherence to forms; and Baron Recsey, a lieutenant in the guards, consented, for a donation of 1600*l.*, to endorse these violent edicts. The rest, it was thought, might safely be left to the victorious Jellachich. But as some resistance was expected in the Magyar

districts, measures were taken to convey troops and artillery into Hungary. These auxiliaries were to leave Vienna on the 6th of October. On their march through the town, they were surrounded by a mob, and entreated not to fight against the Hungarians, since the Austrian liberties were bound up with those of Hungary. The soldiers wavered and hesitated. The officers in command urged them on. Violent language was resorted to: blows followed. Some companies fired upon the populace, others supported the people. The labourers, national guards, and students, supported by the mutineers, put the troops to flight, stormed the arsenal and the War-office, and killed Count Latour, the secretary at war, whose duplicity and treasonable correspondence with Jellachich, though long suspected, had but lately been exposed. The emperor and his family fled to Moravia, and on the morning of the 7th October, when the fugitive Ban approached Vienna, he was met by the news of a successful revolution.

Foremost among the charges which the Austrian writers in the Cabinet and the press have advanced against the Hungarian parliament, stands the accusation that the Vienna revolu-

tion and the assassination of Count Latour were provoked by Hungarian advice and bribes. The Count Louis Batthyanyi, in particular, has been charged with having, by means of Francis Pulszky, the most subtle and active of Mr. Kossuth's partisans, corrupted the Austrian press, parliament, and soldiery. This accusation remains unsubstantiated. Though often repeated, no credible evidence has been brought forward in support of it; and the Austrian writers, while they state '*it is asserted by a respectable witness—a person well acquainted with the state of the case deposes*'—have never been able to support their allegations by quoting a single witness whose name and character would convince an impartial and conscientious judge. Their gratuitous assertion that three of the most important classes of society—Austrian journalists, legislators, and soldiers—were open to wholesale bribery, proves the degradation of a government which volunteers to defame its own nation to colour an act of private revenge.

If proof were wanting to show that the Vienna revolution of October, 1848, was an unpremeditated act of popular zeal and ferocity, it might be furnished by the conduct

of the Viennese and the Hungarians after the eventful day which established an impassable gulf between the Habsburg dynasty and its subjects. The citizens of Vienna, astonished and awed by their success, took no steps to follow up their victory, to defeat the rest of the Emperor's troops, which, commanded by General Auersperg, were encamped within gun-shot of the capital, and throw the disorganized band of the Croats back upon their Hungarian pursuers. These last, in their turn, might have marched into Austria, occupied the capital, and detached armed bands into the disaffected districts of Styria, Austria Proper, and Gallicia. The two combined might have carried the fiery cross from one extremity of the empire to the other. Nothing of the kind was attempted. The revolutionists of 1848 professed to despise despotic power, and the delay and duplicity of diplomatic transactions; but they were as arbitrary in their sway, and as dilatory and intriguing in their proceedings, as the governments which they sought to displace. The Viennese wasted their time in sending ambassadors and deputations to the Emperor at Olmütz and to the Hungarian general, Moga, at Parendorf. General Moga sent messengers

to treat with the common council and the parliament of Vienna. The Viennese wished the Hungarians to occupy their town without a special invitation. The Hungarians professed to respect the Austrian territory, and though desirous of occupying the capital, they waited for the Vienna parliament to give them a bill of indemnity.

While compliments and professions of sympathy and goodwill were thus being bandied between the head-quarters of the two insurrections, the Imperial family took measures to regain their power, and revenge themselves on their enemies. German, Bohemian, and Polish regiments marched upon Vienna, under the command of Prince Windishgrätz, a Moravian landowner and officer of high rank, whose services during the insurrection at Prague, in the summer of 1848, had been so successful that he was considered the mainstay of the house of Habsburg. This general's troops, supported by the forces under Auersperg and Jellachich, invested the capital on all sides, and stormed the suburbs at the point of the bayonet. The fortified city capitulated after a siege of eight days; but the capitulation was broken when the news of the

advance of the Hungarians spread among the besieged, and the insurgents, reduced by a general attack of the Imperialists, were treated with revolting cruelty.

General Moga, who would gladly have shirked the responsibility and danger of attacking the Emperor's army, was, by the distrust and the exasperation of his officers, compelled to cross the river Laytha, which forms the frontier between Austria Proper and Hungary. On the evening of the 29th October, he bivouacked at Shwadorf, and the following day he led 16,000 regular troops, 14,000 irregulars, and 90 pieces of artillery against the Austrians at Shwechat. The united armies of Windishgrätz, Jellachich, and Auersperg numbered 80,000 old troops, with 250 cannon. The Imperialist generals were resolute and elated with success. The Hungarian leader oscillated between two dangers: he feared a victory almost as much as a defeat. The Austrians had the advantage of being strongly entrenched at Shwechat, Mannsworth, and Kaisers Ebersdorf. The second of these positions was stormed by the right wing of the Hungarians under Colonel Bárczay and Major Guyon; while their centre, under Colonels Lázár and

Görgey, advanced upon Shwechat; and their left wing, under Colonel Repasy, attacked the heights of Himberg. In the first hours of the battle, the Imperialists endeavoured to outflank the Hungarians on their left,—a dangerous movement on so long a line. This was shown by the success of the enemy, who, in despite of their numerical inferiority, continued to advance, until at noon Prince Windishgrätz concentrated his artillery in and around Shwechat, from whence he opened a murderous fire upon the Hungarians, silenced their artillery, and routed their young militia. General Moga retreated, while Colonel Repasy and Major Guyon kept the Imperialists in check; on the last day of October, his army re-crossed the Laytha, and returned to Parendorf. The unsuccessful leader was compelled to resign, and Mr. Kossuth, as President of the Committee of Defence, gave the command of the forces to Colonel Görgey.

Arthur Görgey, at one time a subaltern in the Austrian army, resigned his commission when no patriotic motives could have prompted that step. Poor and unprotected, it is to be presumed that the slowness of a military career jarred upon his impatient ambition. Though no other profes-

sion was open to him, he sacrificed the scanty pay of a continental subaltern with the same cynical indifference which he displayed on other momentous occasions, and he devoted himself to a life of misery and privations. Ill-dressed, fed, and lodged, he passed several years in the chemical laboratories at Vienna and Prague. Even at that time, his military bearing, tall and active figure, and saturnine aspect, the roughness and studied brutality of his address, his neglected hair and beard, and the torn and filthy raiment which appeared a matter of choice rather than of necessity, awakened the curiosity of strangers, and amused and perplexed his friends. He preferred, or pretended to prefer, the coarsest food, and even of this he ate sparingly. He would leave his wretched attic to sleep on a stone floor, or on the hard and frozen earth. In all this there was much discipline, but also much temper and affectation. He delighted in appearing mysterious, unaccountable, impenetrable. The obtrusive contempt with which he affected to regard social customs and the opinions of men betrayed his thirst for notoriety.

When Jellachich's invasion threatened Hungary, Görgey offered his services to the Bat-

thyanyi Cabinet. They were readily accepted, and he was charged with the organization and the command of a free corps, and instructed to defend the banks of the Danube, near the island of Csepel. While on this station, his troops captured Count Zichy, a wealthy nobleman and descendant of an old Hungarian family. This man was taken under circumstances which warranted the gravest suspicions. The documents found on him left no doubt that he carried on a treasonable correspondence with the enemy, and that he was in the habit of informing Jellachich of the plans and movements of the Hungarians. The practice of espousing the national cause openly, and of secretly communicating with the Cabinet of Vienna, or the Croatian invaders, had become general. Such was the indifference or duplicity of the Austrian officers, who commanded almost all the native corps, that an extensive system of espionage was carried on by numbers of officers, noblemen, and gentlemen, who, doubting the end, wished to gain the good opinion and to merit the thanks of either party. The rules of war of all nations know but of one punishment for a traitor and a spy. In the present instance, the culprit was a

nobleman, a member of the Emperor's household, and the scion of an illustrious and powerful family. Major Görgey saw nothing but the spy. The Count Zichy was tried by court-martial, condemned, and executed. The government at Pesth confiscated his possessions, and the result proved that Görgey's act was as judicious as it was just. It terrified the trimmers, and drove them to the Imperial standard, where they did no harm to the cause of Hungary. Hence Görgey had a twofold claim on Mr. Kossuth's confidence. His operations against the Croatian reserves, and his conduct at Shwechat, showed that he, at least, would not dally with the enemy. The 'murderer of Count Zichy,' as the Austrian journals called him, was a doomed man, unless the Hungarian struggle proved successful. No other native officer had given equal proofs of zeal, energy, and devotion. Mr. Kossuth's selection of a commander-in-chief, was, moreover, highly flattering to the national Magyar party, and to those Hungarians who had served in the Austrian army. This class of persons received an important addition to their numbers by the wholesale desertion of the Emperor's Hungarian Noble Guard, who at an early

period of the struggle left their barracks at Vienna with the hope of greater licence and splendid fortunes in the ranks of the national army. The services of these young men were highly prized by the parliament. Favours and promotions were lavished upon them; nor were the motives suspected which induced these military adventurers to discard the Habsburg colours for the Hungarian *tricolore*.

Indeed there was little time for reflection. After the fall of Vienna, Prince Windishgrätz pushed his outposts to the banks of the Laytha. Jellachich's Croats, again provided with arms and ammunition, were ready for the field. Large masses of troops advanced from Bohemia, and the Gallician garrisons detached their super-numerary battalions against the defiles of Jablunka. Troops from Styria approached Lake Balaton. General Puchner occupied Transylvania. The Servians under Suplicacz threatened the Banat and the Bacska in the south. The Hungarian army, dispirited by its defeat at Shwechat, was still disorganized. Mr. Kossuth travelled through the country, seeking, by moving appeals and fiery speeches, to create a public opinion among the illiterate

peasantry, and rouse them to resistance against the power of Austria.

The friends and eulogists of that remarkable man have alternately extolled his administrative genius, his political sagacity, and his rare and subtle diplomacy. But they have scarcely done justice to his most brilliant talents and most prominent qualities. It is impossible to follow Mr. Kossuth's career without becoming convinced that, as an agitator, he was superior to any demagogue of ancient or modern times. He has often been compared to Mr. O'Connell, whom he surpassed in singleness of purpose, earnestness of feeling, and blindness of faith in the mission which he believed himself predestined to perform. At the commencement of his career, he created public opinion among the upper classes of his countrymen by establishing a newspaper press. He inspired and organized parliamentary parties; he defined and concentrated their action, and, even as a minister, he favoured and strengthened the opposition by an appearance of official moderation. But it was the second part of his task which called forth his chief energies. Great as the power of the press is in England, its influence is next to nothing in the east of

Europe. The population of the counties on the Theiss and Danube; the Magyar peasants and herdsmen, the vagrant gipsies, and the trading Jews are alike strangers to the artificial sympathies of civilized society. Even the few who have learnt to read are impressible rather by the ear than by the eye. In addressing himself to the great mass of his nation, Mr. Kossuth discarded the press, and, travelling from county to county, and from town to town, convening popular assemblies, and appearing in public wherever he went, he spoke to the pride, the prejudices, and the patriotism of his countrymen, elevating his diction to the wild poesy of their ideas, and appealing to *Magyar Isten*, to that peculiar deity which guides the destinies of his chosen people, the Magyars. He reminded his hearers of the aggressions and spoliations of the foreign usurpers, and told them the time had come when the Hungarians must be a free people or a despised race of outcasts on the face of the earth. The impression of these speeches was powerful, enduring, almost ineradicable. They awoke the dormant energies, they directed the enthusiasm, and concentrated the discontents of a nation, which

now, for the first time, was taught to trace individual sufferings home to national calamities, to visit the misdeeds of its agrarian tyrants on the heads of their foreign abettors, and to consider the independence of their country as certain to be attended by all those blessings of harmony and plenty which tyros in politics love to dream of in some ideal Utopia. National guards, militia, and free corps rose, as if by magic, in the track of the Agitator, and Mr. Kossuth, of all men, may boast that it was his to realize the poet's idea of an impossibility, and to 'stamp soldiers from out the soil.'

CHAPTER IV.

Prince Windishgrätz.—His Plan of Operations.—Delusions.—The 2nd December, 1848.—A Declaration of Rights.—Muster of the Belligerents.—Windishgrätz at Presburg—Retreat from Raab.—Battle of Moor.—Mendacious Bulletins.—Retreat to Debreczin.—Arrest of Count Batthyanyi.—Combat at Tetenz.—Occupation of Buda and Pesth.

ALFRÉD, Prince Windishgrätz, has been the object of much undeserved praise and blame. His siege and conquest of the open town of Vienna have been compared to some of the most brilliant achievements of ancient and modern times. He has been accused of having, by unnecessary delays, permitted the Hungarians to recover from the shock of the battle of Shwechat. It has been said, that with too high an opinion of his own station and talents, he entertained a proportionate contempt for the Hungarian leaders. These charges are founded upon the circumstantial evidence of the Prince's character and career. The descendant of an ancient house, bred to the stately courtesies of the Imperial palace, invested with command in early life before he

had learned to obey, and grown grey amidst courtly festivals, the chase, and the dissipations of the mess-table, his vision limited, and his ideas ground down to triviality by his exclusive intercourse with one class of society only—and that class, perhaps, the least instructed, and certainly the most ignorant of the necessities and duties of practical every-day life—the Prince Windishgrätz was incapable of understanding the causes and appreciating the resources of a popular movement. Stern, haughty, and reserved from his earliest days, as he grew in age and power, he sought to ape the most prominent, but least essential qualities of the Dukes of Wallenstein and Alva. Governor of Prague, in the summer of 1848, when that city became a prey to the horrors of an ultra-national insurrection, the Habsburgs had to thank his sullen firmness for the preservation of the second capital of their empire, and with it, of the kingdom of Bohemia. The bombardment of Prague, and the easy conquest of Vienna, were not calculated to give him a high opinion of insurrectionary tactics. The plan for an invasion of Hungary had been drawn up by Count Latour. Its leading features tallied with the schemes of Prince Windishgrätz, and

with his views of the strength and power of resistance of the Magyar leaders. According to this plan, the object to be kept in view was, not to re-conquer Hungary, and expel Mr. Kossuth and his party, but to surround them on all sides, to invade the country from all quarters, to snare the leaders as in a net, and leave them no choice but death or unconditional surrender. The framers of this scheme anticipated immediate success, and prepared for the most deliberate revenge. In the north-east of Hungary, along the frontiers of Austria, Gallicia, Moravia, and Styria, regiment after regiment was posted, until the whole line became a vast camp. An army of 65,000 men was concentrated in and around Vienna, with directions to advance on the military roads on either bank of the Danube, and occupy Buda and Pesth. A small corps of 9000 men, under General Simunich, left its cantonments in Moravia, and entered the valley of the Lower Waag, for the purpose of effecting a junction with a corps at Tyrnau. Another corps of 9000 men, then in Silesia, and commanded by General Götz, was to pass through the defiles of Jablunka into the valley of the Upper Waag, and to occupy the mountain districts and cities of Shemnitz and Kremnitz ;

while General Shlick's corps of 24,000 men, quartered in Galicia, received orders to march through the defiles of Dukla upon Eperies.

In the west, General Puchner, with 32,000 men, was in possession of Transylvania. From that province, he was commanded to enter the valley of the Maros, effect a junction with the garrison of Temesvar, relieve the fortress of Arad, and occupy the Banat; while, in the south, the Servian Landsturm of 30,000 men, rose to occupy the Baczka, and assist General Puchner in reducing Szegedin and Vasarhely. The Generals Trebersberg and Dahlen were to advance in the south-east, by way of Fünfkirchen, and General Nugent, with 12000 men, from the east—i. e., from Styria, was to occupy the districts round Lake Balaton, to intercept the retreat of a Hungarian corps under Perczel, and generally to prevent the junction of the Hungarian forces in the south on the Drave, and in the north on the Laytha. These arrangements were complicated, uncertain, and dilatory. It took some weeks before all the corps were apprised of the commander-in-chief's intentions, before the weaker corps had received their reinforcements of fresh levies from Bohemia and Italy, and before they were all sup-

plied with ammunition, provisions, and the manifold requirements for a winter campaign. The Hungarian leaders expected no expedition before the return of spring. Mr. Kossuth, writing to Görgey, on the 5th December, says :—

‘I cannot believe that Windishgrätz will attack us before the end of the winter. By that time, I can have an army of 60,000 men, with 200 guns. I am more than ever convinced that you and I are destined to save the country, as a reward for which service, I hope to pass the rest of my days in some rural retreat as a farmer; while you, general, will, I trust, live to be professor of chemistry.’

While Mr. Kossuth professed hopes which were too modest to be sincere, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief wasted some valuable days in the puerile occupation of collating and publishing a *hue and cry* after Mr. Kossuth, his wife, the Generals Görgey, Perczel, Messaros, and other members of the Hungarian parliament, declaring that the said persons were running about and hiding themselves, and offering rewards for their apprehension. To justly appreciate this measure it must be considered that Hungary was in arms, and that

Mr. Kossuth reigned more absolute at Pesth than his sovereign and lord at Olmütz.

That unfortunate monarch felt the reins of power fast slipping from his grasp. His debility and utter helplessness had for years past made him an object of pity to his people, and of scorn to his relatives. Yielding, less to the superior wisdom than to the superior strength of those who surrounded him, he had, ever since the commencement of the great European convulsion, been hurried into acts whose consequences lay beyond the range of his vision. Those consequences—the devastation of his fairest provinces, the rebellion of his most loyal subjects, the death of Count Lamberg, the Vienna insurrection, and the assassination of his Secretary-at-War—appeared to him like so many acts of Divine vengeance. The Nemesis of history, whose awful retribution is a mystery to the eyes of the cunning and the wise, was revealed to the gaze of this idiotic prince. His family were bent upon wreaking their vengeance on Hungary. He wished but for peace. He would not consent to the war. All entreaties, all threats (for so great was the decline of his powers that even threats passed unresented), received no other response

but the moaning cry, 'My oath! my oath!— I have sworn a holy oath!' He clung to that oath in obstinate conscientiousness, and refused to sanction the annihilation of Hungary, because he had sworn to respect her constitution.

It is impossible to say what scenes were enacting in the secret chambers of the palace at Olmütz during the last week of November, 1848. Early on the 3rd of December, the subjects of the Austrian crown were startled by the news of an important state act. On the 2nd December—the day which, three years later, became a fateful day in the annals of the French nation—the members of the Imperial family, the ministers of the crown, and the military chiefs of the Empire were assembled in the great hall of Olmütz Palace. Prince Shwartzenberg, the premier; Count Stadion, his colleague and chief supporter; Dr. Bach, at one time a successful barrister and agitator in the manner of Kossuth, but now Great Justiciary of the Empire; Mr. Bruck, whom the revolution had raised to the Presidency of the Board of Trade; Prince Windishgrätz; the Baron Jellachich, resplendent in scarlet and gold as general of the red-cloaked Szeretshanners, surrounded the Archduke Francis

Charles, heir-apparent to the throne; the Archduchess Sophia, his wife; and the Archduke Francis Joseph, his son, then a boy of eighteen. The Emperor entered, pale, dejected, and resigned. He repeated, with a faltering voice, the formula of abdication, which the privy council had drawn up for the purpose. The Archduke Francis Charles next resigned his claims to the throne. Ferdinand, for the last time exercising a sovereign's power, surrendered the crown to his nephew; 'because,' as stated in the formula, 'the necessities of the time required the energies of a younger man.' That evening, the deposed monarch left Olmütz, and proceeded into a temporary exile at Prague.

Francis Joseph of Austria signalized his advent by two important edicts. His first proclamation, announcing his assumption of the purple, stated his 'firm resolution of maintaining the splendour of the crown;' and for that purpose he relied 'chiefly and implicitly on the tried gallantry, loyalty, and perseverance of his glorious army.' His second edict was directed against Hungary. He denounced the 'rebellious few,' who, by their terrorism, compelled a most loyal nation

to revolt ; but he declared that that nation had forfeited its privileges and constitution ; and thenceforward Hungary must be considered an integral part of the Austrian monarchy. Prince Windishgrätz was commanded to reduce it to that state, and unlimited powers were given him for 'the due punishment of the rebels.'

The German and Bohemian subjects of the empire received the news of Ferdinand's resignation with amazement, but without opposition. Austria Proper was overawed by a hundred thousand bayonets. The Bohemian Czechs, with that fatal animosity of race which, in all domestic dissensions, constitutes the firmest basis of the Habsburg dynasty, rejoiced in the prospect of the downfall of Hungary. The parliament at Pesth alone protested against Francis Joseph and his usurpation of the Crown. Although dissolved by the edict of the 3rd of October, the sittings of that body continued ; and on the motion of L. Madarass, a declaration was voted, asserting the peculiar condition of Hungary as a separate kingdom, its rights to its constitution and to the laws made or assented to by the nation. They protested, further, that no family arrangements

respecting the Imperial throne of Austria could legally affect the Royal crown of Hungary; that a vacancy of the Hungarian throne was possible only in case of the demise of the legally crowned king, and that in such a case the heir to the throne was bound to sign a coronation treaty, to take his oath to the constitution, and to accept the kingdom of Hungary and the crown of St. Stephen at the hands of the national delegates. And finally, they flung back the reproach which the new Emperor had cast upon them, by insinuating that their King Ferdinand was the victim of a rebellious conspiracy, and, 'those who submitted to the authority of Francis Joseph were to be considered as traitors to the country.'

Measures were taken to support this parliamentary defiance. Whatever troops and bands of volunteers could be collected were sent to support the various corps on the frontiers. General Görgey, with 30,000 men and 60 field-pieces, protected the border against the main body of the Imperialists. His head-quarters were at Presburg.

General Meszaros, with 14,000 men and 32 guns, opposed General Shlick in the northern counties. Another force of 14,000 men and 30

guns, under General Kis, occupied the Bacska and the Banat ; and the Pole, Bem, who offered his services to Mr. Kossuth, was sent to Transylvania, with instructions to create an army, and to clear that province from the Austrian troops and the Wallachian levies under General Puchner.

Of the fortresses, Arad and Temesvar were in the hands of the Imperialists, but Esseg, Peterwarasdin, and Komorn were held by national troops and officers.

The total of the Imperialist forces amounted to 110,000 men and 256 guns. The Hungarians had 58,000 armed men, one-half of whom were irregulars, and 120 field-pieces, the majority of which were hardly fit for use. Their cavalry was excellent, though light, and at a disadvantage when opposed to the helmeted and cuirassed troopers of the Imperial army. Their regular infantry, commanded by officers trained in the Austrian ranks, could stand its ground against equal numbers of Imperial troops ; but their volunteer corps and battalions of Honveds were, at that early period of the war, badly armed and clothed, and, in spite of their enthusiasm, unable to cope with the superior discipline, steady-

ness, and perseverance of old soldiers. It was clearly the interest of the Imperialists to draw their enemies into a general and decisive engagement. The Hungarians were equally interested in prolonging the war, in exposing the Austrian army to the fatigues of a long march and the inclemency of the season, and in harassing them by a petty and irregular warfare, which is most annoying and destructive to veteran troops, trained to the complicated manœuvres of the parade ground.

On the 15th of December, all preparations being made, the signal for a general invasion of Hungary was given by Prince Windishgrätz, whose army crossed the frontier near Bruck, on the Laytha. On the following day he fought his first battle on Hungarian ground, and took Parendorf, after a violent cannonade, which compelled the Hungarian forces to retreat upon Raab, while the Imperialists occupied Wieselburg. On the same day an Imperialist column advanced upon Presburg, and entered Theben without encountering opposition. General Simunich's corps, marching from Nadaz, attacked Tirnau, where Colonel Guyon, an Englishman,—the Major Guyon of Schwechat,—commanded a detachment of 2000

men. He might have fallen back upon Presburg, or upon the marshy banks of the Waag: but obedient to Görgey's orders he gallantly held out against General Simunich's corps of 9000, and after an engagement of two hours, he was surrounded on all sides. In this distressing situation, Colonel Guyon was saved by his reckless bravery. Concentrating what remained of his corps, he cut his way through the dense masses which occupied his line of retreat, and, with a loss of 800 men and five guns, he brought his troops to Komorn, where, on the 17th, he was joined by the garrison of Presburg. On the evening of that day, the army of Prince Windishgrätz occupied the whole line from Oedenburg to Tirnau, and measures were taken for the pacification of that part of the country. Courts-martial were established at Presburg; troops were quartered upon the friends and relatives of the Hungarian leaders and members of parliament; detachments of horse scoured the country in search of fugitive insurgents. Fines were imposed upon the landed gentry, and large contributions of labour and provisions exacted from the peasantry. Frau von Udvarnoky, who had given shelter and food to some Hungarian

officers, was arrested, tried, and whipped in the market-place of Presburg.

General Görgey, meanwhile, concentrated his cavalry and some detachments of mounted artillery in front of Altenburg, to protect the retreat of his infantry upon Raab. On the 18th of December, this rearguard was attacked by the vanguard of the Imperialists. The Ban Jellachich, with two regiments of horse and one flying battery, advancing from Sommerein, formed his heavy troopers in line on the plain of Altenburg. His artillery opened upon the Hungarian hussars. Its fire was returned by Görgey's batteries, whose guns did so much execution among the cuirassiers, that they wavered, and lost ground. At that moment they were charged by the hussars, their line was broken and driven back upon Lichtenstein's corps, which came up to support the Ban. So complete was the rout of the Imperialist cavalry, that the hussars were allowed unmolested to follow the *gros* of their army to Raab, where they arrived on the 20th, and where General Görgey proposed to wait for Perczel's corps, and, supported by him to accept battle from Prince Windishgrätz.

This resolution might have been fatal to the

cause of Hungary, for Görgey's small army was dispirited by a five days' retreat, while their enemies were emboldened by success. His position at Raab was protected by entrenchments, and by the confluence of two rivers, which at any other season would have been a formidable obstacle in the way of an advancing army. But owing to the severity of the winter of 1848, the Rabnitz and the Raab-Danube were frozen over, so that even cavalry and heavy ordnance could have crossed over the ice. The entrenchments were too extensive, and too slight, and they were, moreover, badly placed. Görgey's army at Raab was thus exposed on its flanks and rear, while its front had but an indifferent protection. Fortunately for them, they waited five days in vain for the arrival of Perczel's corps, and on Christmas-day, when the Imperialist vanguard came in sight, Görgey reluctantly consented to obey the orders which Mr. Kossuth had transmitted to him from Pesth, to evacuate Raab, and retreat on the road to Buda. His march remained unmolested by the Austrians, who, deceived by his previous intentions, concentrated their army in front of the city, with a view of storming it. This cautious advance

cost them two days. They occupied Raab on the 27th, and immediately despatched their vanguard in pursuit of Görgey's corps. Ottlinger's cavalry brigade, which headed the pursuit, overtaking the Hungarian rearguard at Babolna, routed and put them to flight, killing 400, and capturing 700. Among the captives was Major Zel, who was picked up on the field of battle, bleeding from sixteen wounds. He was tried by court-martial, and sentenced to twelve years incarceration in heavy irons. The *misericorde* of the mediæval warriors was mercy compared to this treatment.

On the 29th December, General Görgey's army was concentrated at Bicske, still waiting for General Perczel, who on that day met the troops of the Ban Jellachich at Moor. Retreating in a parallel line with Görgey, and anxious to effect a junction, he came to Moor, and occupied that place when the approach of the enemy's vanguard was reported by his patrols. Two battalions of his corps had been detached at Körmönd, his ranks were thinned by the casualties and the fatigues of forced marches, and he had but 5000 men and sixteen guns, to oppose to a hostile force of 10,000 men, 3000 horses, and thirty-two pieces of

artillery. But Maurice Perczel, the Hotspur of the Hungarian war, considered nothing except the advantages which the ground offered to his evolutions.

He afterwards excused his rashness by protesting that he expected assistance from Görgey. The road from Babolna to Moor, on which the Imperialists advanced, leads through the mountainous forest of Bakonyi,—in peace the haunt of outlawed robbers, in war, of guerillas. About three miles from Moor, the road, emerging from the forest, runs some distance through the plain, and then ascends a range of low but steep hills, which command the town on the one side, and the approach from the forest on the other. General Perczel placed his sixteen field-pieces on these heights, and, as the first columns of the Imperialists issued from the forest, his artillery opened upon them. For two hours the Hungarian gunners did their work bravely and successfully. The Imperialists made vain endeavours to debouch from the dense wood, which equally concealed and obstructed their movements, but every attempt to gain a footing, and form on the plain, was defeated by the fire of Perczel's artillery. By degrees, the body of the corps

came up with the forlorn hope which had opened the engagement. Some twelve-pounders issued from the thick underwood to the right of the road, and unlimbered in the clearing. They opened upon the left wing of the Hungarians, who returned the fire with interest. Other guns debouched, and took their station to the left of the road. On the road itself, the Walmoden cuirassiers advanced, and formed quickly, and in good order, in front of the Hungarian lines. These preparations were scarcely made, when Perczel's fire slackened. The Austrian batteries advanced, unlimbered, fired and advanced again, and when this manœuvre was repeated for the third time, the cuirassiers advanced to the charge. The quick and regular fire of the Hungarian infantry made no impression upon this dense column of mailed cavaliers. The hussars, broken and confused by the last discharge of the artillery, advanced in vain. In another moment the Hungarian lines were broken by the iron phalanx, their infantry routed and flying for life, one of their batteries taken, and the guns turned upon the fugitives. But the hussars, though defeated, returned to the charge the moment the cuirassiers spread their line to scour the field.

Mounted on slight and nimble horses, armed for the attack only, relying for their defence on the quickness of their movements and the instinct of their steeds, this national cavalry of Hungary spread in a large semicircle round the heavy cavaliers of Austria, and avoiding the cut of their formidable swords, they disabled riders and horses with their slight, curved sabres. Thus harassed, the cuirassiers formed again and again, against an enemy who fled from their charge, and again returned to worry their flank or rear. This hand to hand combat continued until the infantry had recovered from their panic, and effected their retreat, part of them towards Csakvár, whither the left wing of Görgey's army advanced to protect them, and part to Stuhlweissenburg and Martonvasar.

This accomplished, the hussars wheeled round, dispersed, and disappeared with a rapidity which rendered all pursuit hopeless. But many remained on the battle-field, struck down by the long, heavy swords of the cuirassiers. The loss of Perczel's corps on that day is stated by the Hungarians as amounting to 500 killed, and 1000 men and six guns captured by the enemy. The Ban Jellachich's bulletins of the battle assert that he attacked

and routed a corps of 8000 men; that he killed and captured several thousands; and that the remainder, exceeding 8000, made a disorderly retreat towards Martonvasar.

It is impossible to determine the losses of the Imperialists in this engagement, and in other battles in which they remained in possession of the ground. The numbers given in their bulletins are evidently not the true ones; for the writers of these documents endeavoured to persuade the world that the Austrian troops stood their ground against long and violent cannonades, against volleys of musketry, and the furious charge of light horse, not only unflinchingly, but also without serious losses; that they stormed entrenchments and heights crowned with artillery, displaying 'the greatest gallantry and contempt of danger;' and that their 'heroic achievements' cost them only a few killed and wounded. In the Caucasus, the Russian troops fight for whole days without losing, as their bulletins assert, more than eight men in any battle. The Austrian government, too, thought proper to discourage future insurrections by demonstrating how easy it is to conquer an insurgent army. Considering their numerical superiority,

their successes were not brilliant ; but the bulletins which were published after every movement in advance represented the troops of Prince Windishgrätz as marching from victory to victory, amidst the acclamations of the liberated populace. In reality, the progress of the Imperialists was slow ; they were compelled to advance with the utmost caution ; the inhabitants of the country fled at their approach, destroying all provisions or concealing them in the forests or in the moors which skirt the banks of the Danube, the Theiss, and the Waag. The fatigues of the campaign, the want of food and shelter, and the extraordinary severity of the season, combined to make this 'career of victory' most pernicious to the troops of Prince Windishgrätz.

A similar system of imposture prevailed at Pesth.* The populace had for weeks past been amused with accounts of battles fought and victories won, with tales of the hopeless condition of the Imperialists, and the triumphant advance of the national forces. But after the battle of Moor concealment was impossible.

* Klapka's *National War in Hungary and Transylvania*, vol. i. p. 118. Leipzig.

The various corps of the army, partly routed and disorganized, were in full retreat upon the capital. The fortifications of Buda were incomplete; the fortress was untenable; and the generals were not even able to accept a last and decisive battle under the walls of Pesth. The patriotism of those is open to doubt, who wantonly imposed upon a nation which they professed to love and respect.

The news of Perczel's defeat at Moor reached Pesth on the evening of the 30th of December. A council of the 'Committee of Defence' was held, and Mr. Kossuth proposed, and the council assented to, the evacuation of Pesth and Buda. It was resolved to remove the seat of the government, the ministerial offices, and the Parliament to Debreczin, a city in the centre of the vast plains of the Theiss, and protected by its marshes and swamps. But how was that measure to be published? And how was it to obtain the sanction of the Parliament? for up to that hour even the representatives of the nation had been kept in ignorance of the real state of affairs. It fell to the lot of the Secretary-at-War, L. Messaros, to stand the brunt of the popular fury. On the last day of the year 1848 he rose to break the evil news to the House.

His first words drew upon him a storm of indignation. Cries of 'Shame!' 'Turn him out!' 'Down with the traitor!' were heard from all parts of the House. The old soldier calmly braved the wrath of the Assembly. But when the furious cries of the members drowned his voice, he cast an appealing look at Mr. Kossuth, who, more pale, haggard, and dejected than usual, rose to save his colleague from Count Lamberg's fate. In this instance, too, his demoniacal* power prevailed—the tumult subsided; the latter part of his speech was interrupted with loud and enthusiastic cheers; and the House assented to the measures he recommended. Some members, such as D. Pazmandy, and Maurice Szentkiralyi, though they voted for the retreat to Debreczin, declined accompanying the government. Somewhat later a bill of outlawry and confiscation was passed against them.

The removal of the military stores, magazines, dépôts, and hospitals was a gigantic undertaking, in a country where the roads are extremely bad, more especially in winter. Thousands of

* This word is not used in its modern sense.

waggon, heavily loaded, passed through the gates of Pesth and proceeded towards the Theiss. The government offices and archives were sent to Debreczin, but the depôts and military factories were removed to Great Warasdin. So absolute was Mr. Kossuth's sway, so active were the officers under his command, that before the end of January, 1849, these factories were safely established, and employed in providing the Hungarian armies with sabres, gunpowder, ordnance, and other stores. Before that time the Parliament resumed its consultative functions at Debreczin.

Its last act at Pesth was an act of conciliation, of which the credit is chiefly due to Count Louis Batthyanyi. With the consent and authority of the House, that nobleman, accompanied by Count Majlath, Bishop Lonovics, and Francis Deák, proceeded to the Austrian head-quarters at Bia, offering submission on certain conditions. The Imperialist leader refused to receive Count Batthyanyi. The rest were admitted on the understanding that they came not officially, but merely as private suppliants. His reply was short, and full of fate. He would accept of nothing, hear of nothing,

but 'unconditional surrender: '* 'he scorned to treat with rebels.'

The deputies returned with the conviction that nothing was to be expected from the clemency of Austria, and that the transgressions of a period of doubt and confusion, one in which no country, no class, no party was free from reproach, were to be visited with unmitigated severity on the heads of the Hungarians. The Count Batthyanyi in particular received a warning which it was folly to disregard. Although the least guilty, he must have known himself the most hated. He could not have forgotten, that in his younger years, when quartered at Venice, tender, though illicit ties had bound him to the Archduchess Sophia. Those ties had been broken, and not by her. As sweet things when tainted become most loathsome, so was the affection of early days turned into bitter animosity. Nor was this all. The Count Batthyanyi was rich and generous. Many members of the Austrian aristocracy were more extravagant and less wealthy. On some occasions his

* Prince Windishgrätz's German words, '*auf Gnade und Ungnade*,' convey even a harsher meaning.

assistance had been asked, and freely granted. It was notorious that large sums had been lent by him to some of the highest persons in the empire. The Duke d'Este was indebted to him to an extent which made the repayment of the sums advanced, if not impossible, at least most inconvenient. Louis Batthyanyi must have known the weaknesses and vices of the men with whom he had long lived on terms of intimacy, if not of friendship. Nor could he mistake the intentions of a family which has never been known to forgive, and which only seems to forget. Still he made no attempt to escape from Pesth. He was arrested on the 9th of January. From that day the mildest, if not the wisest, of the Hungarian chiefs, was lost to a nation which more than ever needed his moderation, his moral courage, and his patriotism.

The corps of Perczel and Görgey, still retreating before the advance of the Imperialists, took, on the 2nd of January, a defensive position in front of Buda, in a line from Teteny to Buda Ors, and across the roads to Stuhlweissenburg and Bicske. Their outposts were at Hamsaberg, from whence they were ejected on the 3rd by the vanguard of Jellachich's corps. An attack on Teteny followed, but

the Walmoden cuirassiers were defeated, and in the engagement which ensued, the Hungarians remained in possession of the ground. The news of this partial success reanimated the hopes of the Council of War at Pesth, which sent orders to Görgey instructing him to advance upon the Imperialists, and promising the support of two corps under Perczel and Repasy. But Görgey, less sanguine of success, withdrew his army in the course of the night, and on the morning of the 4th, his battalions were encamped on the mountains, and under the walls of Buda. On the afternoon of that day, and throughout the night, the Hungarians retreated from Buda, crossed the Danube, and proceeded by railway to Szolnok, on the Theiss. To prevent pursuit, the rails were destroyed when the last detachment had passed. On the 5th, Buda and Pesth were occupied by the troops of Prince Windishgrätz, and the Magyar tricolour was supplanted by the black and yellow banner of Austria. Prince Windishgrätz addressed a proclamation to the Hungarians, in which he said that, supported by a loyal and gallant army, he had put the rebel bands to flight, and entered the capital. His success was chiefly owing to the

fidelity and devotion of the peasantry, which scorned the intrigues and defeated the schemes of a rebellious faction. The Emperor had instructed him to restore tranquillity and order, to establish liberty and fraternity among all classes and races, to promote the welfare of Hungary, and to exterminate the rebels. He called upon the inhabitants of the country to take advantage of this last respite, and submit to the legal authority of the King of Hungary. 'By this means alone,' concluded the victorious general, 'shall I be enabled to intercede with his Majesty for the misguided tools of the rebellion.'

CHAPTER V.

Windishgrätz at Pesth.—Joseph Bem.—Events in Transylvania.—Massacres at Kis-Enyed and Zalathna.—Combats at Csucsá, Sibo, and Decs.—Capture of Klausenburg and Bisztritz.—Battle of Herrmanstadt.—Mutinous Conduct of Görgey.—His Opposition to Mr. Kossuth.—His Treatment of the Austrian Prisoners.—Secret Motives of his Conduct.

THE proceedings of Prince Windishgrätz showed that he, for one, did not believe in the truth of the assertions contained in his proclamation. Martial law was proclaimed throughout the reconquered districts, and a permanent court-martial established at Pesth. The surrender of arms was rigorously enforced in a country whose inhabitants were accustomed, and indeed compelled, to arm themselves against robber bands and the still more dangerous razzias of wolves from the Carpathian and Styrian mountains. The least offensive demonstrations of national feeling were suppressed with rigour or punished with cruelty. The prisons of Buda and Pesth were filled with political offenders. Old transgressions were raked up, and an unlimited scope

was given to the hoarded-up vengeance of individuals. The population of the country and the towns was at the mercy of the Imperialist troops, whose greed, insolence, and brutality took no heed of rank, class, or political opinions. To resist their extravagant demands, to resent their grossest outrages, was considered an 'insult offered to his Majesty's troops,' and punished accordingly. Sentences of fines, of imprisonment in heavy irons, and, worse than all, of corporal punishment were showered upon the unfortunate people. The Jews, a numerous, wealthy, and consequently an influential class, were among the chief objects of the Imperial commander's animadversion. He suspected them of favouring Mr. Kossuth's party. A series of vexatious decrees were published against them generally, but chiefly against the Jews of Pesth, who were, moreover, mulcted in an enormous sum as a fine for their 'rebellious tendencies.' The Jews, whatever their sympathies or antipathies might have been, were by this treatment compelled to espouse and support Mr. Kossuth's cause. The great master of that policy which Prince Windischgrätz represented, recommends the utmost caution and forbearance in spoliation, which, of

all kinds of injustice, is most impatiently borne by the citizens of every country. Hebrews are proverbially tenacious of money. The Jews of Pesth, Raab, and Presburg, who monopolized trade throughout Hungary, and whose influence, swift, sure, and secret, extended from the heart of Austria far beyond the Turkish frontier, proved the most zealous supporters and most serviceable allies of Mr. Kossuth. They facilitated his financial operations, carried his despatches, and informed his generals of the strength, the positions, and the movements of the Austrian corps.

After the occupation of Pesth, the Imperialist commanders confined their operations to the siege of the fortresses of Leopoldstadt and Komorn. General Nugent occupied the counties on the Mur and the Drave, thereby securing the communications of the army with Croatia, Styria, and Austria. The Generals Götz and Frisheisen entered the valley of the Upper Waag and the county of Turocz, while in Upper Hungary, General Shlick advanced to within nine miles of Miskolcz. The Hungarians were confined to the wide marshy plains of the Theiss and to the banks of the Maros, where the bulk of

their levies were concentrated under Perczel and Repasy; while measures were taken on a gigantic scale, and almost incredible results accomplished in the creation and organization of a large popular army. General Görgey had undertaken to withdraw the attention of the enemy from this, the most important point of the Hungarian position. Hovering round the Imperialists, on the left bank of the Danube, and threatening their lines of communication and retreat, he sought to attract the bulk of their forces, and if need be, to fall back upon Komorn or to the Carpathian mountains. Prince Windishgrätz has been censured for his want of energy in not marching at once upon the head-quarters of the insurrection. His proclamation shows that he waited at Pesth to receive the submission of the various counties. His army was, moreover, unfit to continue the winter campaign amidst the desert plains and morasses of the Theiss and the Maros. His bulletins stated that he had marched from victory to victory, and that he had defeated the Insurgents at the expense of perhaps a thousand lives. In reality, the march from the Laytha to Pesth cost him about 20,000

men in killed and wounded ; his regiments were reduced by disease and the want of shelter and food. On many occasions, the videttes were found frozen to death. All his soldiers wanted rest, comfort, and clothing. His stay at Pesth, however pernicious to the success of his plans, was prompted by necessity rather than by choice.

Such was the state of affairs when information reached the head-quarters at Debreczin and Pesth, that at least in one part of the country the fortune of war had been in favour of the Hungarians.

Joseph Bem, a Pole, from Tarnow, in Galicia, had, after the battle of Shwechat, solicited a command in the Hungarian army. His request was supported by his high reputation for genius, science, coolness, and courage. He was fond of war, and familiar with all its features. In 1812, he served as lieutenant of artillery in the corps of Davoust and Macdonald and assisted in the defence of Dantzic. In 1815 he entered the service of Russia, and was a captain and professor of mathematics in 1819. He introduced the Congreve rockets into the Russian artillery. In the insurrection of 1831, he fought with

great distinction at Imania, Ostrolenka, and Praga, where he commanded the Polish artillery. In 1833 he went to Portugal, and entered the service of Don Pedro. A fanatic among his countrymen discharged a pistol at him, and the fate of Don Pedro was decided before he recovered from the wound. The year 1848 found General Bem at Vienna, and the fall of that city drove him to Hungary. Old, grey-haired, of a small, spare body, covered with wounds, he was nevertheless energetic, active, of an untiring perseverance, wary, full of expedients, and gifted with a miraculous contempt of danger. The explosion of a magazine at Warsaw blew him high into the air, and left him a mangled, scorched, seared body. He bore the marks of all his battles. He was twice wounded on a barricade in Vienna. He would read his despatches, and write his answers, amidst a hail-storm of bullets. A strict disciplinarian, he scandalized the Viennese by insisting on shooting two soldiers of their *garde mobile*, one for violating a woman, the other for insulting an officer.

‘You will not leave this position,’ said he, to the commander of a barricade on the Jägerzeile, ‘until it is quite untenable, and then—

even then, you must not leave it.' And to a deputation of Vienna *gardes mobiles*, he said, 'Will you fight or treat? If the latter, don't disturb me, for I never did treat. If you will fight, I am at your service.' And when they mentioned their hopeless condition, he replied, 'A general has always some resource, and I am a general. I will stand by you to the last man. You speak of treason!—look at my wounds!'

Such was the man to whom Mr. Kossuth would have confided the chief command of the Hungarian armies. But the fanaticism of the Poles, whose political intrigues Bem refused to support, prevented an arrangement which, as subsequent events proved, might have changed the fortunes of the war. As in Portugal, so in Hungary, General Bem was wounded by a pistol-shot from a Pole, who loudly protested that the old man was a traitor. Such words tell in times of general doubt and confusion. Mr. Kossuth* 'had a great weakness, and one which at a later period was attended with the most fatal consequences. It was his want of a just and due appreciation

* Horn; *Ludwig Kossuth*, vol. i. p. 80.

of character.* He distrusted General Bem, but, overawed by the cold, determined manner of the old warrior, dared not utter his suspicions. The President of the Hungarian Government sent the old Pole on what he considered a hopeless errand, and gave him a command without an army. Bem was instructed to collect what volunteers would follow his standard, and with them to reconquer Transylvania.

That province, one of the crown-lands or dependencies of Hungary, is chiefly inhabited by Wallackian natives and German settlers. Both were strongly opposed to the Magyar minority, and the Wallackians especially had profited from the troubles of Hungary and the protection of the Imperialist troops to wreak the stored-up vengeance of centuries on the heads of their oppressors. The Magyar cities and villages were occupied and disarmed by the Austrians. When these left, they were invaded by Wallack hordes, which followed in the track of the Emperor's officers. They sacked and burned the towns, villages, and manor-houses, and butchered the inhabitants, or tormented

* Menschenkenntniss is the German word.

them to death. Nagy-Enyed, Zalathna, Abrud-banya, Körösbany, and Brád, the most flourishing towns of Magyar Transylvania, were left heaps of smoking ruins, while in their streets lay, half burnt, the mangled bodies of men, women, and children, their nails torn off, their eyes put out, their bodies run through with pikes.* The Magyar population was exterminated in Transylvania. The officer who undertook the conquest of that province had nothing to expect from the sympathies of its

* On the 18th October, 1848, the Wallackians attacked Kis-Enyed, a little town in the county of Lower Albo. They tortured and killed all Magyars, no matter of what age or sex. L. Porsolt, his wife and his two daughters were seized in his house. Mrs. Porsolt was on the eve of her confinement. They put her to death under circumstances of the most revolting cruelty. The two girls were violated before their father's eyes, who was afterwards killed with an axe.

Mr. Jablonczay, formerly a judge in the same district, fled to the fortress of Karlsburg, and claimed the protection of General Horak, the Austrian commander, at whose hands he and his son were demanded by a crowd of armed Wallackians. The general surrendered the two victims. The Wallackians bound their feet, tied them to a carriage, and dragged them through the town. Mr. Jablonczay died. His son was dragged through all the villages of the district, and in every village fifty blows were administered to him. He was finally piked to death.

Sigmund Bartha, his wife, and some relations, sought

inhabitants. He had to contend with the stubborn Sachsen or Germans, and with the hardy, savage Wallackians. The country, covered with high mountains, and intersected by long, narrow valleys and rapid streams, is one of nature's fortresses. The defiles, the citadels, and fortified cities were held by armed bands of Wallackians and by an Austrian army of 18,000 men, and 60 guns, six and twelve pounders. For all that, General Bem proceeded

refuge in a loft, where they hid themselves under the hay. They were pulled out, flung into the yard, and caught on the pikes of the Wallackians.

Clara Apathin, a lady of rank, whose limbs were palsied, was burnt in her bed.

Of the Brady family, in the county of Zarand, thirteen persons were drowned in a well.

The city of Zalathna was destroyed by a horde of Wallackians led by their chief, Janku. Two thousand of the inhabitants were murdered in the presence of the Austrian troops. The Administrator, John Nemegy, was shot, and his son, a child of four years old, was piked. The wife of the Doctor Decanie, severely wounded, lay writhing on the ground, crying for mercy. A Wallack took a lance and killed her in a manner which decency forbids to specify.

Janku, the Wallack chief, was afterwards the guest of General Haynau. He was decorated by the Emperor Francis Joseph, who shook hands with him, saying: *Multum fecisti Janku, vere multum fecisti!*—See Czetz and also Patacky's *War in Transylvania*.

to the execution of a task which, to any other man, would have appeared hopeless. He collected the remnants of the Viennese insurgents, who had sought refuge in Hungary, and the fugitive Hungarian forces, whom the Austrians had driven from Transylvania. Zealous, energetic, and persevering, he created and concentrated a force of 5600 men, with 1335 horses and twenty-four field pieces, and on the 19th December he resolutely opposed this small army to the Imperialist corps, which endeavoured to debouch from the defiles of Transylvania with a view to invading Hungary and operating against Great Warasdin. On the 19th, 20th, and 23rd of December, he fought the Austrian troops at Csucs, Sibó, and Decs; he routed them in each of these combats, and, proceeding by forced marches, appeared at the heels of the fugitives before the important city of Klausenburg, where the Austrian general, Wardener, stood prepared with nine battalions and a squadron of horse. A determined resistance was expected, and General Bem, who had hitherto gained his victories by the superior tactics of his artillery, almost every piece of which he placed and pointed with his own hands, cheered his troops with the promise

of rest and comfortable quarters at Klausenburg. The capture of that town was easy beyond his boldest hopes. Cowed by defeat, the Imperialists lost ground at the first gunshot, and as Bem's troops advanced, supported by quick and effective discharges of artillery on their flanks, their antagonists turned and fled towards Bisztritz. This sudden flight spurred General Bem to fresh exertions. His soldiers, careless of rest and food, pressed on in pursuit, and, attacking and defeating the Austrians when they attempted to rally at Bethlen, Bisztritz, and Tihucsa, Bem drove his enemies through the defiles of Borgo, into the Bukovina. He occupied Klausenburg and Bisztritz, and on the 13th of January, when he marched against the town of Maros-Vasarhely, the Austrian garrison evacuated the place and retreated to Mediash. So great was the confidence of the victorious general, that he wrote to Mr. Kossuth: 'I ask you neither for soldiers, nor weapons, nor money. I can get all I want.' And he added that within three days he expected to take Herrmanstadt, the capital of Transylvania. True to his word, on the third day he led his troops across the plain in front of the town, which is

fortified with a wall and rampart, and which was, on this occasion, surrounded by strong redoubts, and held by 9000 foot, 2000 cavalry, 30 field-pieces, and 24 guns in position, supported by 7000 German and Wallackian irregulars. To confront so large an army in its advantageous position, General Bem brought 7000 men and 30 guns into the plain of Herrmanstadt. He could not expect success, unless the Imperialists, demoralized by their frequent defeats and their terror of his artillery, should decline the battle, and make good their retreat. The assurance with which he led his soldiers up to the mouths of the Austrian cannon showed that he relied rather on the moral effect of his audacity, than on the means by which battles are usually lost and won. Nor was he altogether wrong in his calculations. Desertions had of late been frequent among the Austrian troops, and on the day previous to the arrival of the Hungarians, General Puchner had narrowly escaped the consequences of a mutiny among his officers. So impressed were the inhabitants of Herrmanstadt with the panic of the troops, and the rebellious spirit of their leaders, that they fled to the dense forests of Rothenthurm.

But Bem's expectations were signally disappointed. As his troops advanced on the road with their artillery on either flank, and when they were close to the outer entrenchments, the Imperialist artillery opened upon them. The first discharge covering General Bem and his staff, killed his adjutant and one of his colonels. In another moment the fire was returned by the Hungarian artillery, and a violent cannonade commenced. In this engagement the infantry and cavalry also were brought into action. Bem's Vienna legion and his Szekler hussars (almost the only natives of Transylvania who espoused the Hungarian cause) made three unsuccessful attempts to take the works. They were each time driven back by the grape-shot and the musketry of the Imperialists. The Hungarian artillery, which was stationed in the open plain, was repeatedly attacked by the Austrian cavalry, and each time the attack was repulsed by a murderous fire, supported by the violent onset of Bem's hussars. When the engagement had lasted above five hours, six of the Hungarian guns were dismounted, and the centre and left wing of Bem's position were seriously shaken. His ammunition was spent. A retreat was un-

avoidable, and the first retrograde movements were being executed when his reserves, under Major Czetz, gained the field of battle. That officer, who ought to have arrived immediately after the commencement of the engagement, came in time to cover the retreat of his general by a fresh attack. But even this succour did not avail to rouse the hopes of the young and undisciplined Hungarian troops. Retreating slowly at first, they soon wavered, dispersed, and covered the field in their rapid, disorderly flight, while the Austrian horse and artillery issued from their entrenchments to complete the rout. At this trying moment Bem's cool and calculating courage served him in the stead of an army. He made no fruitless attempts to rally the fugitives, but surrounded by one troop of hussars and supported by six field-pieces, he stood at bay, firing, retreating, and firing again, and for seven long hours keeping his pursuers in check. In these seven hours he retreated at the rate of a mile an hour, and at eight o'clock at night he reached the village of Stolzenburg, where, placing his artillery in a commanding position, and impeding the enemy's advance by the destruction of a bridge, he made a final

and successful resistance. His fugitive troops came to Stolzenburg in the course of the night. Early on the morning of the 22nd of January, General Bem, though apparently defeated, held a commanding position within a few miles from the field of battle and the capital of Transylvania. The news of these events, coming from a part of the country from which Mr. Kossuth could not in reason expect to hear of aught but defeat, reanimated the courage of the Hungarian leaders. Though the attack on Herrmanstadt had failed, it was now certain that General Puchner and his army were kept in check by an able and daring commander, heading a force whose numbers were daily increasing, while each engagement added to their experience in war. According to the original plan of Prince Windishgrätz, it was Puchner's task to debouch from Transylvania into the plains of Hungary, to occupy Great Warasdin, Debreczin, and the other head-quarters of the insurrection, and, supported by the troops from the Banat, to prevent the escape of Kossuth and the rest of the Magyar leaders. This portion of the plan had signally failed. Whatever the result of the campaign might be, it was now certain that

the Hungarian forces expelled from Pesth were not to be driven back to that town by the advance of General Puchner in their rear. The Commander-in-chief of the Imperial army was compelled to resume his operations against the plains of the Theiss, and to detach fresh forces in pursuit of Görgey, who, retreating along the banks of the Danube and threatening the corps which blockaded Komorn and Leopoldstadt, defied the Imperialists by a line of march which brought him to the vicinity of the Austrian frontier. It required but the genius of a Bem to make this vexatious position one of real danger for the Empire. But, even at this early period of the war, Görgey almost purposely dispelled all doubts as to his ultimate intentions. There was a moderation in his manœuvres which admitted but of one construction. It was his object to show himself a formidable antagonist, and, at the same time, to avoid being hated as an enemy; to detach the troops under his command from the national cause; to form for himself an army willing to fight his battles and consent to his treaties; and finally, to obtain an influential and commanding position in that Imperial army, which to him and his com-

rades stood in the place of country, friends, and home. All his actions conduced to this one leading idea. The Hungarians identified Mr. Kossuth with the national cause. It was Mr. Kossuth whom Görgey mentioned with studious contempt, whose orders he disobeyed with a vaunting effrontery, and whom he denounced as a 'quill-driver' and a 'petti-fogger.' Severe and even cruel to his troops, neglectful of their comfort, and careless of their sufferings, his treatment of the Austrian prisoners was marked by a kindness which caused his soldiers to say they would rather be Austrian captives than Honveds. The captive officers, in particular, were the objects of his attention and care. While Prince Windishgrätz and the Austrian commanders generally took a pride in ill-treating their prisoners — while some of the captive Hungarian officers were shot, some hanged, and others loaded with heavy irons — while the captive Honveds and hussars were deprived of the most necessary clothing, and compelled to brave the severity of the season with naked feet, in open yards and sheds: General Görgey, far from alleviating the sufferings of his countrymen by judicious threats or acts of

retaliation, had his prisoners well fed, lodged, and clothed, and some of the more conspicuous among them shared his table. This extraordinary forbearance in so stern a man was at the time ascribed to an under-current of generosity in Görgey's character, nor was it possible to suspect the true cause of so much apparent humanity.

CHAPTER VI.

Görgey at Waitzen.—His General Orders.—His Moderation.—His Retreat from Waitzen.—Combat at Turczek.—Skirmish at Igló—Guyon in the Branitzko.—George Klapka.—Henry Dembinski.—Klapka's Confusion.—Combat of Torna Alya.—Dembinski and Görgey.—Countermarching.—Battle of Kapolna.—Dembinski's Clemency.—Mutiny.

ON the 5th of January, 1849, the army of the Upper Danube, under Görgey's command, was concentrated at Waitzen. The troops, about 15,000, were discouraged and discontented. Their recent defeats, the loss of the capital, and their seemingly hopeless expedition, were eagerly canvassed among them, and formed subjects for the most sinister speculations. Their leaders, most of whom had joined the insurrection with a view to immediate and signal advantage, deplored that selfish step, now its object was foiled. Many were the regrets and loud the sighs for the flesh-pots of old Egypt, for the amusements and the easy routine of an Austrian garrison. Some asked for leave of absence. They departed, and never returned to their standards.

One of them, General Lazar, who went to Pesth to make his peace with the Austrians, was arrested, tried, and sentenced to twenty years' confinement in a fortress, for the part he had taken in the insurrection. Others obtained a mitigation of the sentence which the courts-martial at Pesth were prepared to pronounce, by making their terms before they surrendered. The desertion of the officers made the troops still more desponding and mutinous.

Under these circumstances, it became General Görgey's duty to re-animate the courage of his army, by a vindication of the motives which had guided the government in its late measures. The common gossip of the camp accused Mr. Kossuth and his advisers of incompetence, treason, and cowardice. Harsh words! but easily to be shamed into silence among a nation which delights in strong terms, and which, for good as for evil, is in the habit of expressing more than it means. That Görgey felt the responsibility of his position is shown by the fact of his assembling a council of war at Waitzen, and notifying his determination to treat all deserters with the utmost rigour of the law. At the same time he offered to accept the resignation of every officer whose courage

or patriotism was not equal to the dangers of the expedition. But he would not defend the course which the government had taken. Such a defence was easy enough, for he could rest it on truth. The retreat to Pesth, and the subsequent retreat into the Theiss counties, were suggested not by choice but by necessity, and justified by the precedent of almost all Hungarian campaigns. Instead of urging the obvious reasons for the government measures and its plan of operations, reasons which had been communicated to him, and which at the time had at least the sanction of his silence, he published a general order, which in strong, though guarded language, accused the government of incapacity and cowardice. He declared that they had abandoned the capital under the influence of a panic, and that they were impelled by motives of selfish ambition, to which they wished to make the troops subservient. He encouraged the army to protest against the government measures and plans, and to follow no guidance but his own. He caused this order to be signed by all the staff-officers of the corps, who were presumed to act for and with the assent of the troops. Subsequent events proved that few of the officers, and

among them scarcely any but the deserters from the Austrian service, sympathized with Görgey's sentiments and schemes. Klapka admits that the sergeants and men were unanimous in their condemnation of the general order of the 6th January.*

Mr. Kossuth met this mutinous declaration with remonstrances and entreaties. He implored Görgey, 'for God's sake, for the sake of the country and of history,' to abandon the course on which he entered, by the publication of his proclamation. To beg and entreat was all he could do. The rebellious general and his corps were detached, and their position, if dangerous, was also perfectly independent. A large hostile army separated them from the government troops on the banks of the Theiss. An attempt to supersede Görgey in his command, might have goaded him on to desertion, if not to open rebellion. No steps were taken to reduce him to obedience, and he was allowed to fight his own battles in his own way. He was in the habit of complaining that in the retreat from Shwechat to Pesth, his plans were foiled and his movements hampered by

* Klapka's *National War*, vol. i. p. 146.

the Committee of Defence, of which Mr. Kossuth was the president. In his general orders great stress was laid on his desire for action and his thirst for great and glorious deeds of war. He could now give full scope to the leanings of his mind. His instructions were vague, as they naturally must be under the circumstances. He was to advance to the Upper Danube, and remain in communication with the fortress of Komorn, and with Kremnitz, and Shemnitz, the mountain cities of the Carpathians. It is an important and significant fact, that no mention whatever was made in these instructions of a diversion across the Austrian frontier. The rebellious spirit of the Austrians, and their sympathy with the cause of Hungary, were well-known to Mr. Kossuth and his associates. No formidable array of forces obstructed the road to Moravia. General Simunich, with a few thousand men, blockaded the Hungarian garrison of Leopoldstadt. Görgey's army of 15,000 might have been increased to 25,000 men by drafts upon Komorn, Leopoldstadt, and the forces in the Carpathians, and as no sufficient number of troops could be concentrated to resist his progress either in Hungary or

Moravia, a *razzia* into the enemy's country, which was likely to cause a general insurrection against the Emperor's power, offered many chances of success. It was a desperate move in a desperate game, and ought to have tempted a soldier who professed to scorn the prudential considerations which influenced the counsels of his chief. But the idea of an invasion of the Austrian provinces, which most naturally suggested itself to all foreign commanders in the Hungarian army, was either pertinaciously opposed or quietly discountenanced by the native generals. Even had Görgey received instructions to such a purpose, he would most probably have refused his obedience. The plan of his independent operations shows that no advance into Austria was ever thought of by him. He proposed to proceed along the river Waag, leaning on Komorn on the one hand, and on the forces in the Carpathians on the other, to relieve the fortress of Leopoldstadt, driven General Simunich into Austria, and next—instead of following up his advantage—to gain Tyrnau or Presburg, or to manœuvre, that is to say, to wait for the attack of the enemy, in the valleys of the Upper Waag.

With these views he left Waitzen on the 7th of January, just when General Csorich, with about 7000 men, was sent to attack him. This small corps followed so closely in Görgey's track, molesting his rear-guard under Colonel Guyon, and so great was his desire to escape from pursuit, that he never thought of ascertaining the exact strength of the enemy. Throughout his march, he was haunted by the fear of a large corps advancing to crush his 15,000 men. If he had waited for the advance of his Austrian pursuers, his troops would have defeated them, for besides the advantage of numbers, Görgey's corps had seventy-two pieces of artillery to Csorich's 36 cannon. A battle at Leva, which he reached on the 11th, would have had an important, if not a decisive influence on the course of events. It would have compelled Prince Windishgrätz still further to reduce his army at Pesth by sending fresh forces to the Upper Danube; thus weakening his own army and exposing it to the attacks of the troops which Mr. Kossuth, in such a case, could have sent from Debreczin. But the chief advantage of a victory at Leva would have been found in the increased confidence

of the army and of the country at large. If anything could excuse Görgey's mutinous language, such a victory, gained within the first fortnight of his independent operations, might have excused it. It would have proved that his rebellion was not prompted by his own evil desires, but that his talents could not brook, and that his courage disdained the restraint of incompetent and timid leaders. But General Görgey, who in his proclamations stated that he thirsted for a decisive engagement, evaded the battle, even when he was informed that General Csorich had detached a strong column on the direct road to the Carpathians. He remained at Leva, and suffered Guyon and his rear-guard to be forced back upon Maygarad.

At Leva, he heard of fresh disasters which had overtaken the Hungarian forces in the Carpathians. Colonel Benitzky, with 400 men in the valley of the Upper Waag, had been defeated and expelled from that position by General Götz, who was, moreover, on the point of receiving considerable reinforcements. This news was enough to make General Görgey abandon all thought of Leopoldstadt and its garrison, which was subsequently compelled to surrender.

He led his troops in forced marches upon the Carpathian cities of Kremnitz and Shemnitz, with a view to an escape to the banks of the Theiss. He even divided his force to expedite its movements. Thus, hastily retreating, and pursued by an enemy whom he might have crushed at any moment, he reached Shemnitz on the 13th. So hurried were his dispositions on this march, that he forgot the existence of an important defile at Nemethi, which the Austrians were expected to pass on their advance to Shemnitz. When reminded of the danger, he secured that defile with a small body of volunteers, who occupied and defended it against a detached column of Götz's corps. That corps was allowed to effect a junction with Csorich without one single effort on the part of Görgey to prevent this important manœuvre.

On the 14th of January, despatches reached him from Debreczin. General Meszaros, whose duty it was to defend the counties of the Theiss and Debreczin against General Shlick—the most humane and talented of the Imperialist leaders—had suffered a signal defeat at Kashau, and Shlick's corps was becoming dangerous to the government. To ease the troops of Meszaros

from their pursuers, who pressed upon their heels, Kossuth instructed Görgey to attack the rear of Shlick's corps, and advancing either by Gomor or through the Zips county, to effect a junction with General Meszaros. These instructions tallied with Görgey's previous intentions. His forced marches to Shemnitz had no other object than that junction with the forces on the Theiss which he was now ordered to effect with all possible despatch. But, perhaps because it was ordered and because some good was to be effected by it, the scheme became distasteful to Görgey. For the first time since his departure from Waitzen, he pretended to feel for the fatigues and privations of his troops. He could not possibly go on retreating. Even the enemy in his rear failed to shake his resolutions. He fixed his head-quarters at Shemnitz, and prepared to hold out in the mountain cities of the Carpathians.

For once, however, necessity compelled him to relinquish his opposition against the government, whose plans he sought to foil. The Carpathian cities were void of provisions for man and beast, and if he remained, it was at the risk of starving his army. The troops might

possibly imitate his example, and goaded on by despair, rise against their leader. No choice was left him, and on the 18th January, four days after the receipt of the orders which instructed him to support Meszaros, he moved his head-quarters to Neusohl, where he proposed to concentrate his forces from Kremnitz, Heilig-Kreutz, Shemnitz, and Windshacht, which places they occupied during the halt. But on the 20th, the Imperialists advanced against Windshacht, which Colonel Guyon with lion-like courage defended against numbers far exceeding those of the troops under his command. Retreating in the course of the night upon Shemnitz, he was again attacked on the 22nd, and after a desperate struggle, compelled to evacuate the town, and fall back upon Neusohl. Görgey, who took the command of Piller's brigade, next to Guyon, made a faint endeavour to attack the Austrian flank; but he was soon entangled in a woody defile, where the Austrians surrounded his troops, captured five of their guns, and finally put them to a disorderly and ruinous flight. So bewildered was General Görgey by this reverse, that he remained motionless and almost bereft of sense, while his soldiers fled or fell around

him. Lieutenant-Colonel Pusztelnib, who sought to make head against the Austrians, fell mortally wounded at the head of a detachment of volunteers. The Hungarian officers state that 700 men were killed and wounded in the engagements of Windshacht and Shemnitz, and that ten pieces of artillery were captured by the Austrians. Such was the result of Görgey's first attempt at independent generalship.

For a time the safety of his retreat was seriously endangered, for the Austrian corps under General Götz, sought, as early as the 19th, to gain the defiles in his rear, and would have gained them but for Colonel Aulich, who, leading his detachment from Kremnitz on the 20th, attacked and defeated the Imperialists at Turczek, and then joined Görgey at Neusohl, where he arrived on the 23rd, after a miraculous march through the terrible ravine which divides Kremnitz from Neusohl.

On the 24th, Görgey commenced his march over the Carpathian mountains. Dividing his corps into two columns, each preceded and followed by detachments of pioneers, the roads, which were blocked up with snow and earthfalls, were cleared as the troops advanced, while the rear-guard sought by all means to make them.

impracticable, in order to impede the pursuit of the enemy. Ascending the long steep ridges of mountains, climbing down into narrow valleys, and crossing streams and ravines, the Hungarians proceeded slowly, but still less slowly than their pursuers, who found the roads blocked up with fragments of rocks, and the bridges burnt. On the 29th of January, the column which Görgey commanded reached Rosenberg, and proceeded along the Waag to St. Miklos, and from thence to Poprad. The second column, under Guyon and Piller, conquered the dangers of the mountains with equal success, and advanced upon Gömör. On this road they were met by the advanced guard of General Shlick, whose troops occupied the roads from Kashau to Debreczin and from Dukla into Gallicia, and who had scarcely been informed of the advance of Hungarians in his rear, when he made good Mr. Kosuth's prediction, by wheeling round upon Kashau, with a view of occupying the Branitzko defiles on the road to Eperies, and the defiles of the Hernad Valley on the Kashau road. By this manœuvre, he might have compelled Görgey to remain at the foot of the Carpathians and await the attack of

Götz and Csorich, who were hunting on his track.

The first meeting of the two hostile corps was at Igló, where, on the night of the 3rd February, Shlick's advanced guard made a descent upon Guyon's corps. The surprise was complete on either side. Colonel Guyon, who was not aware of the vicinity of the enemy, had no videttes. The Austrian officer fancied he led his troops against a detached outpost. The Austrians proceeded into the heart of the place before they were challenged by a sentinel. When at length the alarm was given, the confusion was altogether appalling. A straggling fire was kept up from all the windows, as soldier after soldier, roused from his sleep, discharged his musket upon the assailants. Some who rushed out of the houses, and into the midst of the enemy, were engaged in desperate hand-to-hand fights. The air was filled with curses, the shrill cry of women, words of command, the rapid discharge of musketry, and the deep-mouthed bellowing of cannon. Burning houses threw a lurid glare on the scene of confusion and bloodshed. But as one column of Guyon's soldiers after another crowded the streets, and cleared them at the point of the

bayonet—when their ranks, opening at intervals at a hoarse cry from the rear, made way for the near and fatal discharge of artillery, the Austrians found to their dismay that they had roused a lion in his lair. They wavered, lost ground and fled, taking with them some cannon they had captured during the first moments of the engagement. But Guyon, with two troops of hussars, pursued them, recaptured his artillery, and took some of their cars and ammunition. He pursued the fugitives to the mouth of the Branitzko defiles, which, supported by a few other troops, he stormed on the 5th of February, thus relieving Görgey from the dread of General Csorich and the corps which for thirty days had hunted on his heels, and placing the army of the Upper Danube in direct communication with the government at Debreczin and the army on the Upper Theiss.

On the 6th of February Colonel Guyon occupied Eperies. A rapid advance against the corps of General Shlick would have squeezed the Austrians into a dangerous position between the army of the Theiss and the army of the Upper Danube. But so unprepared was Görgey for the success of Guyon's bold enterprise, and so immoderate was his joy, that he

remained inactive in the position which had been gained for him. His lethargy was the more profound since his rear was protected from the dreaded advance of Csorich, and since the occupation of the Branitzko pass enabled him to defy the enemy. On the 8th, his corps was still unconcentrated; nor did he recommence his operations until he received positive orders from the government to co-operate with the army of the Upper Theiss, and until the vanguard of the two armies met at Kachau on the 10th. Thus ended Görgey's retreat, which has repeatedly been quoted as furnishing the most brilliant proofs of his gallantry, judgment, and energy of action. In reality, this retreat wants the excuse of necessity. But for the apparent desire to escape from the enemy, it would also be devoid of purpose. The real dangers of the expedition fell to the share of Colonel Guyon, who alone and unsupported commanded the rear-guard while the enemy was in pursuit, and who equally unsupported led the van of the army in the assault upon the Branitzko when the danger shifted from the rear to the front. This view is confirmed by the confession of Görgey's friend and comrade, Klapka, who

admits that the commander of the army of the Upper Danube proved 'a master in the art of retreating, while he was a mere tyro in the attack.'* To this testimony may be added the statement of General Dembinski, who mentions Görgey as an officer 'who has the misfortune of seeing the enemy wherever they are not, while he can never see them where they really are.'†

The command of the army of the Upper Theiss had up to this time been in the hands of Colonel Klapka. The history of this fraction of the campaign admits of a short summary. Meszaros succeeded for a time in defeating the advance of General Shlick, who, according to the plans of Prince Windishgrätz, was to support the operations of the chief army of Imperialists against Pesth, by a rapid advance into the strongholds of Magyarism. Battles were fought at Sziszko and Kashau on the 28th December and the 4th January. At Kashau Meszaros suffered a signal defeat, retreated upon Tokaj and resigned his command. George Klapka,

* Klapka's *National War*, vol. i. p. 172.

† Dembinski's Report to the President Kossuth, dated Debreczin, 16th March, 1849.

a young Hungarian officer and ex-lieutenant of the Austrian Noble Guard, was promoted to the vacant post. He concentrated the remainder of the troops at Tokaj, and held that place against Shlick's attacks from the 11th to the 31st of January, when he was placed under General Dembinski, who arrived from Debreczin with money, arms, and reinforcements, and who at once attempted to change the character of the operations of the Hungarian armies.

The Magyar officers (or, to speak more correctly, the native Hungarians who formerly held commissions in the Austrian army) gloried in their retreats. Henry Dembinski took the offensive. He, the descendant of an ancient Polish family, born in 1791, received his education in the Academy of Engineers at Vienna. He learned the rudiments of war under Napoleon, and was made captain after the battle of Smolensk. In the Polish revolution of 1830, he commanded the levies in the district of Kalish. After the battle of Grochow, in which he took a distinguished part, he was promoted to the command of a brigade. The battle of Kuflew, in which he took the odds of one against ten, made him a General. He planned and

executed the expedition into Lithuania, and gained the battle of Raygrad. But for the incompetency of his commander-in-chief, he would have carried the standard of the Revolution into Kurland. Foiled in this scheme, he, with a corps of 4000 men, continued the operations in Lithuania, and finally conducted his troops through the midst of hostile armies, to Praga and Warsaw. This retreat, which must always stand pre-eminent in modern military history, lasted twenty-five days, and extended over 130 German miles. He crossed eleven rivers, led his army over the most dangerous ground amidst lakes and moors; while he defeated or outwitted his pursuers on every day of his march. He commanded a division at Warsaw, and after Skrzinecki's fall he took the chief command of the Insurgent army, and fought the last battle on Polish ground. A refugee in Paris in the year 1848, his experience and talents were gained for the cause of Hungary by Count Ladislas Teleky, the agent of Mr. Kossuth's government in France.

Thus was General Dembinski's name connected with some of the greatest military achievements of the age. Though a foreigner, he was bound to the cause of Hungary by

political sympathies and by the hope that the independence of the Magyars might lead to the independence of the Poles. In the ranks of the enemy he saw his old foes, the Austrian Slavonians; and beyond them, their allies by consanguinity and principle, the Russians. His talents were on record: there was no reason whatever to doubt his fidelity to the cause which he espoused. Hence it was to be expected that the Hungarian officers would gladly embrace the opportunity of learning the art of war under so renowned a chief. But the young men whom the convulsions of the time raised above their proper level, were too vain and selfish to feel anything but displeasure at the appointment of a general whose mental superiority and brilliant achievements eclipsed their own pretensions to martial renown.

General Dembinski assumed on the 2nd of February the command of the army of the Upper Theiss, consisting of two separate corps, under the Colonels Klapka and Repasy. Almost on the first day of his command he had to correct the inexperience and discountenance the crude schemes of one of these officers. Colonel Klapka, whose quarters were at Rakamor, had impressed himself with

a firm conviction that General Shlick intended to attack him on the left bank of the Theiss. He wrote to his commander asking for support, and giving a detailed and impressive description of the enemy's numbers and movements. Rumours had already reached the army on the Theiss of Görgey's retreat and Guyon's advance upon the Branitzko. Leaving his quarters at Polgar and proceeding to Rakamor in a forced march, General Dembinski came in time to witness his junior officer's discomfiture at the false alarm he had given, for by that time it was evident that Shlick's corps was in full retreat upon Kashau, and that Klapka had been deceived by demonstrations in the enemy's rear, which were intended to mask that retreat. In order to atone for this mistake, the young Colonel proposed to pursue General Shlick to Kashau. Dembinski opposed this plan; but when Klapka insisted, and when his views were supported by Mr. Kossuth's agent, Szemere, he was compelled to give his consent to the expedition. He said: 'I will let you do as you please, but only to give you satisfactory proof that I know more of war than you do. You will not come up with Shlick at Kashau, and for the future

you will know that *my* will alone ought to be the standard of your judgment.' Colonel Klapka led his troops upon Kashau, where he was again deceived by the demonstrations of Shlick's rear-guard, for in his first report he assured his commander that the Imperialists were preparing to hold the city against him. He desired support for his left wing at Sziszko, and support was sent accordingly. His second report showed that the demonstrations of the Austrian rear-guard had scared him. He had retreated the length of one day's march. Four-and-twenty hours after this prudent movement, he informed General Dembinski that the Imperialists had evacuated Kashau, that he proposed to pass the night where he was, and that on the following morning he intended to 'make a *cautious* advance' against the place. After wasting another four-and-twenty hours in this useless advance, Colonel Klapka at length consented to march upon Miskolcz, where Dembinski awaited the termination of his manœuvres. On receiving this news, Dembinski placed his vanguard under Lieutenant-Colonel Kazinzy, whom he sent forward to Edelen, to molest the flank of the Austrians at Szendrö. But Colonel Klapka's marches and

counter-marches in front of Kashau proved fatal to the success of this manœuvre.

When the Hungarians reached Edelen, the Austrians had already passed that village and Szendrő, and were in full retreat upon Torna Alya, which they reached on the 13th of February, after a march which General Dembinski, even after the experience of his Lithuanian retreat, designates as *fabulous*. At Torna Alya Shlick proposed to grant his troops some rest and food. He quartered his army on the surrounding villages, and made preparations for a halt of several days. But Dembinski, hastening up in forced marches from Miskolcz, attacked him at noon on the 14th, and compelled him to evacuate Torna Alya. On the 15th, Shlick fell back upon Rima Szombat, making his way through a narrow defile, which effectually prevented Dembinski from molesting his march. In his despatches, Dembinski protests that General Shlick would have been completely routed if Colonel Klapka had not misled him as to the strength of the Austrian corps, of which the Colonel protested he had the *ordre de bataille*, quoting 16,000 men, while in the attack on Torna Alya it was found that the Austrians mustered at most 9000

men. Another reason of the incompleteness of Dembinski's success is to be found in the refusal of Colonel Piller, of Görgey's corps, to take part in the engagement. That officer, though repeatedly entreated to support Dembinski's operations, pleaded the positive orders of his chief, which compelled him to retreat upon Kashau. On the day after the battle, Dembinski received despatches from Debreczin, which placed the corps of General Görgey under his command. The order was dated the 12th of February. If it had reached the General two days earlier, there can be no doubt that the operations against Shlick's corps would have ended with the battle of Torna Alya.

The order of the government which instructed Görgey to place himself and his corps under the command of General Dembinski, was followed by a second mutinous proclamation to the troops, in which Mr. Kossuth, as well as Dembinski, were mentioned with great acerbity and disrespect. Immediately after the publication of this proclamation, the officers of the corps assembled and declared that they owned no commander but Görgey, and that his orders alone should be obeyed. The two documents were duly forwarded to the government at

Debreczin, which in reply thought proper to admonish Görgey and his officers. According to military law, the General ought to have been shot and his officers cashiered.

Dembinski's first order to Görgey instructed him to lean his force upon Miskolcz. Görgey's first act under the new command was an act of indirect disobedience. He protested that his presence was required in the Zips county, where he was quartered, and pleaded the necessity of keeping up the communications with Galicia. It required a second and peremptory order to induce him to march upon Miskolcz.

General Görgey was generally considered a proud and sensitive man. Presuming this to be his character, his Polish commander-in-chief treated him judiciously and delicately, by requesting Mr. Kossuth to reward this act of obedience on the part of the refractory General. He proposed, if Görgey's movement proved successful, to raise that officer to the command of a division. It ought to be added, that Dembinski was aware of the offensive general order which Görgey had addressed to his troops.

General Shlick, meanwhile, relying on Görgey's previous inactivity, made preparations for

an advance upon Miskolcz, for the purpose of preventing the junction of the two Hungarian corps. Dembinski, who anticipated this manœuvre, concentrated a force of 10,000 men under the Colonels Shulz, Pöltenberg, and Aulich, at St. Peter, near Miskolcz, while Colonel Klapka was ordered to make a rapid advance upon Mezo-Kovesd. The object of this manœuvre was to compel the Austrians to expose Szolnok and the line of railway from that place to Pesth.

While these operations were in progress, and while the commander-in-chief waited at St. Peter for Colonel Guyon's brigade, which had been directed to join him, he was surprised by the arrival of an officer from Debreczin with a verbal order from the President Kossuth, instructing him to send 10,000 men of Görgey's corps to Szegedin, there to operate against Windishgrätz and Shlick. Dembinski refused to make so important and, in his opinion, so fatal a movement on the strength of a verbal message. He demanded a written order, and at the same time he deprecated the President's interference. Mr. Kossuth, who overlooked the most flagrant disobedience on the part of Görgey, gave this act of Dembinski's the most

unfavourable interpretation and professed to remember it for a long time.

The next days passed amidst continual misunderstandings and attempts on the part of the Hungarian officers to fix a quarrel upon their commander-in-chief. His orders were evaded whenever evasion was possible; if impossible, they were reluctantly and negligently executed. General Görgey wrote offensive and impertinent letters, asking what had become of his divisions? where they were marching to? whether his commander would guarantee the safety of his baggage?—evidently with the intention of compelling Dembinski to submit his plans and discuss his operations with the officers under his command. The Hungarian generals were partial to councils of war: Dembinski, acting on the experience of his former campaigns, refused to state his plan of operations, or add to his orders the motives and reasons he had for giving them. The one instance in which he departed from this rule of conduct by meeting Görgey on the 24th February, and informing him of the exact nature and object of his operations, was not calculated by its result to encourage him to repeat the experiment. It was Dembinski's intention to attack

the Austrians at Mezo-Kovesd, and if possible to occupy Szolnok and the *tête du pont* on the left bank of the Theiss. Görgey and the chief of his staff, Colonel Bayer, endeavoured to dissuade him from this plan, and finally, by their reports of Shlick's force and movements, they succeeded in impairing the despatch and consequently the success of the expedition. Nor was this all. Now that the responsibility of the operations lay with a foreigner, Mr. Szemere, the commissioner attached to the army, displayed a culpable negligence. He reported that two weeks' provisions for 10,000 men had been stored at Tisza-Füred. When the commander-in-chief inspected those depôts, he found that the provisions were scarcely sufficient for a couple of days. And yet, in all his letters to Mr. Szemere there recurs the earnest entreaty: 'Pray remember the troops!'—'For God's sake! pray collect bread and meat!'

In spite of all this ill-will, and in spite of all these obstacles, General Dembinski reached Erlau on the 28th of February. Here he fixed his head-quarters, with the intention of tempting the Austrians to an attack, that thereby they might lessen their garrison at Szolnok. He was consequently anxious to let the Im-

perialists know of his presence at Erlau. The stratagem succeeded. Strong detachments, 12,000 men, foot, horse, and artillery, from Szolnok, advanced on his left to Arokszallas. Prince Windishgrätz, who hastened from Pesth to superintend the operations against the redoubtable Pole, fixed his head-quarters at Hatvan, and a corps of 6000 men took up a strong position at Gyöngyös. General Shlick was at Petervasar, endeavouring to effect a junction with the troops which crowded the space between Hatvan and Gyöngyös. Verpeled was the only point of junction on this line; for on any other route it would have taken Shlick three days to reach either of the two places. His corps was watched by Colonel Klapka, who marched to Verpeled on the 26th February. The other divisions were concentrated at Kapolna, Dobro, and on the right bank of the Torna. Everything was preparing for a general and decisive engagement. Damjanich was sent to take Szolnok, while General Shlick, loth to advance by Verpeled, sought to join the corps of his commander-in-chief by a circuitous route.

A few days before the battle which had been preparing by these marches and counter-

marches, Görgey came to Dembinski's quarters. The commander took him aside, saying, 'General, we are on the eve of a decisive battle. Tell me honestly, may I rely on the gallantry of your troops?' Görgey's reply was short. 'No!' said he, 'not by any means!' And after a few moments, remembering Guyon's victorious assault upon the Branitzko, he added, 'Give them a village or a wood to storm, and they'll do it; but if you *show* them the enemy in the plain, they will not stand fire for five minutes.'

On the afternoon of the 29th of February, Colonel Klapka, whose position was at Verpeled, where he was instructed to look to his right and stop General Shlick, if that officer attempted to advance through the valley of Petervasar, commenced an action with the Austrian troops on his left, near Kapolna. Colonel Pöltenberg's brigade was brought into action against the Imperialists, who defeated the two corps and attacked Kapolna. The confusion which followed is indescribable. 'Nobody,' to use the emphatic expression of the officers and soldiers who fought on the occasion—'nobody commanded at Kapolna.' The divisions were led singly into fire, ad-

vancing or retreating unsupported. Some of the officers left the field; they knew not what position their battalions were to defend, and they preferred removing their troops, to seeing them swept away in the general confusion. At a later period of this disorderly and unauthorized engagement, just when all the detachments and divisions were in full retreat, General Dembinski, attracted by the cannonade, and attended by Görgey and Bayer, hastened from Erlau to Kapolna. Within gun-shot distance from the village, they were met by the whole of the Commissariat in full flight. After them came small parties of Honveds and hussars, each carrying the spear of an Imperialist lancer. In despite of these trophies, they were bent upon getting away from the scene of the combat. Scared by the rout, Görgey would have joined their flight but for the remonstrances of his chief, who compromised the affair by despatching his refractory junior with orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Szekulit, at Raab. This done, the gallant Pole hastened on towards Kapolna, placing the troops, which were upheld solely by their undisciplined bravery, under the command of their proper officers, whom he

rallied, and thus restored the equilibrium of the fight. While the commanders of corps and divisions were retreating on all sides, and while the Imperialists were still pouring a shower of rockets and shells upon the village, General Dembinski, establishing himself on the contested ground, addressed a general order to the troops with the date of '*Head-quarters at Kapolna.*'

The boldness of this measure insured its success. The Colonels Klapka and Pöltenberg, who were retreating from their positions at Verpeled and Dobro, retraced their steps and resumed their places in the line. The battle was over for the day, and the head-quarters of the army were actually established at Kapolna. In the course of the night Prince Windishgrätz brought up his troops with a view to a fresh attack on the following morning. General Dembinski too made his preparations, by ordering three divisions under the Colonels Aulich, Kmetty, and Guyon, to come up before day-break and support his centre at Kapolna. The orders to this effect were entrusted to Colonel Bayer, the chief of Görgey's staff, who took charge of them at seven in the evening, and who promised to deliver them before one

o'clock on the following morning; but by Bayer's treachery, Aulich alone received his order in time. The order to Guyon was delivered at four, and that to Kmetty at six o'clock next morning. Thus when the Hungarian army went into battle, two important divisions were wanting in places where their presence had been calculated upon by the Commander-in-Chief.

At daybreak on the morning of the 29th of February, there was a movement among the dense masses of Imperialists on the heights round Kapolna and the neighbouring village of Nagyfalu. Large bodies of infantry were pushed, *en echelon*, from the right to the left. At seven o'clock, as Prince Windishgrätz, with a brilliant staff, rode down the line, the air was rent by the wild shouts of the troops, which now for the first time expected to meet the rebel soldiers in a pitched battle. On either side, the issue of that battle was looked to with hope and anxiety. Thirty-nine thousand Imperialists were concentrated before Kapolna; thirty-six thousand Hungarians under Dembensi's command, occupied the country on the other side. If the Hungarians gained the

battle, they had opened the road into Austria. If the Austrians prevailed, there was nothing to prevent their march to the Lower Theiss, the stronghold of Magyarism.

As Prince Windishgrätz passed down the battle line, the word of command was given, and the tirailleurs, lancers, cuirassiers, and light-horse, swarmed out of the compact masses on the hills and approached the Hungarian position at Kapolna, where Dembinski, with two battalions (the whole of his centre, until Guyon and Kmetty should have come up), awaited their arrival behind the hollow banks of the mountain stream which skirts the village. The bridge across this stream was barricaded, and flanked by field-pieces in battery. The Imperialists attacked Kapolna and Nagyfalú (about a gunshot's distance) almost simultaneously. Their skirmishers, after reconnoitring the Hungarian position, fell back, and a terrible cannonade commenced upon the village, which Dembinski left the last of all his troops.

Prince Windishgrätz occupied Kapolna, and was just sending his artillery in pursuit, when Colonel Aulich opened fire with his batteries. Dembinski himself, rallying his troops, pre-

pared to attack the village. His van was composed of an Italian regiment. These soldiers entered Kapolna without pulling a trigger, and when within call of the Imperialists, they hoisted the Austrian colours and deserted. Their Colonel was afterwards tried and executed, by order of Prince Windishgrätz.

General Dembinski had scarcely time to recover from the shock of this treachery, when he was astounded by the sudden cessation of the cannonade on the part of Aulich's artillery. That officer saw his left wing threatened by four Austrian batteries and retreated accordingly. Dembinski, supported only by Colonel Psotta, with 400 hussars and six field pieces, held out, and detained the Austrians in Kapolna until one o'clock in the afternoon, when he reluctantly gave his sanction to Colonel Aulich's retreat, by directing him upon Porosslo. Later in the afternoon, Colonel Guyon's division came up, and the battle was renewed by him against the whole strength of the Imperialist army with strong chances of success for the Hungarians. But Görgey, who was at Kerescend, at the distance of five gun-shots

from the hostile lines, interfered in favour of the Austrians. He sent to the Colonels who took part in the engagement and ordered them to fall back. Guyon, always true to his duty, referred the bearer of the order to the Commander-in-chief; but Colonel Pöltenberg of Görgey's corps, retreated beyond Kerescend. The Imperialists could now concentrate their forces against Guyon, who was alone and unsupported. Kapolna, which had been so hotly contested, remained in their hands; and but for the exertions of Dembinski, Guyon, and Psotta, the Hungarian forces on the Theiss would have been put to the rout. As it was, the head-quarters remained at Kerescend during the night; on the two following days the army retreated in good order to Mezo-Kovezd and Porosslo.

General Görgey, when called upon to account for the fatal order which defeated his own troops at Kapolna, pleaded the danger of their position. He thought they might be cut off on their right. It was afterwards proved that their right was protected by a detachment of Klapka's corps.

On the 1st of March, when General Dem-

binski's head-quarters were removed from Porosslo to Ivanka, Klapka's corps engaged in a skirmish with the Imperialists at Tarmos, and retreated upon Porosslo. On this occasion, Görgey, scared by the report of the distant cannonade, left his position in the line without seeing the enemy, and retreated upon Löva.* That same night, he hastened from Löva to Porosslo, against the express orders of his commander, who directed Guyon's corps upon Ivanka, and desired Görgey to wait until that brave officer should have come up. The following day, Dembinski and Görgey met at Porosslo; and the latter, when charged with his crime, disarmed the wrath of his chief by confessing his fault with a great show of humility and penitence.

On that day it may with justice be said

* General Dembinski's opinion of this conduct is emphatically expressed in his despatches. He says:—'This was too bad. It was the same proceeding which had shocked me at Kapolna. He was afraid to be cut off, and ran away without orders or authority. My reply to his adjutant was, 'Tell your general that there is no difference whatever between a general who runs away from his post, and a sentry who goes off before the relief comes.'—*Report of the 16th March, 1849.*

of General Dembinski, that he connived at Görgey's crime. When the fate of armies and nations may be marred by the cowardice, insubordination, or treachery of one man, no prudential considerations, no motives of false humanity, ought to stand between that man and the doom which the military codes of all nations and times pronounce against the soldier who disobeys the orders of his general, who leaves his post on the day of battle, or who intentionally and maliciously favours the operations of the enemy. Of two of these crimes Görgey was convicted; of the third he was suspected. General Dembinski shrank from the painful duty which devolves upon a commander under such circumstances. He evaded it by reporting the matter to the President Kossuth, who, thereupon, announced his intention of repairing to the head-quarters, for the purpose of 'adjusting the differences between Görgey and his Commander-in-chief.*'

* That General Dembinski was fully sensible of Görgey's crimes, is proved by his reports to Mr. Kossuth. He says, 'If Mr. Commissioner Szemere had not assured me that you, sir, intended to come to Tisza-Füred within the next few hours, I would have given my orders for the arrest of

Dembinski's evasion of his duty as Commander-in-chief was soon to be punished by the loss of his command. Görgey, emboldened by a clemency which men of a certain stamp are prone to mistake for weakness, multiplied his acts of insubordination. He disobeyed the orders that were sent to him. He ceased reporting his movements to the Commander-in-chief. The operations against the Austrian armies came to a stand-still for want of concert, and the army was reduced to that defensive attitude which the Austro-Magyar officers loved so well. The next step was a conspiracy against Dembinski. Already, on a former occasion, had Colonel Klapka secretly and by night left his position on the outposts for the purpose of conferring with Görgey. These conferences were now open and frequent. The Government Commissioner Szemere supported them, and the Colonels Repasy and

General Görgey. But, of course, I could not but believe that so many instances of criminal insubordination and cowardice were not sufficiently punished by a simple arrest. I expected that the powers of the Government, if once brought to bear upon the transgressor, would effectually prevent him from doing harm to the cause.'

Aulich took part in the plot. On the 4th of March, the four officers appeared at the Commander-in-chief's quarters at Tisza-Füred. Görgey, the leader and spokesman, informed his superior officer that the troops had no confidence in him, and that henceforward he was expected to communicate his plans to the officers under his command. Dembinski refused, and an hour afterwards he was told by Mr. Szemere that, acting as Mr. Kossuth's representative, he transferred the command of the army to General Görgey.*

Insults and outrages were heaped upon the deposed General. Colonel Bayer, the chief of Görgey's staff, came to seize his papers and despatches. On Dembinski's refusing to surrender them, a corporal's guard was posted in

* Dembinski's reply to the conspirators ought in justice to be quoted wherever mention is made of his previous fault. He said, 'The same request was made to me in the course of my Lithuanian campaign. I met it with a peremptory refusal, and said, 'I'd fling my cap away if I knew it inquired into my plans.' It is now eighteen years since I commanded in Lithuania. I have since reconsidered my views on war, and my will has improved in determination. You may break me, as you do steel; you can never bend me to your will.'

the corridor, and sentries would have been stationed in his room, but for his adjutant, who shut the door and turned the key. A guard was then placed at the door, and the commander of the Hungarian army remained a prisoner until the President Kossuth arrived at Tisza-Füred, when he was sent for and called upon to reply to the accusations of Görgey. On the same day, Meszaros was deputed to negotiate with the deposed General. He said that the President had the will, but not the power to punish Görgey; that Dembinski was not required to resign his command; but that for the sake of the cause of Hungary and of freedom, he must submit to be declared *incompetent*, lest Görgey's mutiny, by appearing unjustifiable, should demoralize the army. Dembinski owed it to himself and to the cause he served to resist this pitiable appeal. Yielding to his feelings rather than to his conscience, he consented. Kossuth declared that Dembinski had been justly deposed, and that Görgey's mutiny had the excuse of imperative necessity. It is impossible to conclude this account of Dembinski's merits and claims to confidence more fitly than by quot-

ing his prophetic appeal to Mr. Kossuth: ' You have given dignity, power, and your own fate into the hands of the man who, of all others, is most dangerous to the cause of Hungary. God forbid lest you and the country suffer for it !'*

* Dembinski's Despatches.

CHAPTER VII.

Delays.—Hatvan and Gödöllő.—Operations in Transylvania.—Close of the Winter Campaign.—Military Executions.—Treatment of Prisoners.—The Constitution of the 4th March, 1849.—A Choice of Evils.—Declaration of Independence.—Discontents.—Conciliatory Measures.—Schemes.—Görgey's Choice.—General Hentzi.—Siege of Buda.—Treason.—A Crisis.—The Appeal to Russia.—The Russian Intervention.

AMONG the last operations under Dembinski's command was the occupation, by Damjanich's division, of Szolnok. A railroad connects Pesth with Szolnok; and the possession of this place, which commands the crossings of the Theiss, had long been coveted by the Hungarians. At the end of January it had been assaulted and taken by General Perczel, who with his free corps defeated an army of 20,000 Imperialists, driving them across the Theiss, and along the line of railroad to Szegled. He took twenty pieces of cannon and 1800 prisoners; 1200 Austrians, among them General Ottinger, were killed in the battle. On this occasion the

chief depôt at Pesth was threatened, and measures were taken for its removal. But the danger arising from the footing the Hungarians had obtained in the plain between the Theiss and the Danube was averted by a sudden thaw. Perczel retraced his steps to the left bank of the Theiss, to prevent being cut off from Debreczin and the bulk of the Theiss army. After Dembinski's operations at Polgar, and after the scene of the war had, under his command, again been transferred to the plain between the Theiss and the Danube, the occupation of Szolnok on the 5th March, as opening a direct road to Pesth, became an event of great importance. Dembinski had concentrated 23,000 men in and around Szolnok, while a corps of 24,000 occupied the passage across the river at Tisza-Füred. It was his plan to reinforce these troops by 17,000 men, and with a powerful army of 40,000 to attack Prince Windishgrätz at Maklar, to cut him off from Pesth, and to drive him upon Erlau and Mezö-Kovesd. This manœuvre was certain of success; it would have shortened the campaign by four weeks. The event showed that weeks, and even days, were of vital importance to the cause of Hun-

gary. Görgey's conspiracy, and Mr. Kossuth's weakness, prevented the execution of Dembinski's plan. In vain did that officer, even after his deposition, tender his advice, entreat, and even implore, Kossuth to reward General Damjanich's success, and reinforce him, if not with 17,000, at least with 15,000 men. Vain was his prediction that the bridge of Tisza-Füred would probably be lost from want of moral power, but that the bridge of Szolnok would certainly be lost from the want of a sufficient number of troops. His advice and his entreaties were alike unheeded, and although the operations which the young Hungarian officers commenced were crowned with success, there is reason to believe that the same advantages might have been obtained at a smaller sacrifice of time and men, and that the subsequent victories of Mr. Kossuth's armies were owing rather to the fabulous bravery of the young Hungarian levies than to the generalship of their leaders.

The main army of the Hungarians, under Görgey, Klapka, Damjanich, and Pöltenberg, resumed its operations in the latter half of March. Advancing from Szolnok to Szegled, they attacked and defeated Jellachich at Tapio

Biski, and pursued him to Isaszegh, where he was backed by General Shlick's corps, which, however, could not save him the disgrace of another defeat. Prince Windishgrätz, who brought his army to the rescue of his lieutenants, met the Hungarians successively at Hatvan and Gödöllö. Here again the good fortune and the bravery of the Hungarian troops prevailed. Windishgrätz retreated from the field of battle, and sought to collect his shattered forces on the Rakosh plain near Pesth, while the Ban Jellachich, a large hostile army interposing between him and his leader, made a rapid and disorderly retreat to the Lower Danube, where his own province, the Banat, was threatened by the advance of General Perczel. That officer who, on the 3rd of April, gained a battle over the Servians, at St. Thomas, and who, though repulsed at Titel, had been able to effect a junction with another corps of Hungarians under General Vetter, attacked the Ban at Warasdin, and compelled him to retreat upon Kanisha.

Prince Windishgrätz, encamped on the Rakosh plain, was preparing to defend the capitals of Buda and Pesth against the Hun-

garians, whose light horse surrounded and harassed his army. He fortified the two cities on which the centre of his forces leant, but the Hungarians, while they occupied the Imperialist commander on the Rakosh, and by feigned attacks led him to believe that they were watching their opportunity for a pitched battle, withdrew their troops from the plains, and marching up the Danube to Waitzen, defeated the Austrian corps under General Götz, which held that city. Götz, who fell in the streets of Waitzen, was buried with military honours. On the 18th April, the insurgent army routed another Austrian corps under General Wohlgemuth, at Nagy Sarlo, and two days later they defeated a corps of fresh troops under General Welden, at Pered. They entered Pesth, relieved the garrison of the fortress of Komorn, and forced the passage of the Danube at Atsh on the 26th April. On the 3rd May they crossed the river Waag, at Zered, defeated the Imperialists at Altenberg, took the cities of Neutra, Raab, Tyrnau, and Wieselburg, and threatened Presburg and the Austrian capital.

The successes of the Hungarian arms were not confined to the territories on the banks of

the Theiss, the Danube, and the Waag. General Bem, who, after his unsuccessful attack upon Herrmanstadt, on the 7th February, had been compelled to assume a defensive position at Stolzenfels, met General Puchner and the Imperialists again at Bicski, and defeated them to such an extent that no obstacle could be thrown in the way of his advance against Kronstadt and Herrmanstadt, the capitals of Transylvania and the central points of the Saxon, that is to say, of the German districts of that province. The assistance of a Russian corps, which occupied the adjacent Turkish principalities of the Danube, was solicited by the Saxon population, and readily granted. Herrmanstadt and Kronstadt were occupied by Russian brigades. Engaging these on the 14th of March, General Bem forced them back into Wallachia, and after compelling the remainder of Puchner's Austrians to follow their example, he completed the conquest of Transylvania on the 20th of the same month, and organized the administration of the province and its defence against future inroads of the Russians.

Thus closed the winter campaign of 1849, with the total defeat of all the invading armies.

Mr. Kossuth's energy and unparalleled powers of agitation—the historic gallantry of the Magyar people—the unpopularity of the Austrian rule, and the mistaken policy of the Imperialist generals: their attempts to capture the rebels rather than to suppress the rebellion—their security, indolence, and the brutality by which they arrayed against themselves all ranks and classes—all these circumstances combined to rescue Mr. Kossuth's party from the destruction they courted by their private quarrels. The insurrection of the Hungarians against the foreign invader will always remain a subject of just admiration in the history of modern times. That small national army which struck the first blow against Jellachich had in the course of the campaign increased to several hundred thousands of men. Persons who but a few months before were profoundly ignorant of the art and practice of war, were now trained to the field and tried in battle against the old regiments of the empire. A nation whose indolence had become proverbial, was in possession of vast and efficient military workshops and factories. About the end of April the armies under Mr. Kossuth's command numbered 400,000 men, in thirteen

corps, and consisted of 67 regiments of regular infantry, 21 regiments of Honveds, 6 battalions of foreign auxiliaries, 2 regiments of artillery of 1000 men each, a carabinier corps of 1600 men, 6 regiments of rifles, 28 regiments of hussars, 14 regiments of mounted Honveds, and 2 regiments of mounted rifles. Of these troops about 190,000 were fully armed and equipped; the rest were armed with scythes, axes, pitchforks, and lassoes.

It is true that these marvels were not produced by agitation alone, but that strong, and sometimes tyrannical measures were resorted to by Kossuth and the Committee of Defence; that patriotism was, in many instances, goaded on by terrorism; and that sacrifices for the cause of the country were not only demanded but frequently extorted. In the course of his Servian campaign, General Perczel, after the taking of Neusatz, pressed all the male Servians, between the ages of fifteen and forty, into his corps. The expenses of the war were chiefly defrayed by *assignats* on the national property, which Mr. Kossuth caused to be printed, and of which the acceptance, in lieu of payment for services and stores, was enforced under heavy penalties. After the

evacuation of Pesth by the Austrians, the parliament, then sitting at Debreczin, issued a terroristic decree against the persons and properties of those who, during the Austrian occupation of the capital, endeavoured to form a legion for the suppression of the rebellion. E. Miskey and Hoffner, who took office under the Austrians, were tried by court-martial and shot. Catholic priests, who were suspected of favouring the cause of Austria, were persecuted, and in many instances put to death by the Magyar commissioners and officers. Thus was the Rev. Mr. Mericzay, an old priest in the diocese of Waitzen, executed by the order of General Damjanich. The vicar of Koka and four other ecclesiastics were shot. A. Krasznanski, the archdeacon of Saros, was ill-treated, arrested, and taken to Kashau. Thirty other priests were held in close confinement because, in 1848, they had refused to promulgate Mr. Kossuth's proclamations. In Transylvania the Protestant pastors Roth and Binder were shot by the troops of General Bem. In the same provinces General Czetz decreed the execution of two priests—Greising, of Kronstadt, and Wellman, of Fogorash. It will always be impossible to deter-

mine whether these persons and others suffered for real political crimes, for violations of that strict discipline which the rulers of a country in war are bound to enforce, or whether they were punished for their opinions rather than for overt acts. Certain it is, that the official lists of persons tried and executed by Mr. Kossuth and his lieutenants, which were published by the Austrian government, cannot be relied on as indicative of the degree of terrorism which the national government of Hungary employed in dealing with its subjects. For while these lists quote hundreds of political martyrs whom the Hungarian chiefs are alleged to have put to death for their attachment to the house of Austria, it is proved that the majority of these pretended martyrs suffered death for larceny, robbery, espionage, or mutiny—crimes which the courts-martial of all countries and of all times have visited with capital punishment. All those necessary acts of rigour by which the internal discipline of an army is maintained in war, have by the Austrian government been represented as acts of political persecution. In this, as in many other instances, the antagonistic parties are at pains to conceal the truth.

Enough has, however, transpired to show

that Mr. Kossuth's rule was neither so sanguinary as his enemies pretend, nor so mild and averse to the shedding of blood as some of his partisans endeavoured to represent. He did not compel the Hungarians in a body to join his banner and fight with him against Austria; but, in many instances, compulsion was resorted to, and his orders were enforced with severity at all times, and sometimes with harshness. With respect to the Austrian prisoners alone, the President of the Committee of Defence and his generals showed a uniform, though, under the circumstances, scarcely a judicious, kindness and humanity. The Austrians treated the captive Hungarians as rebels and not as prisoners of war; the Hungarians seemed to consider their captives as masters. The Austrians ill-treated their prisoners as criminals of the worst kind, whom to punish was at once a duty and a pleasure. The common soldiers were robbed, deprived of all the necessaries of life, and enrolled in 'penal companies.' Some were sent to fight the battles of Austria in Italy; others were kept to hard labour in the Bohemian and German fortresses. The captive officers were sentenced to imprisonment or death. After the

surrender of Leopoldstadt, Baron Mednyanski, an officer, and Gruber, an artilleryman, were hanged at Presburg. Ordödy, the commander of the place, was condemned to eight years' confinement with hard labour. Görgey's clemency to his captives has already been mentioned. Mr. Kossuth's conduct was equally humane. The foreign officers alone, and among them Dembinski, sought to alleviate the miseries of the captive Hungarians by threats of retaliation. Dembinski, in particular, declared that he would shoot a captive Austrian officer for every Magyar whom the Austrians should execute during his command, and it appears that this threat had its effect for a time. He, too, was a strenuous advocate of an invasion of Galicia, but the Hungarian chiefs, although they assented to the principle, opposed the plan on grounds of expediency. Görgey's motives, even at that time, were sufficiently plain. But Mr. Kossuth, long adhering to his original idea of a *national* agitation, showed a fatal desire to confine the war to the Hungarian territory, and a strange reluctance to carry matters to extremities.

At that time, however—in April and May, 1849—his very successes carried him onwards.

Battle after battle had been gained by the young armies of his creation ; one Austrian corps after another was driven across the frontiers. The question, What was next to be done ? became daily more pressing. It left Mr. Kosuth's private councils, where it found no satisfactory solution, and obtruded itself upon the parliament. A compromise with Austria was not to be thought of. The deputies remembered Count Louis Batthyanyi's mediation, and his captivity. In former times, indeed, the insurgent chief Rakoczy had, under similar circumstances, wrung a treaty from the Imperial government of the day, and that treaty had obtained the sanction and guarantee of the great European powers. But the young Emperor, his family, Count Gr nne, and the prime minister Shwarzenberg, had given sufficient proof of their determination to obtain all or nothing in Hungary. Taking for their pretext that rebellion, which Jellachich's invasion provoked, and their own injudicious severity fostered, they wantonly and publicly broke the bond which for three hundred years united Austria and Hungary.

The Austrian constitution of the 4th of March, 1849, ignored the existence of Hungary,

as an independent kingdom under the Austrian crown. By it the kingdom was dismembered, its ancient rights and privileges abolished, and its people placed on a footing with the most dependent provinces of the empire. The war was made, not to restore to the Habsburgs those limited sovereign rights which they could justly claim in Hungary, but to conquer that country throughout and in the fullest sense of the term, and to incorporate it with the rest of the Austrian monarchy. For this purpose did the army of Prince Windishgrätz invade Hungary. For this purpose were the early successes of that army followed by the publication of a charter which abolished the ancient and legal connexion between the Habsburgs and their Hungarian subjects; which cancelled the old coronation compact, and supplanted it by a new cabinet-made law, that absolved the Hungarians from their allegiance in order to procure their subjection. The Austrian charter of the 4th of March, setting aside all historical traditions and spurning all precedents of former transactions between the two nations, appealed directly to the sword as the sole arbiter between a prince who was resolved to be absolute, and a nation which

was equally resolved to obey only on compulsion. It established the maxim, that might is right, and the success of a cause the sole test of its worth.

The effect of this great political act was not confined to Hungary. The other provinces and dependent kingdoms of the empire were equally affected, equally injured, equally insulted. They were deprived of their local governments and of their hopes of provincial independence, and compelled to submit to the Vienna scheme of centralization. The publication of this charter showed the Slavonian tribes and the Bohemian Czechs the folly which they committed in supporting the Emperor's government against Hungary; it taught them that the Magyars, however selfish and arrogant, were the champions of provincial and national independence against the encroachments of a bureaucracy, and the usurpation of the Austro-German minority. If Hungary conquered, she broke not her own chains only, but also those which bound the Czechs and the Slavonians; if victory remained with the Habsburgs, all parts and provinces of the empire were alike left of independence. Hence the charter of the 4th March, and the violent dis-

solution of the Austrian Diet of Kremsier gained the Hungarians many thousands of partisans among their late enemies; it damped the ardour of the stanchest Imperialists, and it identified the Kossuth party with the prejudices, the hopes, the hatreds, and the existence of the Magyar nation.

This position of the belligerents ought to be maturely considered. It is not enough to say that Mr. Kossuth was an ambitious and reckless agitator. Neither his ambition nor his talents of agitation could have accomplished the task of rousing his nation against a beneficent, a just, and liberal government. The Hungarians had their grievances almost from time immemorial. They complained of the brutal manner in which the reigning race sought to deprive them of their laws, and to sever them from the customs and traditions to which they, perhaps foolishly, clung. Nor could Mr. Kossuth, either by agitation or terrorism, have converted Hungary into a camp and the nation into an army, had not his ambition been fostered by the encroachments of the Austrian cabinet, had his agitation not been supported by the invasion of the Croats and Servians, acting with the consent and at

the instance of Austria. When the invasion was renewed under Windishgrätz, the Austrian armies marched at the bidding of a prince who claimed a right which was not recognised by the Hungarian constitution, and who would have been a usurper even if he had claimed that conditional allegiance which of right still belonged to his uncle Ferdinand. But the Emperor's usurpation went further: his lieutenants declared that nothing could disarm his wrath but the unreserved, unconditional surrender of the 'rebellious country;' and until that country lay prostrate at their master's feet, there could be no idea of clemency or pardon for its inhabitants. Thus much had been said in the hour of victory, nor was one single word retracted in the hour of defeat.

Under these circumstances the parliament at Debreczin were compelled, by their successes, to provide for the future government of the country. They were beset by many schemes, of which some were impossible, others dangerous. Submission was out of the question. The Regency of an Austrian prince; the Introduction of a republican constitution, after the model of that of the United States; the Election of a Prince of Coburg-Cohary to

the throne of Hungary, were in turn canvassed, proposed, and abandoned. To the regency of an Austrian prince or the royalty of a Coburg-Cohary there was an insurmountable obstacle: the impossibility of finding a pretender to the crown. The introduction of the American constitution, which was for a time advocated by the wilder among the theorists, appeared clearly out of season. A country still reeking with battle-fields, torn by furious factions, and threatened by the power of a great empire, was peculiarly unfit for political experiments. It was generally felt that Hungary wanted neither a representative of her royalty, nor an electionary law based on universal suffrage; that the time and its dangers called for a Dictator, and that the supreme power ought to be confided to the most distinguished, the most able, and the most patriotic among her politicians. Mr. Kossuth was pointed out as the man whom the parliament ought to elect. He was identified with the revolution. He had helped to make it, and it had made him. His national agitation and armament, and his defensive operations, had just carried the country through a terrible crisis. He of all the leading men of Hungary was least known and most

popular. His fortunes were bound up with those of Hungary; for of all his countrymen he was most cordially hated by the Austrians. No personal advantages could ever compensate him for the ruin of the national cause. His character was beyond the reach of suspicion, and no one thought of suspecting his nerves.

Another consideration had its weight with at least some of the leading men among that restless and ambitious nation. The agitator had a sickly appearance; he made the most of his real or pretended ailings; it was believed that his days were numbered. His reign was not likely to be of long duration. His increasing infirmities, or perhaps his death, would open the road to power to those who were not yet prepared to grasp it.

These undercurrents of thought influenced the parliamentary debates on the state of the nation. Mr. Kossuth himself took no ostensible part in them, but he sought to prepare the military chiefs for the result. His overtures were met coldly by the generals. The officers who felt that their real home was in the ranks of the Austrian army shrunk instinctively from any scheme which threatened

to place an insurmountable barrier between them and the object of their ambition.

Their objections, however, were overruled, and even Görgey was compelled to submit and bide his time. The parliament resolved to repudiate the sovereignty of Austria, to declare the independence of Hungary, and to appoint Mr. Kossuth to the dictatorship.

These important resolutions were publicly pronounced on the 14th of April. The Lower House, leaving the place where it usually held its sittings, assembled on that day in the Cathedral of Debreczin, where Mr. Kossuth recounted the history of the early connexion of Hungary with the Habsburgs, their tyrannies, treacheries, and the causes of the war. He protested that the time had come for Hungary to break the chains she had worn for three hundred years of sorrow, that she ought to take her place among the European States, and that a sentence of expulsion should be pronounced against that dynasty of princes whose government in Hungary presented an uninterrupted series of perjuries from generation to generation; who had wantonly torn the bond that bound them to the nation, by forming alliances with the enemies of the country, for the pur-

pose of oppressing the nation ; by attempting to annihilate its independence and its most sacred constitution ; by attacking with the strong hand the people which had committed no act of revolt ; by violating the integrity and diminishing the power of a country which they had sworn to protect, and by employing foreign armies for the murder of the people and the oppression of its liberties. It was necessary to terminate these atrocities, and a resolution to that effect was asked at the hand of the national representatives. The people, the army, the circumstances of the time, their duty to God, and their honour in the eyes of the world, demanded such a resolution, and he summoned them to assent to the following propositions :—

1. That Hungary and Transylvania, with their dependencies, now and by virtue of these presents, shall constitute a free, independent, sovereign State, whose territorial unity is inviolable, whose territory is indivisible.

2. The House of Habsburg-Lorraine having, by its treachery, perjury, and by its levying war against the people of Hungary, as well as by its violation of all compacts—by attacking the integral territory of the kingdom—by the separation of Transylvania, Croatia, Sclavonia, Fiume, and divers other districts, from Hungary ; and further, by compassing the destruction of the independence of the country by force of arms, and by calling in the armies of a foreign power for the purpose of annihilating

its nationality, thereby violating both the Pragmatic Sanction, and certain other treaties concluded between Austria and Hungary, on which the alliances between the two countries depended: is hereby convicted of treason and perjury, and for ever excluded from the throne of the United States of Hungary and Transylvania, and all their possessions and dependencies, and is hereby deprived of the style and title, as well as of the armorial bearings appertaining unto the crown of Hungary, and declared to be banished for ever from the said united countries, and their dependencies and possessions. The said House of Habsburg is therefore declared to be deposed, degraded, and banished for ever from the soil of Hungary.

The third proposition declared the intention of the Hungarian nation to remain in a state of amity with all other countries.

These propositions were voted unanimously and by acclamation. All the debates had taken place in the former sittings of the House; and the meeting of the 14th of April was intended rather as a public solemnity than as a consultation of the legislature. The same ready assent was given to the fourth proposition, which provided in general terms that the future form of government should be determined by the parliament, and that until this point should have been decided 'on the basis of the ancient principles which have been recognised for ages,' the government of Hungary should be in the hands of *Louis Kossuth*, who

should act as Governing President, assisted by such ministers as he should please to appoint.

The last clause of this extraordinary State act released the inhabitants and civil and military authorities of Hungary from their allegiance to the House of Austria. It provided that those who dared to act in opposition to this decree, or who in any way presumed to aid or abet in violating it, should be punished as guilty of high treason.

The proceedings of the 14th of April were decisive for the two countries. They convinced the Austrian government that Hungary had accepted its challenge in the spirit in which it was given. They furnished the Hungarian nation with a solemn precedent for future revolutions. They did more than this. They aroused the envy and spurred on the ambition of the Hungarian chiefs, many of whom were opposed to Mr. Kossuth and his influence. In the legislature, they assisted the formation of a party of clerical dignitaries and magnates who rallied around the representatives Kiss, Nyary, and Perenyi, who opposed the Governor to the best of their abilities. The effect which the Declaration of Independence produced on the army, that is to say, on its officers, was still more

powerful and fatal. General Görgey, and the Generals Kiss, Gaspar, Lazar, Török, Vecsey, and Klapka, the chiefs of the Austrian sympathizers, felt that by the Resolution of the 14th of April the gulf was widened which separated them from the goal to which their secret wishes and intrigues were tending. With much uneasiness and sad forebodings did they calculate the chances of the success of that national cause which they pretended to defend only because they wished to profit from its ruin. Their patriotism waned with the hope of a compromise. The national insurrection had raised them and their kind from the subordinate positions in which it found them. Still they asked with great acerbity whether it was for this they had fought, and whether Hungary should be severed from Austria merely to satisfy the ambition of a 'quill-driver' and 'pettifogger?' Their bitter regrets and but half-suppressed invectives showed plainly how little they cared for the nation and its independence, and how deplorable is the case of a people whom necessity compels to lower the highest dignity in the State within the reach of the greedy and ambitious.

The Governor Kossuth, indeed, endeavoured

to repress these rebellious ebullitions, partly by menaces, and partly by bribes offered to the vain, uneducated, and sensual. His official gazette, the *Közlöny*, denounced those who at such a crisis preferred their own sordid interests to the prosperity and the glory of the country. Better had it been for them had they never been born, than that they should dare to stop an enthusiastic nation in its progress to freedom! These newspaper articles which were published by Mr. Kossuth's authority, show that the Governor of Hungary was aware of Görgey's enmity and the intrigues of his faction, and that he had the will, but wanted the courage, to repress them.

Promotions, promises of future distinctions and advancement, flattering letters, in which vain and selfish young officers were compared to the heroes of the purest days of ancient Rome—these and other baits were held out to the commanders of the army, whom the Governor sought moreover to conciliate by a laxity of discipline unparalleled in military history, and which in the second campaign caused all the commanders of the corps to act for themselves—thereby defeating the success of all combined movements of large

masses of troops. Bribes of a grosser kind were employed where they were less needed. The soldiers and petty officers of the national armies were pre-excellent by courage, devotion, and patriotism. Still it was thought proper to gain them for the parliamentary declaration of independence, by double rations of food, wine, and tobacco—largesses which astonished the troops, while the malcontents took occasion to argue that the Governor would offer no bribe unless he wished the military to promote his private views rather than the welfare of the country.

The cities for the most part hailed the declaration of independence with real or pretended joy. It is always difficult to discover the real feelings and motives of the *bourgeoisie*. The citizens, who throughout the revolution sided with the strongest party, were in this instance also the zealous supporters of the Hungarian *Commonwealth*, for that is the appropriate translation of the name which the Governor gave to the country during the interregnum. At Kashau, the change was proclaimed with great solemnity, and the pictures of the Habsburg princes were removed from the town-hall. Illuminations, popular fêtes, and other demonstra-

tions signalized the event in all other Magyar towns.

Mr. Kossuth's next measures were evidently prompted by the desire to connect his new power with the aristocratic traditions of the country, and to impress the public mind with the stability and splendour of his government. In the cabinet which he formed, he placed Count Casimir Batthyanyi at the head of foreign affairs; the secretaryship of the war-department was thrust upon General Görgey, to the signal annoyance of that officer. The parliament offered the Governor the allowance which under the former reign had been paid to the Palatine, but he, who had free control of the national exchequer, declined the offer. At the same time, he strained his virtual irresponsibility by laying hands on the treasures of the church. The gold and silver vessels which were, at his command, taken from all the sacred places in Hungary, were stated at the time to have furnished him with coin to the amount of 22,000,000 florins, or about 2,200,000*l.* He originated the idea, and drew up the statutes, of a new order of military knighthood, for courage shown in battle. At his command plans were drawn up and submitted

to the parliament, of great public works for the improvement of Pesth. Among these schemes were a Palace of the Invalids, public parks on St. Margaret's Island, and a large harbour and docks. There was a railroad from Pesth to Szolnok—the Governor proposed to continue that railroad to Debreczin. Preparations were also made for the formation of a special life-guard of 400 picked men, to attend the Governor on his journeys, and guard his palace: and it was announced that the parliament should meet at Pesth.

Those who consider the energy and the vastness of these schemes, must feel that they provided for distant and uncertain contingencies, while they masked the neglect of nearer and more sacred duties. Of all the accusations which have been directed against Mr. Kossuth there is none which strikes so deep, none which, if proved, so completely condemns him, as the charge that after his accession to sovereign power, he identified the State with himself, instead of identifying himself with the State. He did not separate his own interests from those of his country (it would have been impossible for him to do so), but he consulted his own likings and dislikings—his own opinions

and prejudices—his own hopes and fears—in preference to the safety of the country, and the success of that revolution which he had fostered, and from which he derived whatever influence, power, and dignity he possessed. He forgot that in times of great danger, the practical irresponsibility of a public servant adds to the weight of his moral responsibility, and that there are seasons at which a statesman's power is unlimited, not for his own sake, but to meet the extraordinary extent of his duties. In no one instance is this so clearly shown as in Mr. Kossuth's connivance at Görgey's rebellion and treachery.

That intractable commander accepted the post offered to him, but remained with the army, where he held the chief command of various corps which, after the battle of Waitzen, relieved the fortress of Komorn by defeating the Austrians under General Shlick at Acz. He had the Governor's command to follow up the advantage hitherto obtained, by pursuing the Imperialists across the frontier, and into the disaffected Austrian provinces. The success of this operation was likely to be decisive, and if executed with despatch and energy, it would have enabled the Hun-

garians to dictate their own terms of peace at Vienna.

So obvious were the advantages, and so certain was the success of this move, that even General Görgey, though resolved not to go to extremes with Austria, was at a loss how to evade the order without betraying his secret intentions. In this dilemma he fixed upon the fortress of Buda, which was still held by an Austrian commander. 'Buda, the ancient capital of the Hungarian kings, durst not remain in the hands of the invaders. The minds of his soldiers were bent upon taking it.' Görgey, whose harshness to the petty officers and soldiers was on record, pretended on some occasions that his actions were influenced by the will of his troops. Meeting the Governor's positive order to invade Austria with this pretext, and the promise that he would carry the fortress at the point of the bayonet before the third day's sun had set, he, without waiting for further orders, retraced his steps along the Danube, and marched upon Pesth. A courier, bearing still more peremptory orders, met him on his way but could not stop his march. Görgey protested it was too late. To turn back again would be a sign of indecision,

and fatal to the discipline of the army. It was perhaps for the purpose of proving his determination that he insisted on retaining the whole of his cavalry. Fifty-two escadrons of hussars, instead of being sent across the Austrian frontier, were led by Görgey against a fortress which is situate on a steep hill, and which he had promised to take by a *coup-de-main*. In spite of the fear which his brutality created, even the citizens of Pesth ventured on an indirect remonstrance. They implored him to send his cavalry against Austria, and proposed to supply him, for the estafette and orderly service, with a troop of their mounted national guard. Görgey treated them scornfully, and dismissed them with great rudeness. On the 1st of May he established his head-quarters at Pesth, and made his preparations for the siege of Buda.

It remains a matter of doubt whether or not this act of insubordination was the result of a secret understanding with the Austrian cabinet. Görgey, the stern republican, that 'truly Spartan character,' as Mr. Kossuth sometimes described him, was on intimate terms with the captive Austrian officers, some of whom he released. As a fortified place, Buda was

untenable. Though important as a depôt for a large army, and important also because it commanded the city of Pesth and the crossings of the river, it was a place not of honour but of ruin for a small and detached garrison. The holding it was a wilful sacrifice of human life and military strength, unless it could be foreseen that the siege would furnish Görgey with a pretext for discontinuing the offensive operations against the Austrian frontier. The garrison which the Imperialists left at Buda was small; it mustered at most 4500 men, Croats and Italians, mere food for powder. The officer in command, too, was curiously selected. Major-General Hentzi, a Swiss mercenary in the Emperor's service, had in the course of the war been a captive in the hands of the Hungarians. He had been discharged on *parole*—that is to say, he had pledged his word, as an officer and a gentleman, to remain inactive to the end of the war; on the strength of that promise he had been allowed to depart. He had broken his promise, and forfeited all claim to the courtesies of war, by again taking arms against the Hungarians. Such a man was not likely to capitulate—dishonoured, he could not trust to the honour of

others. Such a man was also most fit to be sacrificed; for it is in the nature of power to despise those most who most disgrace themselves in its service. Hentzi was installed in the fortress, with orders to defend it to the last, and with a promise that an army should come to his relief. The men who placed him there knew that he must perish, unless the siege were protracted to a most unreasonable length.

If the Austrian commanders calculated on the length of the siege, it must be admitted that Görgey justified their reliance by the tardiness of his operations. Instead of attempting a *coup-de-main*, he leisurely distributed his large army into regular cantonments, and trenches were opened and batteries constructed on the hills which command the castle of Buda. Some time, too, was lost in an attempt to negotiate with the garrison, to intimidate Hentzi by menaces, and prevent his bombarding the city of Pesth. The result was that he bombarded that city before a gun had been fired by the besiegers. An enormous amount of property was destroyed on this occasion, and throughout the siege, which instead of three, lasted twenty days. For after a long and useless cannonade, and several fruitless assaults, Görgey

remembered that, to make a practicable breach, he must have cannon of heavy calibre. Ordnance was consequently sent for from Komorn and Acz. Upon its arrival, a breach was made, and on the morning of the 20th May, the fortress was carried by assault. Görgey was innocent even of this tardy success. The large number of his troops made a certain degree of energy unavoidable, and when the breach was practicable, and no pretence could be found to delay the assault, Buda fell through the dauntless courage and perseverance of the national army. The combat lasted from three to seven o'clock in the morning, when what remained of the garrison surrendered to the Honveds. Hentzi was among the victims of the day. Görgey entered the fortress an hour after its occupation, and issued a bombastic proclamation, announcing the success of his troops, and claiming it as his own. The ostensible losses of the Hungarians were confined to the partial destruction of Buda and Pesth, and to 1700 men killed and wounded. In reality, they had lost twenty-three days and a golden opportunity. In return, they obtained possession of a fortress, which must needs have

surrendered, if Hungary conquered her other enemies, and which was of no value in the case of another Austrian invasion. The stores and ammunition which the Imperialists had not been able to remove, and which consisted of eighty-three cannon, 1400 cwt. of gunpowder, 2000 cwt. of saltpetre, and 14,000 muskets, were of great importance to an army, part of which was but indifferently provided with weapons; but larger and more valuable stores were to be had at Presburg, Vienna, and in the various depôts of Austria and Bohemia.

Mr. Kossuth, the lawyer, might have pardoned the contemptuous disregard which Görgey evinced for his opinion. It was the duty of Louis Kossuth, the Governor of Hungary, to punish General Görgey's insubordination, and to prevent the strength and the time of the nation being thrown away on a worthless object. It was the opinion of all Hungarians who were familiar with the people and the army, that the Governor would have run no risk if he had deposed the rebellious general, and ordered his arrest and execution. But even if there had been danger of a military riot, a true patriot would have considered that the worst which could happen to Hungary was

subjection to Austria, and that subjection to Austria was certain, unless the Governor could repress that licentious disregard of authority of which Görgey set so flagrant and demoralizing an example.

Mr. Kossuth knew and neglected his duty. He did more. Since his courage could not rise to the level of justice, he stooped to flatter the criminal. His will was law to the Parliament, and the parliament resolved to promote General Görgey to the rank of Field-marshal lieutenant, to make him a commander of the military order of Merit, and to appoint a deputation of the House to offer him the thanks of the nation. Görgey met these demonstrations in a scornful manner. After the fall of Buda, he conducted his troops to Komorn. Here, again, the orders of the government were positive. To make up for lost time, he was commanded to take the offensive with great energy, to attack and disperse the Austrians wherever he found them, and to prevent the concentration of their forces. Instead of doing this, he remained inactive at Komorn. A few small corps only were detached against Oedenburg, Warasdin, and Tyrnau. Another attempt was made to re-

move him from the army which he paralysed. He was again summoned to proceed to Pesth, and enter upon his functions as Secretary-at-War. He appointed his friend General Klapka to the War Office, and sent him to Pesth, while he remained at Komorn, anxious to keep his troops out of action, and while fresh levies of Austrian troops and old regiments drafted from Italy were again swarming on the frontier and in the districts which the Imperialists still occupied.

It is true an invasion of Austria was scarcely required to terminate the war, if the belligerents had been left to fight their own battles. Hungary, with a small army and young troops, had defeated the largest and most formidable armament which the Austrian empire could bring into the field. The Hungarian armies were now organized, numerous, and victorious; the Austrian troops were lessened in number and discouraged; the population of Austria was rebellious. Large garrisons were required to keep the various towns and provinces of the empire from insurrection. Vienna waited for the advent of the Hungarians to be revenged for the horrors of the siege of October, 1848, and for the cruel-

ties and vexations which followed the defeat of the democratic party. Bohemia remembered still the promises of March, 1848, and the bombardment of Prague. Galicia was anxious to follow the example of Hungary; Styria was ripe for revolt. The Servians, at one time the most useful allies of the court, were dispersed; the Croats were discouraged and disappointed. They had bargained for less fighting and more booty. Even the Cabinet began to show signs of dissolution. Count Stadion, the prime minister's coadjutor in the 'restoration of the monarchy,' broke down under the burden of his responsibility. He went mad. The male population of the provinces was absorbed by heavy conscriptions; the State was overwhelmed with debt, and tottering on the verge of bankruptcy: the deficit of the year was enormous; gold and silver had disappeared, and in their place paper money, from twopence upwards, formed the medium of circulation. Even this was halved and quartered, to meet the exigencies of the petty trade.

No great military chief was at hand to restore the fortunes of the war. Marshal Radetzky had done good service in Italy; but in Italy

he was wanted. Prince Windishgrätz was incapable. He resigned his command even before the battle of Waitzen. His successor, General Welden, owed his escape from the Hungarian armies only to Görgey's mutiny and the siege of Buda. General Shlick had been most efficient in the last campaign; but he was not thought equal to the command of a large army, because his disposition was too mild and humane. The chief command against Hungary was given to General Haynau, an officer of ferocious energy, whose name became first generally known in connexion with an act of cruel retaliation and bloodshed at Brescia. He was the natural son of a Landgrave of Hesse and a Jewess of the same country. Of generalship he had yet to give proofs; but his talents for the pacification of a conquered country were notorious. Among his first acts were the trials and executions of several political offenders and captive officers, whom his predecessors had left at Presburg. The Cabinet appointed him because they had not a better man; the soldiers knew nothing of him, and the officers disliked him. No one believed in his success.

In this extremity, the Emperor's cabinet,

though reluctantly and with many misgivings, took a step, of which the importance and the consequences have never been fully appreciated. They asked for the assistance of a power whose existence in the system of European States is of recent date, and whose traditions, form of government, population, and means and modes of action, are not European. Ever since the partition of Poland and the wars against Napoleon, the influence of Russian diplomacy in the affairs of Europe has progressed in a rapid and alarming manner. It is the good fortune of that marvellous country to command the destinies of two worlds ; to covet at the same time India and Constantinople ; to conquer where it protects, to influence the councils of all other nations, and to acknowledge no other influence but that of its master. The Russian is a young nation among the mature civilization of Europe ; her faculties are scarcely developed ; her forces still uncentrated. But even in her comparative debility, Russia, by the extent of her territories, by the vastness of her resources, and the number of her subjects, and by her subtle and cautious policy, joined to an uncompromising, un-deviating, and truly respectable singleness of

purpose, has come to be the arbiter, and, in a manner, the legislator of the nations of the continent. Her power gains upon, and may one day even surpass, that of Great Britain. In her early wars she has conquered in, and sometimes by, her defeats. It is recounted in the *Memoirs of Mallet du Pan*, that after the battle of Zorndorf, a Dane, on being told that the King of Prussia had in that engagement killed 30,000 Russians, replied, 'No matter; it is so easy for God to make fresh Russians.' This flippant remark contains a summary of the reasons why the Russians have generally prevailed in spite of the frequent and terrible reverses which befel them in all their wars. Three nations, which at one time were all-powerful on the continent—Poland, Sweden, and Turkey—have been degraded from their high places, stripped of their territories, and broken to pieces by collision with the infant strength of the Russian empire. While protesting that the vastness of its dominions makes all foreign conquests burthensome and even dangerous, that empire has extended its frontiers even in times of peace; it has gained and is still gaining ground on the Baltic and on the Black Sea. The

statesmen of Vienna must have remembered that the majority of their discontented and restless subjects belonged to the great Slavonic family, of which the Russians are the most formidable representatives; that the Czar's interests had on more than one occasion clashed with those of the Habsburgs, and that the same ambition which stimulated the Austrians to the conquest and subjugation of Italy, in preference to the colonization of their vast Hungarian and Slavonian provinces, might possibly have some influence on the sovereigns of Russia. The last will and testament of Peter the Great must have been known to them, and they could not be ignorant of the fact that its provisions had hitherto been faithfully executed by the Czars of all the Russias.

But whatever misgivings suggested themselves to the Emperor's mind, they were silenced by the necessities of the hour. A foreign auxiliary was wanted, and Russia alone was open to an appeal. The German States, with which the Imperial Cabinet was at issue on a question of sovereignty, would have rejoiced if Austria had stooped to solicit their help, but they would have refused it. The Prince President of the French Republic

wanted the power to follow the leanings of his mind. Russia was in a different position from all the other great powers. The success of the Hungarian revolution would have been the ruin of Austria; it would have been a source of the greatest danger to Russia. She too had crushed some nationalities, and now held them under by main force. A Hungarian expedition into Gallicia would have enfranchised the Poles of that Austrian province, but it would also have carried the fire and sword of revolution across the frontier into the Polish provinces of Russia. The Warsaw insurrection of 1830 had cost an enormous amount of blood and treasure. It was obviously in the interest of Russia to prevent a repetition of this catastrophe.

Hence the successes of the Hungarian insurrection had been anxiously watched at St. Petersburg. Large armies were concentrated, and occupied the whole length of the frontier which separates the Russian dominions from the rest of Europe. Poland was a vast camp. Troops poured into Bessarabia and the Turkish principalities of the Danube. Even before the Czar had manifested his intentions, his lieutenant in Wallachia undertook on his own respon-

sibility the invasion of Transylvania. The expedition, though unsuccessful, had the Czar's approval; and when his assistance was formally asked, he granted it. Rumours there are, that his desire to support Austria met with much opposition in his council of state. The majority of the senators pronounced against the intervention. It promised no advantages in case of success; it might possibly fail, and it would certainly be a burden to the country. A war, undertaken exclusively for foreign interests, would disgust the army, which was already discontented. The intercourse with foreign nations would demoralize the Russians. Notwithstanding these arguments, the Czar persisted in his resolution, which was communicated to the army at a grand review, where Nicolaus of Russia addressing his officers, informed them of his intention to make war upon the Hungarians, whom he denounced as 'robbers, murderers, and incendiaries.' The two sovereigns of Austria and Russia met at Warsaw, on the 20th May, to ratify the alliance. It was stipulated that 120,000 troops and 40 batteries should enter Hungary through Gallicia and Wallachia, and co-operate with the army

under General Haynau; that Austria should pay nothing for the services of these troops, but that their maintenance during the campaign should fall on the Austrian exchequer. The Russians commenced their march into Galicia, and a division of 12,000 men under General Paniutine, which preceded the bulk of the army, hastened to reinforce the Austrian forces, which were concentrating at Presburg, and which might still have suffered from Görgey's army. The alliance and its object were duly announced to the nations and cabinets of Europe. The Governor Kossuth, too, issued a proclamation, in which he protested against the Russian intervention. He described it as an act by which Austria sought to carry out her despotic schemes at the price of the deepest self-abasement; he asserted that the Hungarians would never recognise a king who was the assassin of his subjects; and he appealed to the generosity, to the liberal instincts, and the interests of Europe against this propaganda of despotism.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Russian Invasion.—Kossuth's Measures.—Impositions.—Terrorism.—The Palatine Hussars.—Positions of the Armies.—The Crusade.—Battle of Pered.—Combat at Acz.—Klapka's Duplicity.—The Flight from Pesth.—Haynau at Pesth.—Battles at Komorn.

IN the last week of April, 1849, the citizens of Vienna were delighted by the distant thunder of a cannonade, which announced the approach of the Hungarians whom these oppressed people would fain have hailed as deliverers. Their hopes gained ground from the dismay of their rulers, and their exultation was great when it became known that hasty preparations were making to remove the government offices to some place of safety, while the garrison was consigned to the barracks, or drawn up in the public squares, ready to march at a moment's notice. The days, and even the hours, were counted which might bring a troop of hussars to the gates of the capital. The 22,000 horsemen whom Görgey withdrew from the frontier, and whose services

were wasted during the siege of Buda, might, at any moment, have raised a million of auxiliaries to the cause of Hungary. Little credit is due to Prince Shwarzenberg for staking the fortunes of his imperial master on the cast of a single die. It was a gambler's trick, for its success, in the face of all the chances, was owing to causes over which the minister had no control, unless it be proved that he kept up a secret understanding with Görgey, and some other Austro-Magyar leaders. It has before been shown that it is just possible to vindicate the measures of the Austrian Cabinet on the plea of such an understanding; but it is also certain that such a secret—if secret there were—remained treasured up in the breasts of the chief conspirators in either camp, and the confidence it gave was confined to a few persons only. The Austrian officers clung to the cause with a stubborn and despairing tenacity—but the soldiers were demoralized. Loud wailings were heard from the transports of young troops as they marched upon Presburg. They wept, and lamented the fate which drove them to Hungary to be slaughtered.

At this period of unequalled despondency,

the nations of Austria were officially informed of the Czar's protection. The *Vienna Gazette* announced that 'the extension of the Hungarian insurrection made it the duty of all States to protect the Imperial Government against the dissolution of social order,' and that 'these considerations induced the Emperor to ask the armed assistance of the Russian Czar, which that potentate had generously and liberally promised.' On the 4th and 5th of May, 40,000 Russians, with 12,000 horses, entered the Austrian dominions by Krakow; on the 8th, 15,000 men passed the frontier at Tarnograd; on the same day 26,000, with 9800 horses, entered at Brody; and on the 9th and 11th, 17,000 men crossed at Wolosezyo, and 9000 at Hussatin. All these troops were under the command of Field-Marshal Prince Paskievitsh, with whom were the Generals Rüdiger and Tsheodajeff. They occupied Gallicia, and remained there inactive for some weeks, thus showing that their precipitate march into Austria was mainly urged by the Czar's fear of an insurrection among the Gallician Poles. When that province was safe, the movements of the auxiliary armies became slow, their de-

mands upon the population exorbitant, and their treatment of the Austrian officers and local magistrates brutal. Part of the Russian forces were conveyed through Prussia, with the express consent of the king of that country, and to the deep humiliation of the Prussians, who were alive to the disgrace and the dangers of such a measure.

The Russian troops which took the field against the Hungarians were the most ill-favoured soldiery (not excepting even the Croats) that had been seen in Europe since the grand irruption of Asiatic tribes in 1813. They looked ill-fed, and were for the most part clumsily clothed and armed. The infantry wore helmets, heavy shoes, drawers of coarse linen, and great-coats of rough cloth reaching down to their ankles. They had clumsy muskets, with flint locks. The artillery and part of the cavalry were more carefully armed and dressed, but, on the whole, the Russian army showed plainly that the leaders relied on its numbers rather than on its physical force or moral superiority. The soldiers marched with a stupid indifference, which was only enlivened by the hope of plunder. They believed that those who fell in a foreign war

would straightway return to life in their own country. The officers were more enlightened, but equally resigned. When spoken to on the subject of the difficulties and dangers of the campaign, they had but one answer. 'The Czar commanded us to conquer ; his will must be done.' They felt, and ostentatiously showed, the greatest contempt for the monarch whom they came to aid, and believed that if Hungary were conquered, it would be for the Czar, and not for the Emperor of Austria.

While this fresh storm was gathering over Hungary, the Governor sought to animate the confidence of his adherents and to shake the resolution of his opponents by improving upon and extending the accomplished fact of the declaration of independence. He issued his decrees in the name of the ' Responsible Government of the Independent Hungarian Empire and its Provinces.' He had summoned the Parliament to meet at Pesth in July. After the capture of Buda, he established his government in the capital, and entered Pesth on the 5th June with regal pomp, seated in a state carriage which formerly belonged to his enemies, the Habsburgs. Women, dressed in white, scattering flowers, and bands of music, preceded, mounted

guards, and a brilliant staff surrounded him as he drove through the dense masses of the populace, which had gone out to meet him on his way. He signalized his entry into Pesth by an act of grace in the manner of monarchs, by abolishing corporal punishment in the army, and he addressed the people in an eloquent speech, assuring them of the sympathies of Europe and the active support of France. He must have been aware that no such support could be expected from the President of the French Republic. Mr. Kossuth's friends, however, protest that he did not wittingly delude the people with false hopes; that the support of France was promised by the Provisional Government in November, 1848; that it would have been granted if General Cavaignac had been elected to the Presidency, and that six months after the election of Louis Napoleon, Mr. Kossuth was profoundly ignorant of a change in the government of France, which so nearly affected his hopes for himself and his country. By the action of the allied armies, the government of Mr. Kossuth was indeed cut off from the rest of the world with respect to the usual modes of communication. Messengers from Hungary were arrested, letters were

intercepted on their way from or into that country. But his spies were bold, devoted, and crafty, and letters were smuggled through the midst of the Austrian armies. One of Mr. Kossuth's most serviceable spies—Madame Von Beck—was frequently in the Austrian camp, where the change of government and the corresponding change of principles in France were well known. Besides, Mr. Kossuth corresponded with his foreign agents by way of Turkey.

It is therefore almost impossible to conceive that the Governor of Hungary could be ignorant of the defeat of that friendly party in France which, six months since, had, through M. Bastide, assured him of its sympathies and promised its active support. In referring his people to the assistance of France, the Governor Kossuth deliberately stated what he must have known to be untrue. He who had inveighed against the deceptions practised by kings and their ministers, committed the crime he denounced in others the moment he attempted to play a sovereign's part. Louis Kossuth, the democrat, betrayed his want of respect for the people which so nobly upheld him, by suspecting them of a pusillanimity of which the lower classes of that heroic,

though imprudent, nation had shown no signs whatever. His gratuitous untruth was an insult to the nation; it was also a grave political fault, for it raised hopes which the next weeks must destroy, and it enlisted disappointment and distrust on the side of the enemy.

The installation of his government at Pesth was followed by a series of illiberal measures. The property of the Steam Navigation Company was confiscated. Daniel Novak, a journalist, was accused of having, in the *Pesth Gazette*, praised an Austrian Archduke, thereby encouraging the inhabitants of Pesth to assist the Austrians. He was arrested, tried, sentenced, and executed if not by the Governor's order, at least with his consent. Another journalist, the editor of the *Ungar* newspaper, was denounced in a special decree for 'vilifying the Austrians.' The letters of private persons were opened at the post-offices. At Trentshin, for instance, they were opened by a man of the name of Marzibanyi, whom the Austrians afterwards fined 2000*l.* for executing the Governor's orders in this respect. The opening of letters is a breach of trust of which few governments are innocent, and the Aus-

trians, who punished Mr. Kossuth's agents for violating the secrets of private correspondence, opened all suspected letters throughout the war and after it.

At that time the air of Hungary was rank with suspicion. Every man distrusted his neighbour. Every one sought to discover a plot or to make one. During the Austrian occupation of Pesth and its environs, a system of terrorism oppressed those who were suspected of sympathizing with the national cause. Now the tables were turned. The Austrian party, or those who were supposed to belong to it, were prosecuted and mulcted in heavy fines; properties were confiscated, and several executions are mentioned in the newspapers of the time. The populace, too, pronounced its own verdicts and enforced them. Persons who were suspected of *espionage* had their ears cut off. There is on record a decree of General Shweidler, who commanded at Pesth, denouncing the arbitrary ill-treatment of alleged spies, and demanding that such persons should be given up to the courts-martial.

To keep the balance even, it is but just to state that such practices were not confined to the Hungarians. The violence of the belli-

gerent parties was great, and after General Haynau assumed the command of the Imperial army, full licence was given to that wanton brutality which characterizes the Austrian soldiery. In July two clergymen from Dotis were shot at Haynau's head-quarters at Nagy Igmand. In June, the Protestant pastor, Razga, had been shot by Haynau's orders. Nothing is known of the crime of these men. A Hungarian agent, who was arrested near Oedenburg, had his tongue cut out by an Austrian officer. The tongue was nailed to the church-door of the place. The village of Bö Sakarny was burned by Haynau, because some of its inhabitants were accused of having assisted the national troops in a combat at Csorna.

Less objectionable is the severity shown by the Austrians in the case of the Palatine hussars, whose devotion to their country ought to be recorded whenever mention is made of the war in Hungary. Three troops of the Hungarian regiment, 'Palatine,' were stationed in Bohemia, where the authorities kept a close watch upon them to prevent their escape. In spite of these precautions, some of the men deserted when the news of the war in their own country reached them in their distant canton.

ments. It was therefore resolved to send them to the Austrian army in Italy. They marched in the first days of June ; the officers in command avoided the highroads and large towns, to prevent the hussars from learning the vic-tories of their countrymen and the perilous condition of Hungary. But on their arrival in Styria, vague rumours of what had happened came to their ears ; their silence and their anxious looks warned the officers of the desperate resolution which each man concealed in his own breast. Messengers were despatched for a detachment of infantry to escort them. A few hours before the arrival of this escort, a troop of hussars mounting, turned aside from the road to Italy, and with their sabres drawn and their carbines ready, they rode away towards Hungary. On the third day of their flight they crossed the frontier ; on the fourth they reached the outposts of their countrymen. Two other troops followed the example of the first, but took another road, and came to the Styrian city of Bruck, where a detachment of Austrian soldiers stopped their progress. In the skirmish which ensued, twelve of the Hussars were killed, fifty-four severely wounded, and seventy-two captured. A few cut their way

through the enemy, and after many hardships succeeded in gaining the Hungarian frontier. Of the captives, ten were doomed to death, but thanks to a clemency which is creditable to the governor of Styria, only three were executed. The rest were put in irons and taken to Italy to fight the battles of Austria under Marshal Radetzky.

The three armies which contended for the possession of Hungary were drawn up in battle array. Of regular troops, Austria and Russia had 175,000 in the field. Kossuth had a regular army of 150,000, trained to the fatigues of the campaign and the dangers of battle, fully armed and equipped, and supported by large masses of militia. Never before had the Hungarians presented so imposing a front to their enemies. Never before was it so clear that Hungary must prevail if the patriotism of the leaders equalled the heroic devotion of her people. If again victorious in the struggle, she was likely to be supported by the European nations, which felt for her chivalry rather than for her cause. There was no reason why a man who six months before created an army under the hoofs and swords of a triumphant enemy, should not

again conquer, now that the forces were equally balanced.

The Hungarian armies surrounded the country in a large circular sweep. Dembinski, faithful in spite of the Governor's ingratitude, commanded a corps of 12,000 men in Northern Hungary. His lines were drawn from Eperies to Neustadl, on the Waag; his right wing leant on the Carpathians; his centre occupied the cities of Leutshau, Kásmark, and Bartfeld; and his left wing swept the valley of the Waag. This corps was to stem the tide of the Russian army, which, from Galicia, threw the bulk of its forces upon the Jablunka defiles and the other passes of the Tatra mountains. The territory which Dembinski was expected to protect was too extensive, and the numbers of the enemy were by far too large for the number of his troops. The foreigners, Bem, Dembinski, and Guyon, were always placed in the post of danger, with the smallest possible number of troops, lest their achievements should eclipse those of the native generals. They suffered from this jealousy, but they suffered less than the nation in whose cause they were engaged. In the present instance, the most vulnerable part of the

country was least protected; for if Dembinski could not hold all the passes, and if the Russians forced their way through any of them, nothing could prevent their march into the plains of the Theiss, the strongholds of Magyarism.

The central army of the Hungarians, commanded by the Generals Görgey, Klapka and Guyon, with the fortress of Komorn in its rear, numbered 70,000 men, in three corps; it occupied the country from the river Waag to the Borough of Vasarhely, and corresponded, by means of Guerilla bands on Lake Balaton, with the army of the South under Perczel. The Austrian army which these troops were intended to repulse numbered at first 84,000 men, but strong reinforcements of Austrian and Russian troops pouring in, increased its numbers to 100,000 men. Its head-quarters were at Presburg.

Perczel's corps, the Southern army of the Hungarians, consisted of 27,000 regular troops, and 35,000 irregulars, occupying the Bacska, the Banat, and part of Syrmia. Their main depôts were in the fortress of Peterwaradin. Part of this corps was engaged in the siege of the fortresses of Arad and Temesvar. Opposed to them was the Austrian Southern army under

the Ban Jellachich, whose troops were concentrated at Karlovitz, and who with difficulty maintained his position in that narrow slip of land which lies between the Danube and the Drave. In the course of the campaign, Perczel's corps occupied the cities of Weisskirchen, Orsova, and Karansebes, and established communications with Bem and the army in Transylvania. That province, however, was gradually abandoned, and the bulk of its forces drafted off to the Banat, to assist Perczel.

To raise the last remaining strength of the country, and to secure victory at all risks, the Governor Kossuth made another appeal to the nation by proclaiming a crusade against the Russians and the Austrian emperor. The clergy were to harangue the people. All able-bodied men were ordered to provide themselves with weapons of some sort. The tocsin was to be sounded at the approach of the Russians; they were to be harassed by frequent attacks of the peasantry, and alarmed by an incessant ringing of bells. All provisions were to be destroyed, all villages to be burned on the line of march of the Imperialist armies.

The Governor issued this manifesto in the last days of June. The offensive operations of

the allies commenced on the 9th of that month by an advance upon Izgard on the Waag. The combat lasted twelve hours, and led to no result. Three days later, an Austrian brigade, under General Wyss, advanced to Czorna, where it was attacked and routed by some detachments of Klapka's corps under Colonel Kmetty. The Austrian commander was killed in the battle. Similar, though less decisive, engagements followed on the 17th of the month in the island of Shütt, and near the villages of Kiraly Rew and Pered, until, on the 20th of June, the first great battle of the campaign was fought at Pered. Görgey, with 30,000 men and eighty guns, had made preparations to attack the centre of the Austrian position. Klapka remonstrated against this plan, but Görgey protested vehemently that the attack on the Austrian positions along the Waag was absolutely indispensable, and that 'that day's combat must be decisive.' In spite of this energetic assertion, it appears from Klapka's own statements that he, as well as Görgey, passed the better half of the day of the battle at Aszod, about ten miles from the scene of contest; that the combat had been raging above five hours, and that the village of Pered, against which

the operations were directed, had been lost and won when, at 2 p.m., Görgey arrived on the battle-field. It had taken him four hours to ride over the ten miles of ground between Aszod and Pered! When he reached Pered, he ordered the troops into bivouack, deposed the officer in command for commencing the attack without sufficient authority, and on the following day, when the main force of the Austrians returned to the charge, he exposed his troops in an unprotected position to the fire of the Austrian batteries. In the course of that day he got surrounded by the allied forces, and nothing but the courage and devotion of the Honveds enabled him to make good his retreat to Aszod. Two thousand five hundred of his troops remained on the field of battle. Klapka, who wrote rather in favour of Görgey than against him, states, that if the Austrian attack had been conducted more rapidly and violently, 'this eventful day would have witnessed the rout and ruin of a large part of the Hungarian army.' After the battle of Pered, Görgey and his staff dawdled the time away in maudlin helplessness; two corps remained 'for ten days at least,' and for no purpose, on the left bank of the Danube,

while the defence of Raab, against which the Imperialists concentrated the whole of their forces, was left to General Pöltenberg with only 9000 men. At the eleventh hour, a corps, which was stationed at Komorn, received Görgey's orders to reinforce the garrison of Raab. But the distance to that city was above forty miles; the corps had been decimated in the late battles, and Raab was lost to the Hungarians. The Imperialists occupied it on the 29th of June, in spite of Pöltenberg's heroic defence.

After these losses, Kossuth despatched three commissioners to Komorn with orders for Görgey to retreat to the vast plains between the Maros and the Theiss, where the bulk of the national forces were to be concentrated. Görgey promised obedience; but after the departure of the commissioners he accepted battle from the Imperialists who pressed upon his outposts at Ats, in front of Komorn. His advanced positions were driven in and he was compelled to seek shelter in the entrenched camp of the fortress. Of this fact he informed the Governor—adding, that the enemy was too powerful, and that he could not obey the orders transmitted to him. All he

could do was to hold out at Komorn. He invited Mr. Kossuth and the Members of the Government to come to that fortress.

If the Governor had followed Görgey's advice, he would have placed himself in the power of a man who hated him more cordially than even his Austrian enemies could hate him, who fought his battles to the ruin of his cause, and who waited but for a favourable opportunity to terminate the war. It appears that this message aroused Kossuth to a sense of his precarious position. He took what he considered extreme measures, by issuing a decree which deprived Görgey of the chief command. General Meszaros was appointed to take his place, and ordered to join the army at Komorn.

The old general left Pesth, but he halted on the road and turned back, when at Almas the distant and continuous thunder of artillery apprised him of a general engagement between the two armies. But Meszaros was not the only bearer of the Governor's decree, for a courier, who travelled on another road, reached the fortress on the evening of the 2nd July, at the termination of a battle, in which 1500 Hungarians and 2000 Imperialists were killed.

The former were forced to seek the protection of their entrenched camp, and Görgey, who happened to get mixed up in a charge of cavalry, was bleeding from a sabre-cut in the back of his head. That wound played an important part in the history of the Hungarian War. For many weeks, whenever he appeared in public, his head was wrapped up in thick and inconveniently conspicuous bandages. He never discarded the hat which had been cut through by the sabre, but wore it on all occasions, thereby provoking a boundless enthusiasm amongst the troops.

The first and last wound of which the commander-in-chief of the Hungarian armies could boast, preserved him his command. The chief of his staff fomented a conspiracy among the commanders of the corps, and the Governor's peremptory orders for Görgey to resign, for the army to march to the Lower Danube, and for Klapka to see to the execution of these orders, were as peremptorily disobeyed. Klapka convoked a council of war, where it was resolved that he should go to Pesth and insist on the Governor cancelling his decrees. At the moment of his departure he received another decree, by which he was ordered to 'hasten

the march of the army,' while he himself was desired to remain at Komorn, with 18,000 men. The hopeless demoralization of the military leaders is most glaringly shown by Klapka's ingenuous confession, that this order 'spurred him on to greater speed,' and that he immediately proceeded to Pesth.* His mediation sufficed to shake the Governor's resolution, and it was agreed that Görgey should resign his office as secretary at war, the functions of which he had never performed, and that he should remain with the army and retain its command, provided he acknowledged Meszaros as commander-in-chief and promised obedience to his orders. On the return of the negotiator to Komorn, Görgey pledged his word that he would obey the orders of the new commander-in-chief, but he knew how to distinguish between his promise and its performance. He was again requested to march his troops to Pesth. Instead of doing this, he assembled a council of war and proposed to lead the army to Lake Balaton. This plan was so thoroughly opposed to the real interests of Hungary, that the generals, and especially Klapka and Nagy

* Klapka's *War in Hungary*, vol. i. p. 150.

Sandor more than suspected his secret intentions.

It is characteristic of the frame of mind of these patriots, that in spite of this tardy suspicion they consented to support the traitor's manœuvre. Klapka confesses that after the battle of Raab, Görgey 'dropped his mask,' and that but a thin veil of secrecy was thrown over his intention of making a disgraceful surrender. The word *negotiation* was at that time openly mentioned in Görgey's camp; his fear of victory, and his desire either to abandon the Governor or to decoy him to his headquarters were so apparent, and the dangers which these intrigues threatened for the country were so great, that Klapka and the other chiefs would have been justified in arrogating to themselves that power which the Governor Kossuth dared not exert. But George Klapka, whose 'Roman character' stooped to a disgraceful conspiracy against General Dembinski, was far too conscientious to act openly against the man whom, on his own confession, he knew to be a traitor. Inexperienced, indolent, vain, and withal thoroughly selfish, he played a double game, and sought to be the favourite and confidant of the two rival powers: to profit by the

success or to save himself from the ruin of either. He had conspired against Dembinski because that officer exposed his ignorance and irresolution ; he shrank from taking the Governor's part against Görgey because he stood in awe of his stern comrade, and because that comrade's scheme might possibly be attended with success. Once, and once only, did Klapka attempt to obey the Governor's orders, by sending General Nagy Sandor with a corps to Waitzen. This was done by stealth, and the measure was revoked and the troops recalled when Görgey intimated his displeasure at this contempt of his authority. The largest and best appointed army was lost to the cause of Hungary at a time when its services were most needed. Above 40,000 troops and 209 pieces of artillery were, throughout one-half of the campaign, locked up in the entrenched camp of Komorn, while the smaller corps, in other parts of Hungary, were left to contend with the overwhelming numbers of the Russian army. Such an intrigue could have but one result. The arms of the Hungarians had been victorious in Transylvania and in the South, where Bem, Guyon, and Perczel, men devoted to the cause, commanded. The fortress of Arad had

been compelled to surrender to the Governor's troops, and the corps which had conducted the siege was a welcome and a most necessary addition to the forces in the South. But the weak point of the Hungarian defences, the Gallician frontier, where Dembinski and after him Visocki commanded a corps of 12,000 men, was left exposed to the attack of the Russians, who, advancing by slow and cautious marches, forced the defiles of the Carpathians, occupied Eperies, Kashau, Miskolcz, overran the plains of the Theiss and entered Debreczin on the 3rd of July. The combined Austrian and Russian armies at Raab, meanwhile, discovered that the forces at Komorn required but to be watched, not opposed, and after the battle at Komorn, General Haynau could detach a strong corps in the direction of Pesth. On the day the Russians entered Debreczin, the headquarters of the Austrian commander-in-chief were at Babolna.

The inhabitants of the capital began at this time to despair of the war. They were assured that the army at Komorn remained unconquered, and great care was taken to conceal from them the advance of the allies. But the evil news oozed out. Their nights were dis-

turbed by the hollow rumbling of artillery and heavy waggons, which betrayed the clandestine removal of the archives and stores. The greatest confusion prevailed. The faces of the people were anxious and care-worn; many took to flight. False rumours were flying about in all directions. Some of the populace assembled in tumultuous meetings; others sought to liberate the Austrian prisoners of war. Cries of 'Treason!' filled the air. The government was compelled by threats of extreme measures of severity to prevent the outbreak of an insurrection.

The Governor himself resolved to leave Pesth. His private property was removed to Szolnok, and his own departure fixed for the 2nd of July. He wished to leave the city secretly, but the news of his departure became known, and when his carriage drew up at his door, the square was filled with people, anxious to witness his departure. Thus discovered, his plans were changed. He issued from his palace in simple dress with the cross of St. Stephen slung round his neck, preceded by three bishops bearing crosses and banners, and surrounded by his adjutants, one of whom bore the standard of Hungary. After him came his guards. The people cheered the procession as it emerged

from the gateway, and proceeded to the great cross in the square. The Governor stopped at the cross, and knelt down. The people knelt with him. After this act of devotion, Mr. Kossuth assured them that the God of Hungary, who protected them in the battles of Hatvan and Kapolna, would not now withdraw his protection from his people. The Governor's aspect, his anxious, care-worn features, and the impressive tones of his voice, filled the populace with a transport of grief and enthusiasm. Those who but a few days before provoked his threats of courts-martial and wholesale *fusillades*, now rushed forward to embrace and kiss his knees and feet, and even the stones on which his foot had trod. He bade them be of good cheer and promised a speedy return. Crowds of people followed him, bewailing their own lot and his, as the carriage drove slowly away. But few of the male population stayed behind. They left, partly from patriotism, and partly from fear of Austrian vengeance. A week afterwards the towns of Buda and Pesth were occupied by the advanced guard of the Austrian army. General Haynau issued a proclamation, in which he told the inhabitants of Pesth that he would make them

responsible, 'one for all, and all for one,' and that their lives and properties were forfeited in expiation of their crimes. Their city bore the traces of a first chastisement; if they provoked him, he would turn it into a heap of ruin and ashes: a monument of their treason and of his revenge. To make these menaces the more impressive, he reminded the citizens of Pesth of his achievements at Brescia. The Jews, who had throughout supported the Hungarian government, were mulcted in a sum of 1,500,000 florins.

The Governor of Hungary, meanwhile, removed the seat of what was left to him of power to Czegled, and afterwards to Szegedin. He made strenuous but fruitless endeavours to attract Görgey and his army in defence of the capital. Messenger was sent after messenger, order followed upon order, but without result. Mr. Kossuth's entreaties, and the orders of General Meszaros, were addressed to Klapka, but while that officer lamented his inability to meet the Governor's wishes, he consented to support Görgey's plan of dividing the army at Komorn into two corps, of which the weaker, under Klapka, was destined to guard the fortress, while the flower of the army under Görgey's command, was to march away, for a

purpose which at that time was a secret to those only who affected to admire Görgey's brutality as independence, his frantic waywardness as chivalrous daring, and his secrecy as a certain indication of a deep-laid plan for the restoration of the fortunes of the war. But Klapka, who had followed his career throughout, who knew 'the intensity of the hatred' he bore to Kossuth, and who was aware of Görgey's contempt for the national cause and army, could not doubt the object of an expedition which nevertheless he volunteered to support. On the 11th of July an attempt was made to break through the allied Imperialist armies on the right bank of the Danube. Klapka commanded, and Görgey, who pleaded his wound, remained a spectator of the battle, which ended with the retreat of the Hungarians. The loss on either side amounted to about 1500 in killed and wounded. The Hungarian troops fought with the greatest heroism: their defeat was the result of the want of discipline on the part of the leaders of the various corps. Each division fought on its own account. There was no concert in their attack, no combination in their movements, no co-operation in their retreat.

Two days afterwards, on the 13th of July, General Klapka commanded another attack upon the Austrian forces on the right bank of the Danube; and Görgey, who had crossed to the left bank of that river, commenced his fateful expedition into the interior of Hungary by marching upon the city of Waitzen. He had gained his object. For more than fourteen days had he thwarted the movements of the national armies, enabled the Russians to invade the country from Gallicia, and to occupy almost all the important cities of the kingdom. Their armies occupied the country from Debreczin to Waitzen. They met and defeated him near that town. He turned aside, and marched upon Miskolcz and Tokaj, closely pursued, with his rear-guard engaged in frequent skirmishes and negotiating all the while. This retreat, which has been magnified by the pens of credulous writers, was a brilliant piece of military acting from beginning to end. The Russian armies never lost sight of him, but they took care not to press upon his heels. The quarters which he left in the morning, were in the evening occupied by the staff of Prince Paskievitsh. More than once the Russian commander might have crushed him between two corps. While on

other occasions, Görgey might have turned on and defeated his pursuer. Russian officers passed his outposts at nightfall, and returned before the break of day. The negotiations were evidently not confined to his own fate and that of his army. His ambition grew with his success, and the fate of Hungary was decided when he again appeared on the scene and offered to co-operate with the national armies.

CHAPTER IX.

The Beginning of the End.—A Last Chance.—Battle of Temesvar.—Arad.—Kossuth and Görgey.—Kossuth's Abdication.—Negotiations.—Vilagos.—Görgey's last Treason.—Bem and Guyon.—Komorn.—Klapka's Capitulation.—His Apology.—The 6th October, 1849.—The Bloody Assize.—The End of the War.

THE struggle was in its last stage ; still the decision remained doubtful. The Governor's weakness and Görgey's treachery had cost the country much time, much blood, and several opportunities ; the capitals and two-thirds of Hungary were in the hands of the allied armies ; General Bem had been dislodged from Transylvania ; the Austrians and Russians pressed on all sides upon Temesvar, the centre of the Hungarian forces. The most formidable corps of which the Governor could still boast was commanded by an officer who was hostile to the cause, and who, for weeks past, had negotiated with the enemy. But, on the other hand, the Hungarians remained established in the south ; on the Upper Danube they were in possession of the impreg-

nable fortress of Komorn, from whence they threatened the Austrian frontiers and intercepted all communications and transports on the Danube. The counties in the rear of the allied armies were subjugated, but not pacified. The cruelties practised by the Austrian commander and his officers and soldiers had intensified the hatred which the Magyars bore to their conquerors : they had not broken their spirit. A reverse, a defeat in battle, an attempt to retreat, would have been fatal to Haynau and Paskievitsh. Nor was such a reverse altogether out of the question. The Magyars were at bay, and for that very reason they were the more formidable. The allied armies had been decimated by that fiery and uncompromising bravery which urged the hussars and Honveds to fight in spite of the indolence, and to conquer, notwithstanding the bad generalship, and in some instances the malicious intentions, of their leaders. Bem's retreat from Transylvania brought him in connexion with these troops. If he commanded them, if their savage heroism were directed by his talents and experience, the next battle might be the turning point of the campaign. It must also be considered that the fights, the

hardships, and the peculiar climate of Hungary had told upon the invaders. Cholera and marsh-fever had thinned their ranks ; each town they left was a hospital ; each one of their bivouacs was a graveyard. The air was rank with disease. Resistance to the plague was a mere question of time, for the strongest constitutions were shaken, and what bad air, water, and food left undone, was done by terror. The Russian officers confessed that a few more weeks of campaigning would have been the ruin of their army. The scales were still evenly balanced. G6rgey's treachery threatened to strike at the root of the fortunes of Hungary, but his treason was confined to him and a few reprobates of his stamp. The mass of the officers, even of his own corps, could not and would not have acted without him ; and treason, too, on a grand scale was working in favour of Hungary. The Transylvanian Wallacks, the cruel enemies of the Magyar race, and hitherto the staunchest allies of the Habsburgs, were ready to exert their savage fury for the benefit of the nation which they had so long combated. Their chief, Janku, sent his agents to Bem, asking for a free pardon and a general's rank in the Hungarian army, and promising to attack the

Russian troops which occupied his country. His proposals were accepted, and he was ordered to conduct the Wallackian bands into Hungary, and support the national armies. The bearer of this order informed him of the precarious condition of the Hungarians. Görgey, drawing the Russians after him, seemed to fly for refuge to the fortress of Arad. The Austrians held Temesvar; a Hungarian corps under Vecsey besieged that fortress, and its fall might be expected at any moment. Dembinski's army, just defeated at Szöreg, and the troops which Bem conducted from Transylvania to Lugos, were marching to support Vecsey and take the fortress by assault. But Haynau, at the head of the Austrian army, and supported by a Russian division under Paniutine, was hurrying up to drive off Vecsey and relieve the fortress. A great battle was about to be fought under the walls of Arad; a battle at Temesvar was equally certain. Either of these battles would give some clue to the final decision of the war. The wily Wallackian resolved to remain inactive, and to side with the conquerors.

On the 8th of August, the Hungarian chiefs held a council of war at Lugos. The question

was whether they should fight at Temesvar or fall back upon Arad, effect a junction with Görgey's corps, and leaning on the fortress, offer battle to the Allies. General Bem opposed the retreat to Arad: he would fight at Temesvar and at once. If defeated, he would fall back upon Lugos and from thence march to Arad. While if the Hungarians gained the day, Görgey advancing from Arad might take the fugitives in the rear, and having crushed them the two corps of Bem and Görgey combined might wheel round against the Russians. And since some of the generals urged an immediate retreat to Arad, pleading that the troops had been neglected by the commissariat, and that they, from the want of proper food and clothing, were not in fighting condition: Bem declared that he would not trouble the troops much. The battle of Temesvar was to be fought with artillery. He enforced his will, and on the evening of that day, the Hungarians were drawn up in line at Besc-Kerek, near Temesvar. On the following day, the 9th of August, the battle was fought, and, as Bem had directed, mainly with artillery. Bem, and under him, Guyon and Dembinski, commanded. The old General took his stand in the centre of a

battery of 12-pounders, whence he superintended the cannonade. After several hours of firing along the whole battle-line, the Allies, driven from position to position, were preparing for a final retreat. All at once the fire of the Hungarians slackened; a slight confusion was perceptible along their line. Adjutants first, and after them general officers, galloped to the rear and returned at a furious speed. One battery and then another ceased firing. Their cannon were not dismounted; they had still a full complement of gunners, but they wanted ammunition. Their powder casks and shot waggons had early in the morning been sent away on the road to Arad, and to this day it has never been ascertained who among the general officers gave that treasonable and fatal order. Whoever the man was, he gained the battle of Temesvar for the Austrians, whose artillery advanced and whose cavalry charged while the Hungarians retreated in disorder upon Rekas. Bem, who sought to rally them, fell with his horse, and the rumour spread that he was seriously injured. At this fatal moment the army was saved by the presence of mind and the matchless energy of General Guyon, who, concentrating 10,000 Hussars and some batteries

of horse-artillery, charged the advancing Austrians. As his cloud of light horse neared the Austrian ranks, it severed in two mighty waves to the right and left, unmasking the artillery which poured a hailstorm of grape upon their squares, which, closely packed, stood prepared to receive cavalry. The artillery breached and the Hussars spurred in and dispersed the squares. Another attack, one as rapid and effective, broke the centre of the Russians. The fortunes of the day might yet have been retrieved, had Guyon's artillery been able to continue the engagement. The want of ammunition deprived his bold and artistic manœuvres of that complete success they merited. But the Hungarians were saved, and though in the night and from an unaccountable panic its retreat became disorderly, the fugitives were left unmolested by the Allies, who were glad to reorganize their corps on the ground which had twice been lost and won.*

* A letter from General Guyon, kindly communicated by Mr. Arthur Kinglake, contains the fullest apology—if apology were needed—for the bold manœuvres which checked the advance of the Allies:

“I have very often been severely criticised for my tactics, in German papers, because military men are very

Guyon, who during the night sought to rally the Hungarian forces, informed Kossuth of the result of the battle of Temesvar, in terms of fatal brevity. 'The army has been defeated, and is now making a disorderly retreat. Bem is hurt, and unfit for service.'

tenacious, and would rather see their army beaten with their old tactics, than learn anything from a foreign army. Now I borrow from all tactics. I always charge my infantry in line and never in column, if under artillery fire. And I make them lie down until the moment I want them, and never give fire until at 150 metres distance. I never let cavalry charge without being supported by their artillery and a battalion or two of infantry, behind which they can form if once broken, protected by the reserves of each regiment. And I always mask my artillery with cavalry when I really intend attacking, but make a show of it when I intend to remain on the defensive. I never, if I can help it, use one arm alone, but always all three together. I have often marched infantry through enemy's cavalry; the battalions of course *en echelon*, but would not risk it if they had artillery with them. In war we can never depart from certain rules without being punished; yet we must sometimes hazard."

These theories, deduced from the experience of at least twenty battle-fields, dispose satisfactorily of the charge which has frequently and persistently been made against General Guyon. I refer to the charge that he was a mere *sabreur* and cavalry officer—an accusation which, moreover, is invalidated by the efficient defences of Kars, which were constructed by him, and from which others managed to derive credit and advantage.

The Governor Kossuth had meanwhile fought a different fight at Arad, and he too had been defeated. He foresaw the possibility of a junction between the two main armies of the Hungarians: between the troops which Bem, Dembinski, and Guyon led against the Austrians at Temesvar and those which Görgey had just brought to Arad, and which were encamped in the town and its suburbs. Since the two armies were to act together, they would want a commander-in-chief. The Governor resolved to give that post to General Bem, but his cabinet, and Görgey, who had been summoned to their councils, protested against his choice. While they declared that the Governor was not justified in determining the important question of the chief command according to his own likings or prejudices, they expressed the strongest doubts of his judgment, candour, and honesty. Görgey hounded them on by dwelling on Bem's late defeats, and when the Governor mentioned the Transylvanian army, he compelled him to confess that after the battle of Shäsburg the existence of that army was, to say the least, doubtful. He then withdrew, leaving his friends to vindicate his cause. They justified his ex-

pectations by compelling the Governor to cancel Bem's appointment to the chief command, and again to entrust the supreme control of military affairs to Görgey. From what has transpired concerning their discussion, it does not appear that the Governor stated his reasons for his choice. He made no mention either of Bem's devotion to the cause or of Görgey's doubtful sincerity. Indeed, very little attention was paid to the merits of the case. The Governor took his stand on his privilege, and defeated on that point, he yielded to the will of the majority. His opponents, who met him on the same ground, were equally discreet. They knew that Bem would hold out to the last. If not actually privy to Görgey's schemes, they were at least uncertain as to his intentions.

On the evening of that day, the 10th of August, the Governor received brave Guyon's message from the field of Temesvar, which evidently misled him as to the nature and the consequences of the defeat. He sent for Görgey, who left his quarters in the town, and entered the citadel accompanied by one orderly officer only. After a long conversation, he returned to his troops. What happened between

the Governor and his general has always remained a mystery. Görgey, in his *Vindication*, asserts that Kossuth made no mention of Guyon's despatch; that he professed ignorance of the result of the battle; that he even neglected to acquaint him with the decision of the council, and that he merely lamented the series of misunderstandings which had so long prevented their co-operation for the benefit of the country. He then told Görgey that if the Austrians were beaten at Temesvar, the corps at Arad ought to intercept their flight. 'But,' added he, 'what would you do, General, if our troops had been defeated?' 'I would surrender,' replied Görgey. 'And I would shoot myself,' returned Kossuth.* With this understanding they separated.

Görgey asserts on the strength of this conversation, that Mr. Kossuth knew and sanctioned his intention to surrender. He had scarcely reached his quarters when the Governor sent him Guyon's despatch, without one word of admonition or comment. 'Besides,' adds Görgey, 'when I told Kossuth of my in-

* Görgey's *Vindication*.

tention to surrender, my life was in his hand. I was in his quarters in the citadel, which was commanded by General Damjanich, who since our quarrel at Komorn had been my enemy. The garrison consisted of troops which hardly knew me by name; I was alone and unprotected. Nevertheless, he allowed me to leave the fortress, and return to my quarters in Arad.'

If these statements be true, they explain the part which Mr. Kossuth played on the last day of his government. But the man who thus accused him had forfeited all claims to confidence. A traitor to his country, there was no reason why he should shrink from falsifying history. On the following day the Governor surrendered his power to Görgey. That man's unsupported allegations would fail to convince an impartial inquirer. But they are supported by the conflicting statements of Mr. Kossuth's colleagues and followers, some of whom pretend that the Governor was compelled by violent threats on the part of the military chiefs to surrender his power to Görgey; while some of the members of the cabinet, Szemere, for instance, and Kasimir Batthyanyi, complained that they were not

consulted, and that the transaction which left Görgey at the head of the army was executed with great secrecy and despatch. The accounts of Mr. Kossuth's friends are unsatisfactory, and intended to conceal a fact, rather than to explain it. The Governor of Hungary was at Arad, under the protection of the most devoted and energetic of his generals, Damjanich, the Wallachian. How, then, and at what time, could a few officers, with Görgey at their head, compel him to abdicate? And where were the ministers who afterwards protested against his abdication, and who complained that they had not been consulted? The pretence that his abdication was extorted was an afterthought; it was first mentioned when Görgey's surrender provoked the execration and the contempt of all European nations. It was then Mr. Kossuth recoiled from his own act. On the 11th of August, when he wrote his manifesto of abdication, he was under the influence of fear, but it was the fear of capture by the Austrians. His responsibility oppressed him; his office chained him to the spot, while his eager eyes were turned towards the Turkish frontier. He spurned his responsibility and his office. He

declared that the 'late defeats had left him no hope of a successful continuance of the defence against the allied forces of Austria and Russia. He was convinced that his remaining in office would be injurious to the nation ; the leaders of the army must henceforward protect the nation and its fortunes.' An impartial inquirer will naturally ask : how, since defence was impossible, were the leaders of the army to protect the nation, except by negotiations and by surrender ? Three days later, on the 14th of August, writing from Tergova to Bem, who asked him to resume office, Mr. Kossuth refused ; and in this letter he states the reasons which induced him to resign. After protesting that he 'cared not for his own safety,' and that it was not a coward's yearning for life which induced him to hasten away, he declared that he was about to leave Hungary because he was convinced that his presence had become obnoxious to the country. He would consent to resume the conduct of affairs, *if* Bem could manage to gain some battles, and *if* Görgey's army were to call him back. But unless this were done, he could not think of office. He added, 'since I see no probability of accomplishing the end, I will not lend my hand

to make war for its own sake.' The same letter to Bem proves the truth of Görgey's assertion, that Mr. Kossuth knew of his intention to surrender. Speaking of the army at Lugos he says, 'if he (Görgey) *surrenders*, that army cannot hold out for four-and-twenty hours.' This, then, disposes of the plea of constraint, which has been ostentatiously put forward by those who would narrow the cause of a nation by centering it in one man. Even to superficial inquirers, it has always appeared strange that Görgey, if he had the power to extort Mr. Kossuth's abdication, should not also have been able to arrest and hand him over to the Austrians. That the Imperial government longed to wreak their vengeance on Mr. Kossuth was shown by their desire for his extradition from Turkey. Nor can his escape be ascribed to Görgey's generosity, for that person complains of the great haste and secrecy of his flight. All these circumstances show that the Governor of Hungary despaired of the success of his country and that he feared for his own life. He resigned his office and gave his power to Görgey, not because he believed that officer could or would redeem the fortunes of the war, but

because he seemed the fittest person to succeed in a negotiation. A general surrender appeared to him probable, and even necessary, for there was no '*hope of defence against the allied forces of Russia and Austria.*' With this declaration, the ex-Governor of Hungary fled to Turkey.

Mr. Kossuth afterwards protested that of right he was still Governor of Hungary, and that the dignity of that office remained vested in him until the nation should, by its own free will, depose him. Nothing can be more absurd than such a pretence. He deposed himself. He was the elected of the nation, but he resigned his office in the hour of danger. In his letter to Bem, he protests that he is nothing but 'a simple citizen, that it is against his conscience to resign one day, and claim the power of government on the other.' And he advises Bem to call a committee of the national representatives, 'for it is their supreme power alone which can lawfully dispose of the government.' In his act of abdication, he declared that he conferred the supreme power on Görgey, '*until the nation, making use of its right, shall have disposed of that power according to its will.*'

General Görgey, the new Governor of Hun-

gary, assumed the executive immediately after Mr. Kossuth's flight, by disbanding the National Guards and volunteer corps. He next proceeded with his negotiations openly and in the light of day. The vanguard of the Russian army, which had followed him after the battle of Waitzen, watching his movements rather than hastening in his pursuit, was commanded by General Rüdiger. Frequent messages passed between the two chiefs on the first and second days of Görgey's dictatorship. On the third day, the 13th of August, the Hungarian commander withdrew his troops from Arad, probably because he had reason to fear that General Damjanich, who commanded in the citadel, would oppose his proceedings, and that his own troops would support Damjanich. He conducted them to Vilagos, a village on the Menesh hills, ten miles from Arad. The Russians followed, and halted at some distance from the Hungarian camp in and around Vilagos. Thirty thousand men, the flower of the National armies, were in Görgey's camp, in silent expectation, doubtful to the last whether the day was to conclude with a battle or a treaty. Görgey convoked a council of war—a mere mockery, for the fate of the

army was decided, and the setting sun was to see it disarmed and led away into captivity. Nevertheless, he pretended to consult his companions in arms. They met, as the Huns of old did, on horseback, and in the centre of their troops. He told them that all was lost; that he had no hopes of extricating his corps from among the enemy who surrounded them on all sides, and that he was resolved to surrender to the Russians. 'Perhaps,' added he, 'some one of you may be able to advise another expedient. If such a man there be, let him come forward! I will gladly obey him.'

At first the officers stood moody and silent. Görgey's friends, who were prepared for the occasion, said the army must follow the example of its chief. No voice was raised against him from those high in command, but the lower officers vented their rage and despair in groans and imprecations. At length an old colonel of the Hussars came forward. 'I do not want to surrender—I want to give battle,' said he; 'my comrades, too, are of that opinion. I will take the command, if no better man can be found.' Görgey rode up to the old man, and remarked in an undertone, that the scene

they were enacting was not a farce, but a tragedy. 'I am still commander-in-chief,' added he, 'and there are bullets enough to punish every mutineer.' The officer looked at him with contempt, drew his sword, broke it, and flung the fragments at the General's feet; next turning his horse, he rode away. Hundreds, and as some say, thousands, of the privates and officers followed his example, and deserted from the field of shame at Vilagos. Wailings and lamentations, and curses loud and deep, were heard as Görgey, dissolving his sham council, rode to the rear, and wiled away the time in conversation with some of the female camp followers. The Russians advanced. Surrounded by his staff, he rode out to meet them, and returning at the side of Rüdiger, he made his battalions march past, and lay down their arms. They were divided into small parties, and escorted by Cossacks to Sarkad. Prince Paskievitch, the Russian commander-in-chief, informed his master of the termination of the campaign. 'Hungary,' said he, 'lies at the feet of your majesty.'

This was the consummation of Görgey's treason, and as some politicians will have it, it

was a necessary and beneficial consummation. It has been asserted, that at Vilagos he had no choice but to surrender. But it may justly be asked: what induced him to go to Vilagos? What hopes, what temptations, what promises were held out? What schemes led him to conspire against his own army? In his *Vindication*, Görgey would assert that his first negotiations with the Russians took place immediately after Kossuth's resignation, and that he surrendered because he had no hopes of success. From the first he had no wish to succeed. He would not conquer for Kossuth; he despaired of conquering for himself. Throughout the earlier period of the war he shunned a decisive success more than a defeat; his expedition to the Carpathians was a running match between him and an Austrian corps of inferior strength; all his battles were fought by Guyon, without his knowledge, and sometimes against his will. His proceedings under Dembinski displayed a medley of incapacity, ill-will, poltroonery, and treason. He undertook and protracted the siege of Buda, for the purpose of giving the Austrians time to rally their forces. He disobeyed orders, and remained with his army at Komorn 'for the

special purpose of not being compelled to cooperate with Kossuth and the Poles, and for the purpose of treating with the Imperialist generals as soon as his retreat was cut off by the occupation of Pesth and the counties of the Theiss.* He shrunk from surrendering at Komorn, because Klapka was irresolute, and Nagy Sandor hostile to his plans. His conduct was watched by able and loyal men, and his wilful neglects in the battle of Acs exposed him to the animadversions of the officers who commanded the fortress. Colonel Thaly, the director of fortifications, accused him of treason and insisted on his dismissal.† After much hesitation and some manœuvring he left the fortress for Waitzen, Miskolcz, and the Theiss. From that day he negotiated, not about the conditions, but about the mode and manner of his surrender. Mr. Kossuth's abdication and flight offered an opportunity by which he profited. He surrendered to a Russian army, because

* Verbatim from Baron Budberg's report, as given in Prince Wittgenstein's despatch of the 21st July, 1849. This Report, written by a Russian agent, ten weeks before the surrender of Vilagos, gives a clue to the commencement of Görgey's negotiations.

† Thaly's *Fortress of Komorn*. London: 1852.

his officers were deluded by the pretence that their services would be engaged and their lives protected by the Czar. He propagated this belief with considerable art: never openly affirming, but never once denying it. And it appears that almost all the higher officers, the men who made so great a display of their love of country and of liberty, were content to leave Hungary and their heroic countrymen to the worst fate that can befall a nation, while they aspired to act as mercenaries in the service of the most despotic power in Europe.

It has been asked what motive had Görgey for his treason? What were the advantages he derived from it? And since he sold his comrades and his country, where was the price? It is difficult to account for the actions of a man who hates others and despises himself. Extraordinary profligacy is frequently allied to extraordinary folly. The length of his negotiations proves that he made some conditions, and preferred some claims. He found it necessary to defeat the cause of Hungary, and discourage his troops by a series of delays and wilful mistakes. Every partial attempt at treason gave the enemy power over him. His servitude commenced with his guilt, until,

unable to retrace his steps, he was compelled to surrender at discretion—to accept promises in the stead of pledges, and money in the place of rank and preferment. That he did accept sums of money is proved by his *Vindication*. The amount he quotes is small, but even if correct, it ought to be considered that the money thus paid was a reward and not a bribe.

Immediately after his surrender, Görgey addressed letters to General Vecsey, who commanded the corps which, previous to the battle of Temesvar, invested that fortress; and to the commanders of Komorn, Peterwarasdin, and Arad, summoning them to surrender. In his letter to General Klapka, who held Komorn, he stated that Damjanich at Arad had promised to follow his example. This was a deliberate falsehood. If he had been sure of the fortress he would have surrendered it with his army, instead of marching to Vilagos. General Damjanich and the garrison of Arad were betrayed by the General, Severe Botourline, who promised that their lives, properties, and fortunes should be under the Czar's protection. They believed the word of a Russian officer; but when, in execution of the capitulation, the

Russians had entered the fortress, and when General Damjanich and his troops were marching out, they were surrounded, captured, disarmed, and handed over to the Austrians. The commander of Peterwarasdin was induced, by similar representations, to surrender, or, as the phrase went, 'to place himself under the protection of Russia.' General Klapka, too, would have given up Komorn, had not a young Russian officer warned him of the fate which awaited his comrades. Vecsey yielded to Görgey's influence and example. Turning a deaf ear to Bem's entreaties, who besought him to lead his army into Transylvania, from whence, if hard pressed, he might escape into Turkey, Vecsey and his officers declared they would surrender as Görgey had done, and obtain the privileges which he had obtained for his followers.

Of the chief leaders, none remained faithful to the cause and the country but Bem the Pole, and Guyon the Englishman. Dembinski, Meszaros, Perczel, and Visocki anticipating Kossuth's resignation, left the country after the defeat at Temesvar. Bem, assisted by Guyon, collected the stragglers and deserters from the army which surrendered at Vilagos,

and marched into Transylvania to join the Generals Stein and Kmetty, who commanded the National forces in that province. But there, too, the troops dispersed when they heard of Kossuth's abdication and Görgey's surrender. About 5000 men remained faithful, and at the head of this small band, Bem, with Guyon, Kmetty, Stein, and Pieringer—the historian of his Transylvanian campaign—advanced against Deva and Piski, where the General Lüders, with 25,000 men, was prepared to arrest his progress. Negotiators were sent to him, but he treated their overtures with contempt, and succeeded, by his resolute behaviour, and under the cover of night, to awe the Russians into an armistice. He knew that the morning must reveal to the enemy his weakness and their strength. Accompanied by his officers, he fled over the mountains, and sought an asylum in Turkey, while the troops dispersed in all directions.

This breach of truce, more pardonable than the one of which Jellachich was guilty, signaled the last field operations of the war in Hungary. The length and breadth of the country, all its strong places, all its towns and villages, were occupied by the Allies.

There was but one post in which the champions of the late insurrection still held out, and that post was Komorn—the impregnable fortress which, since Görgey's march to Waitzen and the Theiss, had been invested by a small corps of Austrians under General Csorich. Komorn commands the rivers of the Danube and Waag; the cities of Dotis, Gran, Neuhäusel, Raab, and Wieselburg are within a day's march, and exposed to molestation from an energetic commander of that important place. The communication by water between Vienna and Pesth was interrupted, and the subjection of Hungary was not complete so long as Komorn remained in the hands of the national troops. The siege of the fortress required an army of at least 40,000 men; and even then it might be prolonged indefinitely. The utter exhaustion of the Austrian finances, the enormous expense which the Russian auxiliaries entailed upon the empire—the rebellious spirit which, in spite of all reverses, still animated the lower classes of the Hungarians—the growing discontent of the Croats and Servians: all these considerations made the speedy occupation of Komorn a matter of imperative necessity. But the achievement

was difficult, if not impracticable. The place was garrisoned by 18,000 men, with a large complement of ordnance, cavalry, and field-artillery. Every advantage which the garrison gained could be followed up to its last consequences. The stores of gunpowder, projectiles, and provisions were sufficient for a siege of two years. General Klapka, though indolent and irresolute, had within the last weeks been compelled, by reports from without, and by public opinion within, to make a sally upon Csorich's position at Nagy Igmand, where his officers defeated and almost captured the blockading corps, and from whence they returned with large stores of cattle, grain, wine, and ammunition.* The commander had for fifteen days reflected on the dangers of an undertaking which, when attempted, led to such surprising results; but its success showed plainly what the influence of the Hungarian army at Komorn might have been, had that army been commanded by an energetic, enterprising, and patriotic leader. General

* 2800 oxen, 1000 swine, 13 shiploads of grain, wine from Almas, and the whole of the Austrian reserve ammunition.—Thaly's *Komorn*.

Klapka, whom Dembinski describes as irresolute, conceited, and fond of idle boasts,* paralysed the forces which were entrusted to him while the struggle lasted; and after the surrender at Vilagos, his conduct showed that all he wanted to imitate Görgey's example, was an inducement and a fair excuse. It was his duty to understand the advantages of his position, and to despise the dangers which might result from some remote and uncertain contingency. But his conduct was as discreditable to his character as a soldier, as to his pretensions as a diplomatist.

On the first summons to surrender, he agreed to an armistice, because (as he asserted) it enabled him to recal his detached columns from Vesprim and Weissenburg. But as the report of Mr. Kossuth's flight reached him on the 11th of August, at Raab, which he occupied after the successful sally upon the besiegers;—as, immediately on receiving the news, he concentrated all his troops in Komorn, where they arrived on the 14th; and as the Austrian blockading corps did not rally from its defeat before the 18th of the month: there was ample

* Dembinski's *Dispatches*, passim.

time to recal those detachments, provided they were not drawn in with the other troops. Colonel Thaly, who wrote a detailed account of the siege and capitulation of Komorn, knows nothing whatever of these detached columns. That officer, and a citizen named Katona, were provided with Austrian passports, and sent to Arad and the South, to convince themselves of the capture and dispersion of the Hungarian armies. In spite of the threats and the promises of personal favour which were heaped upon them by General Haynau, they fulfilled their mission honourably and faithfully, and advised, on their return, that the fortress should not be surrendered without an adequate compensation on the part of the Imperialists. In a council of officers, which was convened on this occasion, it was resolved to surrender the fortress upon honourable conditions. Even this resolution was passed by a majority of only two votes, for Thaly, Ujhazy, and many of the officers of the corps who had also opposed the armistice, were of opinion that to talk of surrender before a breach had been made was a cowardly proceeding. Still, the conditions it was resolved to demand were advantageous to

Hungary and honourable to the garrison. They included an amnesty for the nation; a free pardon to the Hungarian army, captives and all; liberation of the prisoners; free choice of abode for all implicated in the insurrection; departure of the garrison with military honours; and compensation to the contractors who had made bargains with the authorities of the fortress. Ujhazy proposed, as an additional clause, that the treaty of surrender should have the guarantee of one of the great European powers. The measure was reasonable, and by no means unprecedented. The articles of peace which the Hungarian Insurgents forced upon their Austrian oppressors at Zatmar (An. 1711), had the guarantee of England, Holland, Sweden, Poland, and Venice. The manner in which the statesmen of Austria have frequently broken the most solemn engagements, made this precaution a matter of absolute necessity. But the clause was opposed by Klapka and his majority, because they feared that the Austrian government would not assent to a capitulation when they were bound to respect its terms.

Safety of life and limb, and a speedy termination of their doubts and fears, were the sole objects of these men. When the terms

they proposed were not accepted by the Austrian commander, and when, at the expiration of the armistice, some preparations were made for the siege, General Klapka convoked another council of war, to which all the staff officers and two officers from each battalion were admitted, and by their help he succeeded in annulling the resolutions of the first council. It was agreed to divide the capitulation into two parts: to insist on the safety of the garrison, and, by an humble petition, to recommend the captives and the country to the grace of the Austrian Emperor. Klapka's intentions were again opposed by Ujhazy and Thaly, who declared that it was mean, selfish, and undutiful to make the fate of the garrison the first consideration, and to sacrifice the country and the captives.* In reply to this opinion, expressed in open council, Colonel Thaly was arrested by Klapka's orders, and kept in close confinement up to the day of the surrender. The new draught of the capitulation, which was submitted to General Haynau, exacted no guarantees, and imposed no vexatious conditions. The garrison of the strongest for-

* See Thaly's *Komorn*, p. 200.

gress in Europe resigned its trust, before a stone of its walls had been touched by the enemy's artillery, for the privilege of being allowed to depart without martial honours, for a month's pay to the officers and soldiers, and for the sum of 50,000*l.* to liquidate the debts of the garrison. So loose was the wording of the convention, that almost every portion of it was infringed by the Austrians. A safe conduct to their homes was stipulated for the officers of the garrison of Komorn, but nothing was said of what might be done when they were there. Many were arrested; others were compelled to enlist in the Austrian army, and some were tried by courts-martial and shot or hanged. This disgraceful convention was ratified on the 2nd day of October.

In his Memoirs, General Klapka has attempted to demonstrate that he was wheedled into surrendering the fortress. He declares that the Austrian negotiators fawned and flattered; that the penal prosecutions in other parts of the country were carried on with the utmost caution; and that Count Grünne, the Emperor's adjutant, was sent in hot haste to respite all prisoners under sentence of death. But four weeks previous to the surrender which

left his comrades at the mercy of Austria, the same general enclosed the draught of the first honourable capitulation in a letter to the Imperialist commander, in which he said that what his commissioners, Thaly and Katona, had seen in the conquered districts, was in flagrant contradiction to the promises of peace, reconciliation, and indemnity, which had been held out by the negotiators. 'Instead of peace and tranquillity for our wretched country,' added General Klapka, 'we find that preparations are making for executions. Instead of acts of reconciliation, we learn that courts-martial are assembling, that sentences are publishing, and that our wretched brethren are condemned and executed. You must see that this news cannot induce us to surrender the fortress.' It is impossible to explain the train of reasoning by which the man who wrote these words could be brought to perpetrate the act he deprecates in such emphatic language.

The fall of Komorn gave the signal for a series of executions which have been justly named the Bloody Assize of Hungary. The Habsburg princes were always revengeful, and unsparing in their revenge. Theirs are the

odia in longum jacentes quæ conderent auctaque promerent of the worst days of ancient Rome. The officers who surrendered at Vilagos, those of Vecsey's army, and the commanders of Arad and Peterwarasdin, believed that the Czar would protect them from Austrian revenge. The conduct of the Russians confirmed this opinion. They treated the Hungarian officers as guests rather than as captives; they feasted, drank, and gambled with them. They ridiculed the Emperor of Austria, and insulted his officers. Many of the prisoners might have escaped; they preferred remaining in the camp, for they believed that the Czar would solicit their services against the Circassians. When the truth was told them; when, at the last moment, they were informed that the Russian General had resolved to give them up to the Austrians, these deluded men heard their doom with heroic resignation. One of them, Colonel Pulszky, invited his friends to supper; they passed the night drinking and carousing. Amidst the uproar, their host withdrew to another room of the house. His absence excited attention. They sought him, and found him dead from poison. But the other chiefs despaired from the first, or hoped to the last.

They were conducted to Arad, and placed in close confinement. Even then they expected that the surrender of Komorn would restore them to liberty; it sealed their doom. The news of Klapka's capitulation was sent to Arad, with orders for the immediate execution of the prisoners.

On the 6th of October, the anniversary of the day on which Count Latour was assassinated at Vienna, the Generals Kiss, Aulich, Damjanich, Nagy Sandor, Török, Lahner, Count Vecsey, Pöltenberg, Count Leiningen, and Shweidler, were executed at Arad by the hands of the common hangman, amidst a vast concourse of officers and soldiers, who brutally insulted the victims. With a refinement of cruelty, but one hangman had been provided for the eleven men, and the revolting scene was protracted above four hours, from six o'clock till past ten in the morning. They were all taken to the place of execution at once, and compelled to witness the death struggles of their comrades. General Damjanich, who was suffering from a fracture of his ankle, and who was taken to the foot of the gibbet in a cart, suffered last. He bore all, the rough handling of the soldiery, and the ill-treatment to which his suffering

limb was subjected, without complaint or remonstrance. Once only he made a remark :— ‘It is strange,’ said he, ‘that I should be the last here ; I was always first in battle.’

The anniversary of Count Latour’s death was disgraced by another judicial murder, one even less excusable than the indiscriminate slaughter of the Hungarian chiefs at Arad. Count Louis Batthyanyi, who had been a captive since January, 1849, when Prince Windishgrätz occupied Pesth, was accused of high treason, and tried by a tribunal of subalterns, sergeants, and privates, convened to decide on charges involving for the most part the subtlest questions of constitutional law. He was accused of ‘having by a treasonable issue of Hungarian bank-notes created the most efficient lever of the rebellion ; of having levied recruits and created an army for the purposes of civil war ; of having sought to embarrass the Austrian Government by sending ambassadors to certain foreign powers ; of having fomented (and that too by ‘inactivity’) the disunion between Hungary and Croatia ; and of having taken part in the Vienna revolution of the 6th October, 1848.’ These and a variety of other charges too numerous for

quotation, were mentioned in a semi-official justification of its conduct, which the Austrian Government published. The proceedings of the court-martial itself were never submitted to the public judgment, and nothing is known of that mysterious trial but its result. The sentence was one of death by the hands of the common hangman, not because Count Batthyányi was guilty of any crime, but because he was hated by the Emperor's mother, and because some of the conquerors were in his debt. He sought to avoid the disgrace of a public execution by an attempt at suicide, with a dagger which he had concealed for the purpose. But surrounded by guards, and compelled to hide his movements and his pain, he succeeded only in cutting a deep wound in his neck, and, by the advice of some physicians, who were afterwards punished for their humanity, he was shot instead of being hanged.

Execution followed execution. Csanyi, a member of Mr. Kossuth's government, and Jessenak, a member of the senate, were hanged at Pesth; the same fate befel many other eminent men, such as Scacvay, Giron, Abancourt, and Prince Ivownicki. Czernus, an inoffensive old man, and a partisan of Aus-

tria, was arrested, tried, sentenced, and executed by mistake, without one moment being allowed to him for remonstrance and explanation. Two generals, Desewfy and Lazar, who had been sentenced to die on the gibbet, were pardoned—and shot. About forty general officers and colonels were condemned to imprisonment in fortresses, varying from ten to twenty years. The longer term of years predominated. Exorbitant fines were imposed upon the cities, the country districts, and the wealthier among the landowners. Count G. Karolyi, for instance, was mulcted in 15,000*l.* for having shown an *indecent* joy when Mr. Kossuth entered Pesth. Courts-martial and extraordinary commissions of 'purification' were sitting in every town and in every village. Men, women, and children were summoned before these tribunals, even if no charge had been brought against them, and desired to 'account' for their actions during the insurrection. If their account seemed unsatisfactory, they were committed to prison and handed over to the courts-martial. Sentences of corporal punishment were the mildest form in which the victors wreaked their revenge upon the unfortunate conquered. Next came condemnations

to military service. Above 70,000 Hungarian soldiers were, in the winter of 1849, forcibly enlisted in the Austrian army. Those who escaped into foreign countries had their property confiscated, and their names were painted on the gallows; but the number of those who were sentenced and brought to death by the courts-martial it is impossible to determine. Some of the sentences were not published at all, or published only in obscure provincial papers. Some suffered because they had fought; others because they were rich; others because they had enemies; and many because the court which decided on their fate feared to appear disloyal, if it hanged fewer men than the courts-martial in other districts. There was something awful in the variety of sentences which various tribunals pronounced against one and the same political offence. At the commencement of these proceedings, the Judges at Presburg and Herrmanstadt gave sentences of confinement of two and three years, for actions which in Pesth and Arad brought the victims to the gallows. At a later period the practice became more equal, but even in the milder courts, such as at Güns, there were seven executions in one day.

Thus ended the Hungarian war of 1848 and 1849, provoked and fomented by the Austrian government; carried to the last extreme by the obstinacy of that government and by Mr. Kosuth's ambition; sustained by the devotion of an unfortunate and long-suffering people, and hurried to its abrupt termination by the pusillanimity of its civil leaders, by the deliberate treachery of Görgey, and by the self-seeking, the greed, and the envy of others. It left Austria absolute over Hungary; it goaded her by deep humiliation and a sudden triumph to cruel and brutal deeds, which, if they can ever be forgiven, can never be forgotten; and it left her the ally, the debtor, and the client of a power, whose favours, whose protection, and whose lessons, were always fatal to those doomed to accept them.